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PREFACE
Preface
The decline of central planning in China has given way to a new variant on capi-
talism: the socialist market economy. By following principles of economic reforms
and decentralization China has achieved rapid economic growth. However, in the
Chinese case, the patterns of market economy still remain socialist in many very fun-
damental ways. At the heart of the discussions are notions that business and politics
organizational models, and more speciﬁcally, the relational patterns between ﬁrms
and governments, and how the exchange structures among diﬀerent organizations
deﬁne the unique case of China. It provides chances and challenges for researchers
to explore and understand the systems between market and hierarchies in this coun-
try. Therefore, this PhD thesis theoretically and empirically discusses the topics on
how the relationships between ﬁrms and local governments are formed and evolved,
how the ﬁrm-government relations aﬀect ﬁrm's market transactions and in addition,
what the structure of ﬁrm-government relations means for the economic performance
of those ﬁrms.
In China, the institutional structure in rural economy has diverged from the in-
dustrial and urban economy in important way. The development of township and
village enterprises (TVEs) had been once portrayed as an exceptional organizational
form in rural area, and the primary segment of TVEs contributed to China's high
economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the decline of government inter-
vention in TVEs nowadays, these sectors have been pushed to respond to the market
forces and to hierarchial controls simultaneously. This dissertation mainly employs
extensive data collected in Zhejiang province of China in interviews with managers
of TVEs, government oﬃcials, and academics. The process by which TVEs began
to develop and later to decline is thoroughly discussed, the structures and behaviors
between rural ﬁrm and rural administrative oﬃces is also examined. Furthermore,
we apply more advanced quantitative methodologies to investigate how the rela-
tional and organizational attributes are likely to be associated with ﬁrm's market
transactions and economic performance.
Overview of rural ﬁrms and agribusiness industry in China: an
institutional perspective
Paper 1 begins with examining the process of economic reform in China. It then
lays out the macro and micro institutional background of China's economic develop-
ment. More speciﬁcally, the paper portrays the overview of agribusiness industry in
v
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rural area with detailed introduction about the relationships between dragon head"
agribusiness companies and local governments. The paper oﬀers institutional and
organizational perspectives on agribusiness industry in rural China.
Theories of ﬁrm-government relationship in rural China
Paper 2 has extensively discussed the theoretical models on ﬁrm-government
relationship in rural China. It presents a literature survey of TVEs' relationship
with local governments, and how the relational attributes inﬂuences ﬁrms' welfare
and performance. It then incorporates the perspective of social networks and use
it as an essential argument to describe ﬁrm-government relationship. A simple
bilateral micro model is developed to describe how the ﬁrm-government relationship
inﬂuences ﬁrm's investment plan and welfare functions in rural area.
An analysis of the eﬀect of ﬁrm-government network on management
innovation
Paper 3 as a collaborated work examines the eﬀects of institutions on ﬁrms'
management behavior. By proposing an externally embedded network perspective
on ﬁrm performance, it demonstrates how ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by the external insti-
tutional structure. In the framework of China's economic development, the strong
links between ﬁrm and local government is observed, and these links will signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence the ﬁrms' management strategies. Thus, the paper focuses on the
ﬁrm-government network as a driving force to the ﬁrm management ability and
behavior. Furthermore, by applying a simple game-theoretical model the network
value of ﬁrms' local and external networks in the eﬀects of ﬁrm-government relation-
ship is examined. In the end, some implications are given to the ﬁrms' management
strategies in the light of unique ﬁrm-government relations in China.
Firm-government relations and market transactions in rural China
Paper 4 examines the role of ﬁrm-government relation in ﬁrm's market transactions
in rural China. By examining the past theoretical contributions on ﬁrm-government
relations in the framework of TVEs as well as the evidences we collected during
the interview, a measurement based on ego-centric network theory to operationalize
the ﬁrm-government networks is explored. Using the interview results of ﬁeld trip
survey of medium and small size ﬁrms in rural area of Zhejiang province in 2008,
and by employing ordinal regression methodologies, we observe the ﬁrm-government
vi
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network plays a positive role through a series of market transactions mechanisms,
such as ﬁnancial access and raw materials resources access, in addition, the ﬁrm-
government relations more or less have inﬂuences on input and output products
prices. We argue the managers who are active in political connections may easily
overcome business transaction obstacles.
Estimating the impact of network relation to local government on
technical eﬃciency in Chinese agribusiness industry
Paper 5 discusses two contradicted mechanisms that explain China's economic
success: market-preserving federalism and local corporatism. The former argument
from a macro perspective implies the competition between local governments and
suﬃcient mobility of ﬁrms, by which ﬁrm-government relations have no impact on
ﬁrm performance; the latter emphasizes the importance of local government-ﬁrm
relations as a driving factor of ﬁrms' economic performance. In this regard, the
paper analyzes the impact of ﬁrm-government relations on ﬁrm¡¯s economic perfor-
mance at the micro level. In particular, we estimate a stochastic frontier production
function incorporating social network relations to local government as determinants
of ﬁrm¡¯s technical eﬃciency. Major results imply a signiﬁcant positive impact of
ﬁrm¡¯s network relations to local government on technical eﬃciency. However, after
correcting aggregate outputs for ﬁrm speciﬁc terms of trade, this positive impact of
ﬁrm-government relations vanishes. Interpreting our results we conclude that, while
network relations to local government correspond to valuable resources at the micro
level, these do not necessarily translate into productive resources at the macro level.
Thus, given the institutional background with social planning in China, economy
good connections to local government mainly imply that ﬁrm¡¯s have good access to
scare inputs or to lucrative output markets. However, at the macro level favorable
market access does not necessarily correlate with ﬁrm¡¯s eﬃciency and hence do not
imply higher economic performance.
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Chapter 1
Overview of rural firms and agribusiness industry in China:
an institutional perspective
Jiangping Han
Abstract
This paper begins with examining the process of economic reform in China.
It then consequently investigates the macro and micro institutional back-
ground of China's economic development respectively. More speciﬁcally, the
paper lays out the overview of agribusiness industry in rural area with de-
tailed introduction about the relationship between dragon head" agribusiness
companies and local governments. The paper oﬀers an organizational and
institutional perspective on agribusiness industry in rural China.
Key words: agribusiness, dragon head companies, China
This paper will be submitted to Berichte über Landwirtschaft
OVERVIEW OF RURAL FIRMS IN CHINA
1 Introduction
The magnitude and rapidity of China's recent gains stands out against the back-
ground of stagnate growth among rest of the world. The economic reform shifts the
country from poverty to growing prosperity, from village to city, from plan economy
to market economy and from public towards private ownership, the structure of the
society changes signiﬁcantly. China's agricultural and rural development have also
changed dramatically in the past decades, the nation is working hard to increase
its agricultural production and becomes more agriculturally independent, with a
target of 95% self-suﬃciency. To fulﬁll this objective, agricultural reforms and rural
industry reforms are taking place aimed at making China a more eﬃcient producer.
Agriculture sector has clearly played an important role in supplying labor, food,
raw materials and jobs to China's economic miracle. Indeed, China's economic re-
form has been intensively associated with the agricultural sector. As an innovative
and successful reform coming from the rural area and initially rooted in the agri-
culture, rural industry reform has brought fundamental, transformative changes not
just to agriculture but also to the entire rural economy. Rural industry reform is
generally equated with the development of Township and village enterprises (TVEs)
in China. TVEs, as a special organizational form, are geographically located in
township and villages that are owned collectively or privately by rural community
or individual farmers. TVE ownership has evolved through time, from township or
village government owned at initial time to expansion of private TVEs after 1990s.
TVEs operate in all sectors, especially in construction, chemistry, light industry,
there is a signiﬁcant presence in the service sector as well. TVEs have speeded up
the pace of rural development.
There is a wide misunderstanding among western researchers that the amount
of TVEs has accounted for a large part of agribusiness industry. However, TVE as
a business form in rural area has contributed very little to agriculture and agribusi-
ness sector, in 2007, around 78% of TVE value-added was in the secondary sector,
22 % in the tertiary sector and only 1% in the primary sector (CSY, 2009). In
general, China's agribusiness has seen rapid growth in recent years, from 2000 to
2007, the number of large-scale agribusiness companies has almost doubled from
18,000 to over 29,206 (CSY, 2008). As referred above, there are TVEs specializing
in the agribusiness sector together with state-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and foreign
invested enterprises all active in the same sector in China. The surge of agribusiness
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development is led by increased demand for processed agricultural products such
as dairy and livestock products, as well as government policies that encourage to
directly develop rural agribusiness. However, agribusiness still faces rigorous chal-
lenges. For example, raw material prices have changed signiﬁcantly through years
due to ﬂuctuations of the international market prices and the rural farmers has few
information adapted to the daily changing prices, Chinese government would then
administratively inﬂuence the output and input prices to support the farmers and
support the sector itself. There have been other problems such as poor quality and
sanitary of agricultural products. All in all, agribusiness has come to be seen not
just as economically important, but as a critical part of society.
Agribusiness in China is not only promoted by the government, but also propelled
forward by a ﬂushing of foreign investment and western business strategies. By
becoming a ¡°solutions provider¡± up and down the value chain, more and more
food industry companies discover it could create far greater value in China, and
are encouraged to do so. Taking a partnership approach toward customers and
suppliers, by organizing varieties of business models such as Dragonhead + farmers"
or Dragonhead + farmers + farming base", those leading agribusiness ﬁrms play
an important role in development of agribusiness industry in China.1 The players
who are involved in growing, harvesting, marketing and processing the selected
agricultural products include government oﬃcials, farmers, entrepreneurs, managers
and other staﬀs. As a result of this transformation for the industry, we would see a
newly agribusiness sector in the future.
In spite of a huge number of literature on the development of China's economy
and rural industrialization, few research has systematically investigated agribusiness
sector, and how agribusiness industry is developed under the institutional back-
ground with Chinese characteristics. In the following we will discuss brieﬂy the
institutional background of rural ﬁrms in China, in the light of of macro and micro
settings, then we extensively discuss the general development of agribusiness, the
relational forms between diﬀerent players in this sector and how the agribusiness
companies keep relations with local government oﬃcials, in the end, we conclude
with an outlook on China's agribusiness sector.
1`Dragonhead' agribusiness comapnies are regarded as vehicles for vertical integration and mod-
ernizing agriculture by central government. Enterprises with the name of 'dragonhead' status could
receive political support and other economic beneﬁts.
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2 Institutional Background of Rural Firms
2.1 Macro-level Background
Economic Growth. As the fastest growing economy in the world, China has sus-
tained double-digit growth ﬁgures in recent decade. Even in 2009 while most of the
countries in the world suﬀered from recession due to the outbreak of ﬁnancial crisis,
China is the key winner with growing 8 percent a year as well. As Figure 1 shows,
during 1980s, China's GDP grew at an average annual rate of 10.2 percent; between
1990 and 1996, the average annual rate of economy growth for real GDP achieved
12.3 percent. After 2000, China kept GDP growth rate at high single-digit growth.
It has also had the high industrial and service growth rate in the past decades,
although the agricultural growth rate has kept at a low level. China's economic re-
forms have been obviously a remarkable and dramatic success. Nevertheless, China
is a nation that economic and political power are inevitably interwind, political
inﬂuences have touched every facet of economy and business.
Figure 1: GDP growth in China, 1978-2007 (100 million yuan, RMB)
1978 1990 2000 2006 2007
0
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150000
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250000
300000
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Note: On Feb 21th, 2010 the currency exchange rate between Euro and RMB Yuan is 1 Euro=9.28 Yuan
Source: Data are from China Statistics Yearbook, 2008
On the contrary to the traditional common sense which suggests the power of
market economy, China's amazing success in economic reform lies in the state's par-
ticipation in the economy development and business activities. Referring to how
the transitional economy would be changed into a capitalist system, there are con-
ventionally two arguments, big-bang" approach and gradual" approach. The ﬁrst
school of researchers believe the rapid privatization is the only eﬀective path of tran-
sition from planned to market economy, while second school of researches (Oi, 1992;
4
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Oi et al., 1999; Walder, 1995) argue that markets are fundamentally political, social
and cultural system and a stable transmission to a capitalist system occur in a grad-
ual system, with signiﬁcant and constant support from the state. China obviously
have taken the road of "gradualist" approach, with extensive political participa-
tion and support in the economic issues. In order to understand how the economic
transformation in China is realized, it is necessary to examine the arrangement of
political administrative structure.
Political administration. Since in China the economy is highly embedded in the
politics, the whole country is organized into a tightly nested hierarchy structure
where Communist Party's plan is carried out through the central government in
Beijing, twenty-two provinces, another ﬁve autonomous regions and three munici-
palities (Guthrie, 2008). Approximately 2,200 county governments are set under the
lead of district government, and simultaneously supervise the lowest level of branches
and rural township or village governments. The administrative structure is depicted
in Figure 2. This administrative structure forms the hierarchy in which national
resources and incentives are allocated from the central policies to various levels of
local governments. Diﬀerent levels of governments have direct control over SOEs
in this system. The ministry of a given sector have direct control and supervisory
power over SOEs, as do provincial, municipal and township levels of government.
From the administrative ranking, the governments lower than provincial govern-
ments could be considered as local governments. However, we prefer to regard the
governments rooted in rural area, like village, township or county governments as
local governments due to their inﬂuential power in the local community and their
speciﬁc relationships with local ﬁrms.
Despite of the seemingly centralized economy structure as referred above, lo-
cal governments often interpret the central government's policies ﬂexibly and have
frequently implemented them strategically for their own, as Weingast (1995) has
suggested market preserving, federalism structure. One of the main responsibilities
of local oﬃcials is to oﬀer guidance to the ﬁrms under their jurisdictions, helping
them to undertake new management practices and asking for some economic returns
to the community. Under this situation, local governments would ﬂexibly interpret
the national policies in order to make mutual contract for the goods of two sides.
Enterprise Structure. The political administrative structure decides the enter-
prises structure over the country. China's industry sectors include four main own-
ership categories, state-owned enterprises (SOEs); collective enterprises, which are
5
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Figure 2: Nested hierarchy of diﬀerent levels of administration in China.
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(Bureau)
Large-scale
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Large-scale
SOEs
Control over Central Govt. firms
Policy control over entire sector
Control over Prov.Gov. firms
Policy control for sec in large prov.
Med-scale
SOEs
Control over Coll. firms
Control over 
TVEs
Family households Factory
Source: Data are based from Guthrie, 2008
consisted of township and village enterprises (TVEs) in rural and urban area; for-
eign funded enterprises and individually owned or other private enterprises. Over the
progress of economic reforms, Chinese central government has issued de-collectivization
policies in both rural and urban areas, and formalize oﬃcially that all sectors with
diﬀerent ownerships participate in the market competition on an equal basis 2, the
allowance of family household business and private enterprises have accelerated the
emergence of private industry. Figure 3 shows diﬀerent ownership types of enter-
prises in China, both the number of private enterprises and the share of output
from private enterprises stand much larger than these of other organizational forms.
Figure 4 then illustrates the employment composition among diﬀerent forms of enter-
prises. It is obvious that in both rural and urban areas, the employment contribution
of private enterprises plays a signiﬁcant role.
Even in the area of private enterprises and share-holding companies, we must
acknowledge the complexities of ﬁrm-government relations in the Chinese model.
Although the government is receding from the functions of daily business in diﬀerent
sectors, the political oﬃcials retain some shares in the private enterprises and the
ﬁrms are glad to hold these shares to secure easier resource access and social capital.
2The Decision on Several Issues for Establishing a Socialist Market Economy System, passed in
the Third Plenary Session of the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, 1993.
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Figure 3: Diﬀerent ownership types of ﬁrms in China, 2008
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Private Enterprises
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Source: Data are from China Statistics Yearbook, 2008.
Figure 4: Employment by type of ownership, 2008
(a) Urban employment
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Source: Data are from China Statistics Yearbook, 2008.
Next section we will discuss how the relationship is formed between political oﬃcials
and rural ﬁrms in the agribusiness sector.
Policy Environment. Basically, the government encourages to develop private
enterprises. The Company Law was passed in 1994 to stipulate the legal guarantee
for protecting the non-state sector. The law and other Regulations of Private Enter-
prises encouraged enterprises to build a new corporate structures and standardize
organizational bodies according to the western company set-up structures.3 Since
3The government prefers to keep the status of socialist value, thus it has equated a term com-
monly associated with the private sector in China (mingying qiye, literally translated as "people-run
enterprises") with non-state sector more generally, to distinguish the name diﬀerently from that
7
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then, the non-state sectors have developed fast thanks to the legal acknowledgement
and protection. The private institutions have gradually rationalized. Although all
types of China's business organizations were driven to behave like an autonomous
market player, the political organizations are not reluctant to give up their power
in business practise. For example, when seeking to prove that the reforms have
not undermined state control, the government assigns ﬁrms typically classiﬁed as
non-state, such as collective ﬁrms and shareholding ﬁrms in which the state or local
government maintains a substantial equity interest (CSY, 1999).
The policy environment toward private activity seems not as favorable as the pol-
icy itself explains. For example, the private sector has grown throughout the reform
era but its growth has occurred against substantial and even growing ﬁnancing con-
straints. Allocation of ﬁnancial resources are biased between state-owned or more
speciﬁcally, politically embeded share-holding enterprises and private enterprises.
According to a nationwide private-sector survey which conducted in 20024, Figure
5 remarkably shows the trend: to most private entrepreneurs, the importance of
formal ﬁnance is declined and the importance of informal ﬁnance is increased. The
private ﬁrms in rural areas seem prefer to receive informal loans in the start-up year.
In the next section, we extensively discuss the micro-settings in rural area.
2.2 Rural Micro-level Setting
Types of TVE Ownership in rural area. TVEs were considered as a unique eco-
nomic form in rural China, which were set up by local governments' initiative as
a consequence of a series of national economic policy. Woo(1999) has investigated
the diﬀerent organizational models of TVEs and has summarized three types of col-
lective TVEs, (1) genuine collectively-owned enterprises. These ﬁrms are registered
and operated by rural local governments, like village or township governments; (2)
partnership between local oﬃcials and private entrepreneurs.5; (3) private-ﬁnanced
and privately operated enterprises seeking political shelter and avoiding legal dis-
in the capitalist system.
4The survey was organized and supervised by the All-China Federation of Industry and Com-
merce, with focus on private sector. We take the questions of ﬁnancial treatment of the private
ﬁrms in the start-up year as an example.
5These partnership ﬁrms are very common in modern China. Many local politicians participate
in the ﬁrms' business in the name of their spouses or relatives, in order to escape the supervision
from upper level governments.
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Figure 5: Perceptions of credit bias, 1984-2001
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Note: Loans from banks, credit unions and collective units are considered as formal ﬁnance, loans from relatives
and individuals, or loans through the social relationship with political oﬃcials are considered as informal ﬁnance.
Source: Data are calculated based on Huang(2009), p.200.
crimination.6 As the economic reforms progressed, those collectively owned or public
TVEs in the rural economy were gradually to be cut oﬀ from funds and supports
from local governments. TVEs rapidly became to resemble business organizations
(Walder, 1995). Nevertheless, TVEs, no matter private or public, still ﬁnd diﬀerent
ways to keep connections with local bureaus or local oﬃcials. We distinguish the
ownership of TVEs into two categories, as ﬁgure 6 illustrates, as collective and pri-
vate. More speciﬁcally, we describe in details how the relationships and partnerships
between TVEs and local governments are formed.
Development of TVEs in rural area. When China began to undertake the eco-
nomic reform two decades ago, a self-reliance ﬁscal system was initiated to apply
among local governments, the rural households were gradually relaxed in engaging
in non-agricultural activities. Under this circumstance, local governments held the
responsibility to develop the community economy and absorb the abundant rural la-
bor force by his own. A public ownership was a win-win method for local oﬃcials to
realize the economic growth and to reduce the rural non-agriculture unemployment
rate, and for local business to thrive by taking of local governments' assistance in ac-
cessing scarce un-marketed resources. From 1980 to 1999, the output of TVEs kept
growing by nearly 20 percent annually, achieved the growth rate much higher than
6Category (3) could be merged into category (2) since oﬃcials would ask for share holding if
they are asked to oﬀer political shelter or resource beneﬁciary.
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Figure 6: Types of public and private TVEs and their partnership with local oﬃcials
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that of SOEs. The labor force utilized by TVE sector increased from 28.2 million
in 1978 to 79.3 million in 1986, and 138.7 million in 2004 (CSY, 2008). However,
since the ambiguous statistics accumulation by central statistic bureau, much of the
output and labor participation were realized through private TVEs instead of public
or collective TVEs.7
A glance at Figure 7 also reveals that private TVEs absolutely dominated the
total pool of TVEs even beginning from 1985. Before mid-1990s, there were more
collective or public TVEs than private-run TVEs. After 1996, the private-run TVEs
outnumbered the collective TVEs, and Huang (2008) even has assumed every single
new entrant after that time was a private ﬁrm. Regarding to the employment, private
TVEs were individually smaller than the collective TVEs, which are consistent with
the arguments of Oi et al. (1999) and Naughton et al. (2007). After 2005, with the
7The number of private TVEs are overstated, the estimate result includes the gross output
by those legal-person shareholding ﬁrms that are still substantially owned by the state or local
governments. It includes those ﬁrms that are owned or run by government oﬃcials and their
relatives, as we have stated in the Figure 6.
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introduction of new statistics methods and the decreasing signiﬁcance of collective
TVEs, the static advantage of collective TVEs quickly eroded as private TVEs
accumulated growth rate.
Figure 7: Ownership composition of TVEs, 1985-2007
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Note 1. Due to diﬀerent data sources, the statistics in 2005 signiﬁcantly changes its value.
2. Statistics on household business are excluded here due to their small scale of business.
Source: Data are from the Ministry of Agriculture, 2008;
China Township and village Enterprises and Agribusiness Yearbook, 2008.
Geographical distribution of TVEs. Figure 8 shows exactly the trend that the
importance of TVEs is decreasing. As in 1987, the average of the 10 provinces with
the largest shares of private TVEs is 56.8%, compared with 21.4% for the bottom
10 provinces. However, in 2007, 20 years later, the average of the 10 provinces with
largest shares of private TVEs is 10.4% while 6.5% for the bottom 10 provinces. In
1987, the provinces listed in the top 10 had a smaller GDP and they were far more
agricultural; in 2007, the provinces listed in the top had a larger GDP, and they
were industrial and much more developed. The reason why the shares of TVEs are
decreasing comes from several resources: (1) due to administrative transformation
in rural area, many townships and counties were transformed to districts or cities;
(2) many TVEs were incorporated into big business groups or SOEs to guarantee
the scale of economy and reinforce the local competitive power, especially in poor
regions (west or north). Obviously, in the area of rich regions, the share of TVEs still
account for the large part of Gross output value. In this sense, it is nowadays much
11
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more meaningful to study the development and structure of TVEs in rich regions of
China than to study that in poor region.
Figure 8: Geographical distribution 1987 and 2007
Source: own illustration.
The development of TVEs is an organizational response to both the macroeco-
nomic environment and local condition. When we look back to the Figure 8 in the
light of the involvement of local governments' behavior toward TVEs, we ﬁnd that
the contribution of TVEs to gross output production in costal area is much higher
than those in inner area. In principal, with the help of local government, most of
TVEs in costal area have successfully changed to private ownership or have kept
ambiguous ownership with parts of government share, they have attracted more for-
eign investment fund or developed dramatically in a large and growing market. On
the contrary, TVEs in middle or western area have been gradually absorbed into
local large SOEs, or even went to bankruptcy due to strong competition in the mar-
ket. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate the models of TVEs in coastal area
with respect of the local government's participation in local business. There are
generally three TVE models which demonstrate the diﬀerentiations among diﬀerent
locations in coastal area. Sunan model refers to the TVE governance in southern
12
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Jiangsu province. TVEs in this area were established originally to work on subcon-
tract orders from SOEs in Shanghai, which were very proximately located. At the
beginning, TVEs in this region were characteristically large-scale collective process-
ing industries, and local government oﬃcials played a signiﬁcant role in charge of
the ﬁrms' daily operations, helped to obtain credit from banks, to reserve land to
build factories or to create access to raw materials and marketing channels. Even
after TVEs have been privatized nowadays, the involvement of local government in
business can still be well recognized.
Guangdong Model exhibits the feature of TVE development in the Pearl River
Delta area, which is clustered in southeast China. A deep direct involvement of
community governments is still widely observed in this economic Model. Thanks to
its location advantage, TVEs in this area successfully have attracted massive foreign
direct investments, especially from Hongkong, Taiwan and other southeast Asian
countries. Thus the Guangdong model is characterized by a dominant community
government presence together with heavy FDI participation. By contrast, Wenzhou
model shows the fewest involvement from local governments, many business are
driven by private entrepreneurs. The important role of local government played
is to provide a favorable business environment, particularly protection. Before the
private ﬁrms is legalized in China, community government in Wenzhou area helped
to protect the private business by forming cooperative enterprises or share-holding
enterprises in order to legitimate a socialist enterprise" under the legal framework
at that time.
3 Agribusiness in rural area
3.1 General Development of Agribusiness
China's 1.3 billion population is growing by approximately 10 million people a year
(CSY, 2009). With this number and a booming economy, China is one of the world's
largest consumers of food. The country's annual food consumption is staggering,
every year the whole country consumes almost 51% of world¡¯s production of pork,
33% of rice, 19% of ice cream, 18% of poultry and 12% of beef. Compared to 80
% of the food consumed in Western nations is processed meat, in China it is only
30% (Jia, 2000). However, the market for processed food is growing, and the central
government calls for the development of agribusiness sector as well.
The Chinese agribusiness sector, which includes production, food processing and
13
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the retail/food service sector, is among one of the fastest developing sectors. Al-
though there is no oﬃcial statistics about the economic contribution of agribusiness
to the total economy as a whole, we collect the statistics in diﬀerent sectors to give
an overview, which is made up as follows:
- Farm production: agricultural output grows more slowly than output of other
economic sectors, accounting only 11.3% of GDP, contributing only 0.4% of the 11.9
% economic growth. In 2007, the total output value was 2809.5 billion RMB with
300 million farmers and employees working in this sector.
- Food processing: there are in 2007 approximately 29,206 large-scale food manu-
facturers and processors with total annual sales revenues 2797.7 billion RMB, which
accounted for 7% of the total annual sales revenues among all the industry sectors as
a whole. This number does not include many smaller operations under the annual
revenues 5 million RMB. Unoﬃcial estimates suggest the total number is closer to
900,000 food processing ventures in China (Gale and Collender, 2006), from family-
owned operations to multinational corporations.
- Retail and food service. Changing retail sales patterns are conducive to in-
creased processed foods - traditional street markets are declining while hypermarkets
and supermarkets (where 46% of processed foods are sold) are expanding. Thriving
catering ﬁrms and the ballooning restaurant sector are also increasing demand for
high-value processed items.
- Problems of Agribusiness sector. (1) Low level of overall development. Only six
provinces and cities have an agricultural industry output value/agricultural value
ratio greater than 1:1, and even 15 provinces hold the ratio below 0.5:1. (2) Uneven
distribution. As for the food industry, the eastern, central and western parts' shares
of the total value are respectively, 49%, 33%, 18% (Jia, 2000). (3) Small-scale,
repetitive operations. Almost in every sector of agribusiness, there exists excessive
number of small-operations engaged in similar activities competing for the resources.
In rural area, the composition of agribusiness TVEs is extensively unbalanced.
Agriculture-related TVEs only account for a small part, no more than 1% of total
TVEs output. Figure 9 shows the industrial composition of TVEs with respect to
the gross output value in 2007. Heavy industry and construction account for a large
part of the TVEs. It seems relatively minor important of agriculture-related sector
to other rural enterprises.
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Figure 9: Composition of TVEs Gross output value, 2007
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Source: based on China TVEs and Agribusiness Statistics Yearbook, 2008.
It is necessary to note that agribusiness ﬁrms, including all the agricultural
processing ﬁrms are not the leading industry in countryside. TVEs mostly serve
for non-agriculture industry such as construction, chemistry and textiles, rather,
and TVEs share a secondary industrial system, having almost the same basic sub-
sectoral structure as that of the whole national economy. In 2007, the agribusiness
ﬁrms accounted for 7% of agricultural GDP (CSY, 2008). Since the Communist
Party encourages to develop agribusiness in rural area, more and more ﬁrms are
emerging to engage in high value production, and oﬀer new opportunities for farmers
to increase productivity and income given the restricted land resources.
National policies have been issued to support the local agribusiness ﬁrms. On the
one hand, those ﬁrms are allowed to get exemption or reduction on value-added tax,
get rebates on export taxes and enjoy other privileges to avoid special agricultural
taxes. Discount loans for export-oriented products and special ﬁnancial support are
also applied to these agribusiness ﬁrms8. On the other hand, the central government
views large-scale agribusiness as an eﬃcient solution to help the interior of the
country catch up to the fast-developed economies of China's eastern coast9. Many
large-scale agribusiness companies or agribusiness SOEs are able to receive ﬁnancial
allowances for developing new products and implementing new processing lines10.
Despite the support from government, the development pace for agribusiness is
very slow in rural China. Table 1 illustrates the percent of agribusiness TVEs to the
8Details see oﬃcial document named Supporting Guidelines on leading Agribusiness Firms,
issued in Nov, 2000.
9Details see http://www.china-briefing.com
10See details for Huijie Zhang (2005).
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whole TVEs in the light of ﬁrm numbers, employee numbers and gross output in
2008. The number of agribusiness TVEs account for 0.09% of that of whole TVEs,
the number of employee constitutes only 2% of that of whole TVEs and with gross
output of 5%.
Table 1: The percent of Agribusiness TVEs to whole TVEs, amount, employee and gross output.
Sub-branch Number (%) Employee (%) Gross Output (%)
Farm and Sideline Food Processing 0.060 1.198 3.340
Cereal Grain Grinding 0.012 0.126 0.458
Forage Processing 0.009 0.143 0.512
Plant Oil Processing 0.005 0.099 0.445
Sugar Making 0.001 0.025 0.057
Slaughtering and Meat Processing 0.008 0.226 0.599
processing of aquatic products 0.008 0.208 0.538
Vegetable and Fruit Processing 0.007 0.165 0.299
Other Agri Processing 0.010 0.206 0.432
Food Manufacturing 0.019 0.531 0.999
Bakery Products 0.002 0.049 0.087
Candy, Chocolate and Sweetmeat 0.002 0.058 0.092
Convenient Food 0.001 0.059 0.085
Liquid Milk and Dairy Products 0.002 0.059 0.174
Canned Food Manufacturing 0.002 0.074 0.087
Condiment and Fermented Products 0.002 0.063 0.136
Other Food Manufacturing 0.007 0.170 0.337
Beverage Manufacturing 0.011 0.278 0.566
Liquor Brewing 0.006 0.178 0.336
Soft Beverage Manufacturing 0.005 0.100 0.230
Total 23,908,892 15,089 290,084
1. Calculated based on the China statistic Yearbook of Township and village Enterprises, 2008.
2. The basic value of gross output is 1 million yuan, RMB
3. On Feb 21th, 2010 the currency exchange rate between Euro and RMB Yuan is 1 Euro=9.28 RMB
3.2 Dragonhead Agribusiness Firms
The structure between farmers and agribusiness ﬁrms has distinctive Chinese char-
acteristics. With the forms of shareholding contract, farmers and agribusiness are
formed mutually as Firm + farm households", Firm + farming base + farm house-
holds", Firm + Agent + farm households" and Firm + village government + farm
households". In order to procure essential raw materials, most agribusiness ﬁrms
provide a wide range of extension services to farmers, and they always sign mutual
contracts with local bureaus, especially at the level of village, to get better access
to enough products input.
Beginning from mid-1990s, Chinese agriculture oﬃcials have promoted a compa-
nies leading households" policy to encourage farmers into the commercial food sector
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and raise their incomes. This strategy emphasizes vertical links between farmers and
processing and marketing companies to strengthen farmers' connections with the
real business units and market. Dragon head" or leading" companies are selected
or established by government authorities in localities taking the important role by
contracting with farmers to procure productions with speciﬁc attributes. The drag-
onhead company", for example, provides seed, operating loans, fertilizer and other
inputs, and technical expertise. The farmers may provide the agricultural prod-
ucts or work in the agricultural base set by companies under the mutual contract.
Vertical integration and contracting are expected to grow in China since backyard
production will continue to exit. The system of contractual relationships ensures a
supply of agricultural products, and decreases the volatility in raw material costs for
agribusiness ﬁrms, and rewards the risks shared by processors and producers over
the long term (Huijie Zhang, 2005). The companies may contract with farm house-
holds in villages and townships to procure speciﬁc product varieties at a premium
over open-market prices. However, since the mutual contract is negotiated with the
help of local governments, the input/output price may be distorted.
Figure 10: Style models of dragon head companies with local farmers
Market
Dragon Head
Farm 
Household
a) Firm+farm household
Market
Local governm
ent
Dragon Head
Farming base
(Agent)
Farm 
Household
Local governm
ent
b) Firm+ Agent + farm household
Source: own illustration
It seems China's companies leading households" model resembles contract pro-
duction common in U.S. agriculture(Gale, 2003)11. However, in China, local gov-
ernment plays a much greater role. Large Dragonhead Companies are supported by
the local governments no matter they are privately owned or joint ventures with for-
eign companies. Therefore, the ownership structure of those companies or business
groups is ambiguous, but many seem to be spinoﬀs of local grain bureaus and other
11Amber Waves, a journal by USDA, June 2003
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Table 2: Government bodies in responsible for agribusiness sector.
Abb Agency Main Duty
MoA Ministry of Agriculture Draft and enforce laws, regulations and
policies, Food quality/safety issues
SALM State Administration of Land Man-
agement
Certiﬁcates land allowance.
SEPA State Environmental Protection Ad-
ministration
Formulate policies, plans on environment
pollutions, issues certiﬁcates.
MoH Ministry of Health Food hygiene issues on processed food
SAIC State Administration for Industry
and Commerce
Monitors and manages whole sale and re-
tail market places
MLI Ministry of Light Industry Regulations on food processing industry
SMC Supply and Marketing Co-
operatives
Supply and market target
SFDA State Food and Drugs Administra-
tion
Food safety, health products, food exami-
nation and evaluation
AQSIQ State Administration for Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quar-
antine
Food safety, food inspection
Source: Own illustration.
government marketing entities(Gale, 2003). The government may play as a share-
holder, may direct the business plan, or provide land, facilities or help to access to
credit and subsidiaries. Since government always play as a middleman between lead-
ing agribusiness companies and farmers, the rent-seeking problem which appeared
in the initial TVEs would still exist in the agribusiness sector nowadays.
In principal, there are diﬀerent government bodies and local oﬃces referred in Ta-
ble 2 to take in charge of responsibility on regulating and inspecting the agribusiness
sector. Although there have been some reforms by amalgamating or abolishing some
of the repeated political bodies, destructive competition and replication activities
still remain. As jurisdictional power and personal welfare beneﬁts can be generated
from intervention over industry sectors, those government bodies as well as local
government of diﬀerent bureaus compete with each other on input and market dis-
tribution. Those so-called leading agribusiness companies may collude with diﬀerent
bureaus for essential factors, cheaper inputs and better market distributions.
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3.3 Commercialized Agribusiness Industry
While it is widely recognized that the agribusiness sector in China would come to
meet great opportunities presented by consumer-driven agriculture, great challenges
remain in commercializing the country's agribusiness industry. China has country-
wide small scale of cropland farming operations, and around 60% of the country's
livestock, like chickens, pigs and cattle are raised on small farms (CSY, 2009). Many
backyard farmers in rural areas raise their livestock in small courtyard farms. Labor
costs are almost zero due to family support. The country's collective land owner-
ship bans land sales and makes it diﬃcult for farmers to rent land, presenting an
obstacle to increasing farm size and investing in mechanized equipment. Therefore,
the national policy is supporting large scale enterprises and encouraging small scale
farmers to operate as a collective large-scale entities. Along the supply value chain
from farmers to the consumers, the distribution of value added to the products as it
leaves the farm is lost. Take the livestock for example, normally Figure 11 illustrates
the supply value chain of livestock in China, which is more or less the same as that
in western countries. However, while in the United States the biggest share of the
retail value is accounted for by the wholesale-to-retail spread at 62%, in China the
middleman market share of the retail value is accounted for 64%, which potentially
announces a large proﬁt in the middleman market.
Figure 11: China's livestock supply chain
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Source: based on ,2008.
As more and more foreign invested supermarkets and restaurants ﬂush into
China, conﬂicts have arisen between suppliers and the end players of value chain
like food retails and restaurants, since Chinese farmers are unaccustomed to pro-
ducing goods to such exacting standards. Suppliers to supermarkets must procure
goods that meet standards for size, quality, color, and chemical residues. The large
number of small farmers in China makes it diﬃcult to monitor chemical and seed
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use to enforce green food standards, ensure sanitation in slaughter of livestock, and
certify non-genetically modiﬁed food products.
China's food value chain has developed the most rapidly in its prosperous coastal
areas, while change has been slower in central and western cities and in its vast net-
work of rural towns and villages. Foreign restaurant and supermarket chains have
entered ﬁrst-, second- and third tier cities, drawn by booming residents¡¯ purchas-
ing power and looser business restrictions on foreign investments. Still, Chinese
supermarket chains have opened stores in many small towns and villages and are
planning further expansion. If consumers in rural areas and inland cities imitate the
food consumption habits of coastal cities, the impacts on China's food sector and
its agricultural trade could be substantial.
4 Conclusion
As rural development in China progresses, we provide a brief overview of the insti-
tutional background of rural ﬁrms and agribusiness sector in China, which explores
how institutional and policy reforms and micro/macro settings impact rural indus-
try and, more broadly, rural development. We explain that agribusiness sector is
only a tiny part of the rural industry as a whole, however, political agencies help
and reinforce the development of agribusiness sector. We investigate the diverse
agents, policies, and institutions associated with the production, processing, and
distribution of food and agricultural products in China. We argue that until now,
success in this sector has been contingent on consistency in institutional policy and
strong support at all levels of government from the national to the local.
The pervasive inﬂuence of the State and national policies in agriculture makes
the sector ideal for short- to medium-term economic development, however, all the
policies are initiated and directed by institutional policynot by the marketplace.
With proper planning, an increasingly sophisticated and commercialized farm sector
including husbandry may come to play a greater role in the economy of rural China.
As China's political system grows increasingly decentralized, provincial and local
oﬃcials have taken a more important role in the economic planning of the farming
and agribusiness sector. Increased autonomy of local agencies strengthens the rela-
tionship between local governments and local agribusiness industry. However, even
the local states put the focus on developing large-scale agribusiness groups and
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companies, leaving the limited space for small and medium-scale ﬁrms to expand.
The government may also need to consider helping and promoting a dispersed and
small-scale food manufacturing and processing sector.
We again emphasize the importance of eﬀective vertical interactions across gov-
ernment agencies and state and private producers. Besides, horizontal linkages
among competing producers should also be strengthened to expand the information
exchange of the market. Consensus on which agencies and jurisdictions should initi-
ate and manage rural development programs is as important as deciding what new
programs, policies, and regulations should be introduced. We tentatively dispute
importance of the large and overly bureaucratic agricultural departments in rural
area, although the institutional support and guidance is crucial for the rural devel-
opment. We will investigate the role of local bureaus in the economic performance
of rural ﬁrms, especially agribusiness ﬁrms in the following research attempts.
References
CSY. China Statistical Yearbook. China Statistics Press, Beijing, People's republic
of China, 1999.
CSY. China Statistical Yearbook. China Statistics Press, Beijing, People's republic
of China, 2008.
CSY. China Statistical Yearbook. China Statistics Press, Beijing, People's republic
of China, 2009.
F. Gale and R. Collender. New directions in china's agricultural lending. Electronic
Outlook Report, USDA, Jan, 2006.
D. Guthrie. China and Globalization: The Social, Economical and Political Trans-
formation of Chinese Society. Routledge; 2 edition, 2008.
Y. Huang. Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the State.
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
K. Q. Huijie Zhang, Shenggen Fan. The role of agribusiness ﬁrms in agricultural
research: The case of china. American Agricultural Economics Association Annual
Meeting, 2005.
Y. Jia. Current Situation, Issues and Prospects for the livestock Processing Industry
in China. The Agro-food Processing Sector in China, OECD, 2000.
21
OVERVIEW OF RURAL FIRMS IN CHINA
B. Naughton, S. Rozelle, et al. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth.
Cambridge: the MIT Press, 2007.
J. C. Oi. Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in
china. World Politics, 45(1):99126, 1992. ISSN 00438871.
J. C. Oi, A. Walder, and Y. Yao. Property Rights and Economic Reform in China.
Stanford University Press, 1999.
A. G. Walder. Local governments as industrial ﬁrms: An organizational analysis of
china's transitional economy. The American Journal of Sociology, 101(2):263301,
Sep 1995.
B. R. Weingast. The economic role of political institutions: Market-preserving fed-
eralism and economic development. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
11(1):131, April 1995.
22
Chapter 2
Theories of Firm-Government Relationship in rural China
Jiangping Han
Abstract
This paper discusses the theoretical models on ﬁrm-government relation-
ship in rural China. Many microeconomics models were developed based on
the amazing development of TVEs (Township and village enterprises) decades
ago, but may not be suitable for the situation in modern China. We incor-
porate the perspective of social networks and use it as an essential factor to
explain ﬁrm-government relationship. We then further show a simple model to
describe the how the ﬁrm-government relationship inﬂuences ﬁrm's investment
plan and welfare functions in rural China.
Key words: Firm-government relationship, China
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THEORIES OF FIRM-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN RURAL CHINA
1 Introduction
Although China's political system grows increasingly decentralized, government-ﬁrm
relationship is considered as the most important microeconomic relationship in cur-
rent economy status, especially the central government still emphasizes the socialism
as national ideology (Roland, 2000). As Powell (1990) has suggested, institutional
transition presents the process and issues of how the institutions matter, how the
institutions change, under what circumstances, to what extent and in what ways.
The institutional transition in China symbolizes the change of society and econ-
omy. After studying the case of China, Nee (1996) has argued that the explanatory
account of the dynamics of institutional change should be stemmed from organiza-
tional structures and informal institutions, speciﬁcally, the structural inertia facing
organizational actors and the emergence of oppositional networks and norms would
limit the scope and direction of transformative change.
To examine the institutional transition in China, it is better to investigate from
two diﬀerent mechanisms, institutional environment as the macro perspective and
institutional arrangement as the micro perspective. From the macro perspective,
we demonstrate the fundamental incentives of states, Market Preserving Federal-
ism, Chinese Style (MPFCS) initiated by Weingast and Qian (1996), have observed
the institutional framework condition implying the competition among local gov-
ernments. MPFCS serves as the main macro mechanism of China's institutional
transition. From the micro perspective, the organizational structure in local area is
highlighted. Especially, the structural mechanisms of hierarchically organized gov-
ernment, and the enterprises within social institutions, which Oi (1992) and Walder
(1995) have viewed as Local Corporatism are mostly strengthened. To converge the
macro and micro perspectives we theoretically study the relationship between ﬁrms
and local governments. In China, there exist ambiguous and multiple property forms
where private property rights are often poorly speciﬁed, which implies the strong
government involvement in the transitional economy. Since a bundle of informal
and formal rules may govern the use of resources, we try to ﬁgure out the role of
informal rules reﬂecting the embeddedness and social network between local oﬃcials
and local ﬁrms in the framework of rural community.
Alternative types of inter-organizational relations have a more consistent impact
on ﬁrm performance but this has yet to be demonstrated theoretically and empir-
ically" (Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz., 1994). Taking this comment as a departure
point, we suggest transitional economy like China may present a promising context
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in which exploring inter-ﬁrm and ﬁrm-government relationship would be an interest-
ing topic. To be speciﬁcally, we put the focus on Township and Village Enterprises
(TVEs), not only they are the most dynamic part in China¡¯s economy development,
but also they realize a higher economic eﬃciency when compared to conventional
public enterprises controlled by the national government (Weitzman and Xu, 1994).
The successful development of TVEs and their particular relations with local oﬃ-
cials have been extensively studied in the past decades. TVE is considered as an
innovative organization form in rural China.
Since government and ﬁrms may have diﬀerent goals towards economic perfor-
mance, ﬁrms' managers pursue economic eﬃciency while politicians intervene in
ﬁrms to achieve their own political return maximization. Roland (2000), Qian and
Roland (1998) diﬀerentiated between the diﬀerent behaviors of local and central
governments. Refer to Roland's argument, the central government can not commit
to refrain from preying on private enterprises, thus the local government controlled
ﬁrms are more proﬁtable than private ﬁrms, when the local governments are able to
balance the power of central government. He distinguished TVEs as local govern-
ment controlled ﬁrms, and then concluded the positive eﬀect of TVEs has played on
performance; in other theoretical models, the relations between local governments
and local ﬁrms are also analyzed (Oi et al., 1999; Che, 2002; Blecher, 1991; Lin, 1995;
Yao, 2004), they discussed not only the positive role of local governments' partic-
ipation in ﬁrms' business activities, but also the negative role of local government
played in ﬁrms' economic performance.
Although various scholars emphasized the importance of government-ﬁrm rela-
tions as a driving factor of ﬁrms' economic performance in China, there hardly exists
a common consistent approach analyzing the role of these relations in ﬁrms' eco-
nomic performance. Especially it seems a theoretical discussion on particular ﬁrm-
government relationship in modern China is missing. In this paper, we would like
to throw a brief survey on theoretical models which investigate the ﬁrm-government
relationship in rural China, and then we develop a simple model to incorporate the
relational parameter in ﬁrm's welfare and proﬁt functions to study thoroughly how
the relations with local oﬃcials would inﬂuence ﬁrm performance.
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2 Theories of Firm-Government Relationship
2.1 Public TVEs and local government
One theoretical approach has emphasized the role of local governments in terms of
the property rights relationship. The viewpoints in this regard were based on the
development of public TVEs in 1980s due to the ﬁscal decentralization and the local
governments were entitled to take over the economic issues in their own jurisdic-
tion. According to this view, rural governments resembled an industrial corporation
where revenue generation was paramount and the entire local government oper-
ated as an industrial ﬁrm (Walder, 1995). Weitzman and Xu (1994) argued that the
economic success of TVEs has come from the speciﬁc internal institutional form cor-
responding to social and culture background of local communities, which facilitate
cooperation through implicit contracts among community members. Formally, they
analyzed the performance of TVEs in a game-theoretical framework corresponding
to a repeated non-cooperative prisoner dilemma game allowing for cooperation via
reputation mechanisms. Holding the same argument, Oi et al. (1999) suggested `col-
lectively owned industrial enterprises' was a kind of local government entrepreneur-
ship serving for both the political and economic interests of local cadres. Similar
themes were also clustered under the arguments of Local Corporatism by many other
researchers (Lin, 1995).
Varieties of corporatism deﬁned the role of local oﬃcials as entrepreneurial and
developmental, since in this form, the community were able to generate more rev-
enues and created more employment opportunities (Blecher, 1991). TVEs therefore
were considered as the second-best ownership solution. Che (2002) set up a math-
ematical model to emphasize the positive role of local government played in ﬁrm's
production. He used R = f(a, x), where R was the investment return, a was man-
agerial eﬀort and x was the number of excess workers hired to reach the goal of
investment. From another perspective, he employed both entrepreneurial factors
and non-entrepreneurial factors in an eﬀort function of public TVEs. He further
assumed utility function of local oﬃcials as U(x, θ), where x had the same meaning
as that above, and θ represented the political attitudes that political oﬃcials held.
Accordingly, he distinguished θl as pro-politics government agency and θh as pro-
business government agency. When considering both the returns of investment and
utility, he concluded if the public TVEs were controlled by pro-business government
agency, the beneﬁts would dominate these of private ownership.
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Transaction cost economy school has supported the argument that resource con-
trol of local government reduced the transaction cost of ﬁrm's business behavior.
On the contrary, the theory of corruption economy has tentatively implied that if
the government can regulate entry into economic activity, it would directly cause
the political corruption. Let us consider a simple model to clarify this situation.
We assume the government control the market access by issuing or with-holding
licenses, and he stands in the monopoly position from which he can extract bribes
in exchange of licenses. Let λ be the number of licenses issued and let b(λ) denote
the value to a would-be manager of obtaining a license where b′ = ∂(b)/∂λ < 0,
furthermore we assume b(λF ) = 0 where λF corresponds to the number of ﬁrms
that would enter under free competition. A rent-seeking oﬃcials will be able to
maximize bribe revenues with B(λ) = λb(λ) and issues λL = −b(λ)/b′(λ). At equi-
librium, λL < λF , entry restrictions are thus erected in order to generate bribes. By
extracting bribes from the ﬁrms in a competitive industry, the most ineﬃcient ﬁrms
are induced to exit because the cost of production is pushed up. From this point of
view, the market access control of local government incurs the corruption of local
oﬃcials, but will in return, compel the ineﬃcient ﬁrms. This principle generates the
idea that an appropriate number of politically connected ﬁrms in local area can not
stop political corruption, but will still yield eﬃcient outcome.
Another argument views the ﬁrm-government relationship from the social and
cultural perspective. It is well known that China's culture system is engraved by
the values of collectivism and family. The value of family is reﬂected in both the
spirit of family-based entrepreneurship and the prevalence of private network, which
is composed of family, kinship and other personal ties for exchange of particular
favors (the Chinese word guanxi is to describe this kind of network). The argument
suggested that local government-ﬁrm networks have already formed, social reputa-
tion mechanism has been resulted from the embeddedness of government in social
network relations with ﬁrm management (Cull and Xu, 2005; Chen, 2000; Li, 2005).
The view of political economy is also clariﬁed to show the positive role of local gov-
ernments. Some explained TVEs as the second-best political solution (Naughton,
1994; Nee and Su, 1996). They further mentioned that the Chinese communist
Party would support TVEs because the name of TVEs would be regarded as the
best way to develop the economy without jeopardizing public ownership and state
control. The newly empowered local governments would thus be strongly supportive
to obey policies issued by central government. Blecher and Shue (1996) following
the path dependence" school have stated the same argument. As the prime ex-
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planatory factors were the continuity of leadership across the centuries, there was
dependency view for local leadership to develop a broad based comprehensive de-
velopment plan which strictly follows the rule of public-owned" industry issued by
the central government.
2.2 Private TVEs and local government
Che (2002)'s result was straightforward under the framework of Local Corporatism
in which local governments were thought to align the interests of local community
and to be productive in public TVEs. However, the resources available to the local
community vary enormously among diﬀerent regions, and this directly aﬀects the
behavior of local governments. The nature of local oﬃcials can be more predatory
than entrepreneurial. Yao (2004) also challenged the theories of local corporatism,
he mentioned, if local government failed to commit in the community, neither private
nor public enterprises can develop well.
Sargeson and Zhang (1999) also challenged the positive view of Local Corpo-
ratism" with ﬁeld study in coastal area of China. Their study has shown that the
lack of accountability and commitment from local government would induce the in-
eﬃciency of local corporatism. They criticized the creation of local corporatism"
was an obscure mixture which conﬂates the interest of local governments, individual
oﬃcials and the members of local communities, in the framework of pursuit on in-
dividual proﬁt maximization. The local oﬃcials would put their own objectives not
only above the aims of the central government but also above those of the local com-
munity. For example, local oﬃcials may force TVEs to invest in many loss-making
political projects to advance the political career of themselves (Chen, 2000). Instead
of fostering economic development in the local community, the oﬃcials would behave
predatory on local ﬁrms for their personal purposes.
The same arguments were presented by Bai et al. (2001) and Zhang et al. (2004).
They noted that the government was always supreme and sought to control every-
thing like appointing the enterprise managers, determining the production quotas
and investment levels. Decision-making powers of the local ﬁrms were thus curtailed
in favor of those of the local government. Market orientation was in fact replaced
by government orientation. TVEs were indeed not private enterprise in disguise,
and they were genuinely owned by local governments that exercised control rights,
therefore TVEs had inherent ineﬃciency like all public ownership.
When more and more private TVEs went into the business world, the drawbacks
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of public TVEs were gradually realized by many researchers and the real relations
between local governments and local ﬁrms have changed dramatically as well. On
the one hand, the central government encourages to build new corporate structures
in order to further block political interventions in the decision making process.1 On
the other hand, the township and village governments are not allowed to become
involved in investment and business activities as an owner of the collective econ-
omy. Thus, the relation between local governments and enterprises is not restricted
to one-directional public ownership, but developed to multi-directional partnership
ownership. Managers many seek alliances with government oﬃcials to set up a
project or initiate an investment plan through the ways of joint project partnership,
joint contract. Normally, the government could help to get easily to credit support
and to resources, or treat ﬁrms with other favorable local policies. With the promo-
tion of share-holding in the latter part of the 1990s, it has become clear that local
oﬃcials in a number of areas have used their oﬃcial positions to acquire the major
beneﬁts for themselves, families and associates. Many of them may get possession
of individual shares in the ﬁrm. Lin and Chen (2000) in their study of Daqiuzhuang
have revealed the networks between the local oﬃcials operating in a more predatory
manner. They showed how the share-holding system has been exploited to transfer
the local enterprise into private oﬃcials' hands.
3 F-G relationship as network perspective
3.1 Social network perspective
Based on the two referred prominent mechanisms which ambiguously describes the
ﬁrm-government relations, we provide a new mechanism, social network, which
clearly illustrates the ﬁrm-government relations and is quite consistent with the
current experience in China. Social network is not a new concept in China. In Local
Corporatism, we have referred Guanxi as another Chinese name of personal rela-
tions, which are composed of more family members, schoolmates and close friends,
the propensity to form relationships between those actors based on common back-
ground, i.e., ancestral origin and classmate. Thus, Guanxi base imposes clear bound-
aries on network membership, and limits the pool of potential members to those who
meet criteria for being a member of a particular Guanxi cluster.
1Here it mainly refers to shareholder meetings, corporate boards and managers, according to
the Company Law passed in 1994.
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Diﬀerent from the personal social capital relation of Guanxi, we perceive the
ﬁrm-government relation as a speciﬁc case of inter-organization network from social
network perspective. The core idea is to analyze the ﬁrms and local governments
as agents who strategically manage their diverse network connections to reduce
uncertainties arising from their pursuit of organizational advantage (Mizruchi and
Galaskiewicz., 1994). Social network analysis is originally deﬁned as a resource em-
bedded in social relations, that could facilitate collective action, lead to alternative
forms of social capital analyzed as network closure (Coleman, 1988) or structural
holes (Burt, 1992). Burt has focused traditionally on the absence and presence of
links among the alters of a speciﬁc ego in the network. From his perspective, an ac-
tor or a dyad in a network can derive control beneﬁts from being situated between
two other organizational entities. Actors or inter-organizational relations in this
role can generate themselves beneﬁts which can translate into favorable conditions
in their exchanges.
We believe that the social capital that managers use inherently reﬂect their
background and experience. As a result, the social ties, contacts and networks are
able to aﬀect ﬁrms' performance. This relationship thus leads us to investigate the
links between social capital and ﬁrm performance. Most scholars agree that social
capital embodied in managerial ties and network matters (Burt, 1997; Granovetter,
1985), many studies incorporate social capital and social networks as independent
variables that aﬀect entrepreneur's actions and its outcomes (Hoang and Antoncic,
2003). Even in the case of China, literature has demonstrated the managerial ties
are beneﬁcial in a transition economy. Peng (2004) has focused on the economic
payoﬀ of kinship networks in the context of China's rural industrialization to argue
that kin solidarity and kin trust played an important role in protecting the property
rights of private entrepreneurs and reducing transaction costs during the early stages
of market reform, when formal property rights laws were ineﬀective and market
institutions underdeveloped. Keister (1998) proposed that interlocking directorates
in the business groups in China would improve communication and ﬁrms' access
to scarce capital when markets were beginning to develop, and thus improved ﬁrm
performance.
Some scholars deﬁned the networks of F-G relations as politically connected re-
lations. In particular, political embeddedness in business and its incentive for ﬁrms
have been recently recognized among economists. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ﬁrstly
discussed politician themselves would extract at least some of the rents generated by
connections and ﬁrm performance value would be enhanced only when the marginal
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beneﬁts of the connection outweighed their marginal costs. Faccio (2006) deﬁned
a company as politically connected if one of its large shareholders or top directors
was a member of parliament, a minister, or was closely related to a top politician
or party. He found only a small portion of world's market capitalization was po-
litically connected ﬁrms. He analyzed the relations between stock prices and the
politics-business ties in the board and ﬁnds diﬀerent relationship between business
people and politicians had diﬀerent value. For the speciﬁc Chinese politics-business
relation case, Li et al. (2008) deﬁned the role of aﬃliation with their ruling Com-
munist Party as the symbol of politically connected business in the operation of
ﬁrms in China. Empirically, they found the Party membership had a positive eﬀect
on the ﬁrm's performance when human capital and other relevant variables were
controlled. Moreover, they found Party membership helps private entrepreneurs to
obtain loans from banks or other state institutions and aﬀorded them more prefer-
ential treatment in the legal system. Furthermore, the sources of politics-business
relation value were taken the forms of preferential treatment by government owned
enterprises (Backman, 1999), lighter taxation, preferential treatment in competition
for government contract, relaxed regulatory conditions (Stigler, 1971; Agrawal and
Kooeber, 2001) and access to resources such as bank loans (Faccio, 2006; Bai et al.,
2006) and raw materials (Li, 2005).
3.2 Firm-government relations in TVEs' case
If we consider a rural ﬁrm which is supposed to start an investment plan, there are
two types of costs associated with the investment, start investment costs and raw-
material, labor/energy costs. Investment costs are incurred before the plan is put
into production, and other input costs are incurred afterwards. Since TVE limit in
devoting funds to the ex-ante investment, he turns to local government oﬃcials or
through personal relations to persuade the oﬃcials who have control in accessing to
ﬁnancial funds to allocate the credits. However, due to the strict supervision from
the government audit agencies and potential punishments from the higher levels of
government, local oﬃcials may publicly refuse to cooperate but privately transfer
the credits to the ﬁrms who have close political relationship.
Many researches suggest the ﬁrm's external procurement ability should be in-
corporated into ﬁrm's production function (Guo,2009; Tian, 2002), on the contrary,
we consider the manager's network relation with local oﬃcials as an exogenous cost
to production function. Although the relational cost is an important input to ﬁrm's
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performance, the social ties with local oﬃcials are very personal; besides, if a ﬁrm
invests in building the good relations with local oﬃcials, he wastes time, energy and
money, which sometimes may not do anything helpful to normal production. In
this circumstance, we distinguish the external relations with political oﬃcials as a
ex-ante cost.
We would like to provide several case studies which characterize the interactive
behavior between local governments and TVEs.
Case 1: An entrepreneur A from a richer county J of Zhejiang province in China
considers setting up an extra tee processing plant in a local community of county Z
where cheaper labor, suﬃcient tee plants and tax advantage for new enterprises are
available, since county B has just opened a science park to attract more investments.
The manager A has personal relations with one of the senior oﬃcials from county
government Z via his relatives, the manager A invites local oﬃcials, bank managers
and science park leaders to a dinner, then the investment plan is settled and loans
from the bank are also arranged. In this case, manager A spends money on investing
in strengthening the relations to help with his business. He will afterwards in private
send gifts or other personal beneﬁts to the oﬃcials who have done the favor. How-
ever, he does not have to share the revenue with those oﬃcials, and he can enjoy all
the proﬁts himself.
Case 2: An entrepreneur B also initiates an investment plan as manager A,
but he has no close and direct relationship with local oﬃcials. Since county Z is a
newly developing county and welcomes varieties of investments in local area, they
go to negotiate on the project. The local government guarantees supply of water
and energy to new plan, and the ﬁrm invests some money in transforming an old
local building into new plant. The subsidiary company of local government is allowed
to keep 15% shares. Therefore, the local government and private entrepreneurs are
involved in new plant creation process. The division of proﬁt is also negotiated.
We consider the partnership between TVE and local government as joint ownership.
The manager of TVEs spend some money on relational cost, however, it is obviously
fewer than that of case 1.
Case 3: The private entrepreneur C initiates an investment plan as manager A
and B. He neither has direct relationship with local oﬃcials nor prepares to share the
proﬁts with local governments. He totally runs the ﬁrm on his own. However, he has
restricted access to ﬁnancial supports and to other important resources. The local
government may exert an expected extra fee rate in order to distribute some resources
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to ﬁrm. In this case, the manager spend even less money on relational cost, however,
his production decision is subjected to maximization of local government.
4 Firm-Government Relation: a bilateral Model
We intend to propose a theoretical model to discuss the business cases referred above,
considering ﬁrm-government relationship inﬂuences the investment plan and ﬁrm's
proﬁt in rural China. There are three types of ﬁrm-government relations discussed
in our model: joint ownership, which suggests the both local government and ﬁrm
claim to residual (case 2); two private ownerships, in which one has close contact with
local cadre (case 1), and the the other has no contact with local cadre (case 3). The
model tries to capture the important role played by local governments in local ﬁrm's
business and credit-seeking activities. Based on the economic model of Lu (2007)
and other economists, we think a bilateral monopoly situation, the entrepreneur of
local ﬁrm F and a local rural government G may involve in issuing a project. We
suggest the project requires two inputs, one is the ex-ante investment plan I, which
is only devoted by the entrepreneur F , the other is the production input K, which
is procured through market, or more speciﬁcally, through government controlled
resource market. The ﬁrm's investment plan is based on his connection with local
bureaus, let us deﬁne C(I) as the cost of ex-ante investment, γ as the relational
parameter of ﬁrm-government relation, we consequently assume C(I) = Iγ, where
γ1 > γ2 > γ3 > 1. Since relational ability is considered as the exogenous variable of
ﬁrm's production function, the more relational contacts the ﬁrm manager has, the
more costs he would burden2. Furthermore, we denote the actual credit-seeking cost
for each unit of input as σg, p the price for the production input and normalized the
output price to be 1, θ the ex-ante investment productivity. Normally, investment
is made but productivity is not realized, thus we assume θ is a uniform distribution
over interval [0, 1]3.
The model is illustrated as follows: at step 0, the two sides F and G simulta-
neously investigate the possibility of participating in the project jointly. If they are
able to settle a proﬁt sharing contract, then the sum of the shares can be allocated
between them, let us deﬁne ﬁrm claims δf and local government claims δg; if both
parties can not successfully come to a negotiation, we deﬁne the local ﬁrm as private
2Here we do not consider the transaction costs the ﬁrm will enjoy afterwards, we consider the
debt of `favors'(Renqing zhai), the corruption risks and other relations associated costs.
3The distribution of θ is common knowledge
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ownership. At step 1, given the ownership arrangement the ex-ante investment is
made by ﬁrm manager, meanwhile the cost is also occurred. If the ﬁrm is private but
has close contact with local government beforehand, all the proﬁt is shared by local
ﬁrm alone, therefore, we regard this case as benchmark case; otherwise we continue
to step 2. At step 2, if the ﬁrm is a joint ownership TVE, the local government will
observe the productivity and claim the proﬁt share as they have planned. If the
ﬁrm is private ownership with no contact with local government, F has to pay extra
for procuring essential input, under this case, the local government G will act as a
monopolist in setting a fee for selling controlled resource.
4.1 Private ownership with close political contact
Firstly we deal with the case of private ownership with close contact with local
government as the benchmark case of the model we have proposed. In order to
choose and ex-ante investment level, the participant's problem can be solved through
maximizing the expected social surplus:
max
{I,K(θ)}
Eθ[θF (I,K)− (p+ pσg)K(θ)]− C(I) (1)
To specify the production function F (I,K), we take the production form as
I1−αKα where α ∈ (0, 1) and the cost function C(I) is deﬁned in the form of Iγ1
where γ > 1, we then have the following function:
max
{I,K(θ)}
Eθ[θI
1−αKα − (p+ pσg)K(θ)]− Iγ1 (2)
We solved the problem backward. As referred above, the optimal input K could
be realized given θ and I, we have
max
K≥0
θI1−αKα − (p+ pσg)K (3)
After applying ﬁrst order condition we get:
K∗(I, θ, σg, p) = Iθ
1
1−α (
α
p+ pσg
)
1
1−α (4)
If we insert the result of optimal input into the original proﬁt function, we have
ﬁrstly the optimal proﬁt pi. Since θ is a uniform distribution over [0, 1], the expected
proﬁt function could be derived from deﬁnite integral of continuous proﬁt function
pi over θ interval [0, 1]. Therefor, we have both pi and Π as follows:
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{
pi(I, θ, σg, p) = Iθ
1
1−α ( α
p+pσg
)
α
1−α (1− α)
Π(I, σg, p) = Eθ[pi
∗(I, θ, σg, p)] = I
(1−α)2
(2−α) (
α
p+pσg
)
α
1−α
(5)
Since we ﬁnd out the optimal level of input demand, optimal level and expected
proﬁt level, we can move forward and represent the ex-ante investment decision
problem:
max
I>0
Π(I, α, σg, p)− C(I)1 (6)
After setting up the ﬁrst-order condition we solve for the ex-ante investment
level I as:
I∗γ1P1 =
(
1
γ1
) 1
γ1−1
[
(1− α)2
(2− α)
(
α
p+ pσg
) α
1−α
] 1
γ1−1
(7)
In order to simplify the expression, we set ω = (1−α)
2
(2−α) (
α
p+pσg
)
α
1−α . Finally we
insert the optimal investment level into proﬁt function (11) and welfare function (2)
respectively, we have:
Π(I∗γ1P1 , σg, p) = I
∗ω = (γ1)
1
1−γ1 (ω)
γ1
γ1−1 (8)
4.2 Joint ownership TVE
Since the proﬁt sharing contract has been signed between local government and local
ﬁrm, the ex-ante investment problem could be written as:
max
I>0
δEΠ(I, α, σg, p)− C(I)2 (9)
Note if δE = 1, the ex-ante investment decision problem is the same as (6)
except for the degree of Firm-Government relation. We then solve the optimal
ex-ante investment level under joint ownership TVE case as follows:
I∗J =
(
δE
γ2
) 1
γ2−1
[
(1− α)2
(2− α)
(
α
p+ pσg
) α
1−α
] 1
γ2−1
(10)
We apply the same method above, then we have the expected proﬁt under the
joint ownership as:
Π(I∗γ2J , σg, p) = I
∗
Jω =
(
δE
γ2
) 1
γ2−1
(ω)
γ2
γ2−1 (11)
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4.3 Private ownership without close political contact
At step 2, the productivity of θ for ex − ante investment is only realized through
the eﬀort of F . Since F has no appropriate contact with local government and in
order to get essential input, he turns to local cadre for access to input. Local cadre
G would choose a indicator of fee to maximize his own expected revenue, if we take
IP2 as given, we have:
max
f>0
Eθ[K(IP2 , θ, f, σ)(σf − σg)]
where Eθ[K(IP2 , θ, f, σ) = IP2ω
(12)
If there are many private ﬁrms without political ties competing for the resource
in government controlled market, we assume gc to be market-clearing cost of unit
input. The actual cost for each unit of input will increase if the fee demanded by
local government increases, eventually there will come to an equilibrium at which
only the ﬁrm who can aﬀord the gc left. Applying the ﬁrst-order condition on (12),
we solve the problem for the optimal fee set by local government G as:
f ∗ =
gc + 1− α
α
(13)
Since the optimal fee set by the local government is solved, we insert the result
into the original input decision problem, to replace the credit-seeking cost gc, then
we have the ﬁrm's investment plan as:
max
K≥0
θI1−αKα − (p+ pf ∗)K (14)
We can display pi(I, θ, f, σ) in terms of the proﬁt function in section 3.1 in the
ﬁrst-best case of pi(I, θ, gc, σ):
pi(I, θ, f, σ) = pi(I, θ, gc, σ)α
α
1−α
Furthermore, we solve for the optimal ex-ante investment level under the private
ownership without close political ties with local cadre I∗P2 as:
I∗P2 =
(
α
α
1−α
γ3
) 1
γ3−1
[
(1− α)2
(2− α)
(
α
p+ pσg
) α
1−α
] 1
γ3−1
=
(
α
α
1−α
γ3
) 1
γ3−1
(ω)
1
γ3−1 (15)
The expected proﬁt is
Π(I∗γ3P2 , σg, p) = I
∗
P2
ω =
(
α
α
1−α
γ3
) 1
γ3−1
(ω)
γ3
γ3−1 (16)
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4.4 Welfare comparison
We have the following proﬁt functions under three diﬀerent ﬁrm-government types:
Π(I∗γ1P1 , σg, p) = (
1
γ1
)
1
γ1−1 (ω)
γ1
γ1−1
Π(I∗γ2J , σg, p) =
(
δE
γ2
) 1
γ2−1 (ω)
γ2
γ2−1
Π(I∗γ3P2 , σg, p) =
(
α
α
1−α
γ3
) 1
γ3−1
(ω)
γ3
γ3−1
In the end, we have welfare comparison in the circumstances of three partnership
between local government and rural ﬁrm.
WP1 = (1− 1γ1 )( 1γ1 )
1
γ1−1 (ω)
γ1
γ1−1
WJ = (1− δEγ2 )
(
δE
γ2
) 1
γ2−1 (ω)
γ2
γ2−1
WP2 = (1− α
α
1−α
γ3
)
(
α
α
1−α
γ3
) 1
γ3−1
(ω)
γ3
γ3−1
As we have assumed, γ1 > γ2 > γ3 > 1, to deﬁne the ﬁrm's costs on relations
with local government. The larger the relational parameter is, the better and closer
relationship the ﬁrm would have received, and the larger ex-ante investment costs
the ﬁrm would pay. Figure 1 brieﬂy illustrates how the relational parameter changes
the ﬁrm's welfare. Since γ > 1, the three curves of functions almost increasingly
coincide with each other, which suggest the larger the γ is, the larger the value
of welfare will be. We ﬁnd although the relationship with local government would
increase the ﬁrm's ex-ante investment cost, it can increase the overall welfare level
of ﬁrm as well. From the Figure 1, we agree the positive role that close relationship
with local government has played in ﬁrm's performance, and the relations with local
oﬃcials do help to strengthen ﬁrm's welfare level at micro level.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated a brief survey on ﬁrm-government relationship in rural China,
in particular, we have discussed how the ﬁrm-government relationship is evolved
through the economic reform, and how this institutional arrangement in micro set-
ting inﬂuences the ﬁrm's performance. We combine the perspective of social net-
works and have illustrated the relational Guanxi and its role in business activities in
China. Furthermore, we have proposed a simple model to ﬁnd out how the relational
parameter aﬀects the ﬁrm's proﬁt and welfare functions via ex-ante investment costs.
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Figure 1: Welfare comparison among diﬀerent F-G relational arrangements
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Source: own illustration.
We have observed that government does impose certain political constraints on
the economy through diﬀerent mechanisms, especially through certain patterns of
local governance, and rural ﬁrms rely on the inequality of the distribution of eco-
nomic and political resources across community to acquire economic beneﬁts. As
our model has showed, close relationship with local government can slightly help to
increase the welfare level of individual ﬁrm at the micro level.
In this sense, our survey and analysis of the ﬁrm-government relationship in
rural China brings about a conjecture that the political relation may contribute to
the welfare of rural ﬁrm in local area, our theoretical framework still needs more to
adapt to the speciﬁc Chinese case. This inevitably leads us to do more empirical
work on how the ﬁrm-government relationship aﬀects ﬁrm's business activities and
economic performance in the next round of research work.
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Chapter 3
An Analysis of the Effect of Firm-Government Network on
Management Innovation
Guoda Gu, Jingjing Zhong1 and Jiangping Han
Abstract
In this paper we examine the eﬀects of institutions on ﬁrms' management
behavior. By proposing an externally embedded network perspective on ﬁrm
performance, we demonstrate how ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by the external insti-
tutional structure. In the framework of China's economic development, we
observe the strong links between ﬁrm and local government, and these links
will signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the ﬁrms' management strategies. Thus, we focus
on the ﬁrm-government network as a driving force to the ﬁrm management
ability and behavior. Furthermore, we study the network value of ﬁrms' local
and external networks in the eﬀects of ﬁrm-government relationship using a
simple game-theoretical model. In the end, we give some implications to the
ﬁrms' management strategies in the eﬀect of ﬁrm-government relation.
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1 Introduction
The nature of the ﬁrm has explained by institutional theory through a series of socio-
institutional framework of rules, conventions and constraints (Oliver Hart, 1990;
North, 1971). In order to be survival and gain success, organizations conform to gain
resources and get close to institutions. While management research has accepted
the importance of institutions in ﬁrm behavior, the role of networks, especially, the
political network is becoming more important in China¡¯s status quo.
Principally, a network could be deﬁned as a group of agents who pursue repeated,
enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legiti-
mate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve the disputes that may arise
during the exchange (Podolny and Baron, 1997). The social network analysis is very
broad and incorporates a variety of methods and applications, yielding a research
tradition that is beyond the scope of this review to fully summarize. Important
threads have included the development of methodologies to characterize networks,
including mathematical tools such as graph theory (Wasserman and Faust, 1994;
Watts and Strogatz, 1998); the development of statistical tools to deal with inter-
dependencies peculiar to networks (Holland and Leinhardt, 1977; Krackhardt, 1987;
Robins and Pattison, 2001); and the development of simulation methods to describe
the evolution of networks (Banks and Carley, 1996; Zeggelink, 1995).
Some other authors speciﬁcally investigate the network structure as sources of
social capital, and promote the ﬁrm performance and management ability. The
structural arguments include the formation of dynamic alliances and concentrations
of power tend to occur at certain nodes in networks (Burt, 1982), the network ties
can diﬀer in strength and meaning, they are not equivalent (Granovetter, 1974),
network can be constitutive in the sense that they shape agents' identities and thus
their preferences as well as capacities (Padgett and Ansell, 1993). Durlauf (1993)
has demonstrated that network interactions between ﬁrms in technologically related
industries can generate multiple equilibria for the aggregate growth of the economy.
Feenstra et al. (1997) have found that diﬀerences in business group networks across
Asian countries are reﬂected in diﬀerences in the quality and variety of the products
they export.
Refer to the institutional embeddedness, Granovetter (1985) ﬁrstly deﬁnes em-
beddedness theory, he acknowledges that the on-going networks of social relations
between people discourage malfeasance, actions between individuals is so predicated
on social relations that evaluating behavior based on independent economic actors
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is grossly misleading. Furthermore, Lin (1995) emphasizes social contacts' resources
such as information, inﬂuences and services that are embedded in networks social re-
lations, the resource exchange and personal contact mechanisms are being regarded
as institutional embeddedness as another source of social capital).
Over the last decades China's GDP has achieved the signiﬁcant average growth
rate in the world. China's rural industry, which began a process of rapid growth
after 1970s, has played a major role in the success of China's economic reform.
Arguably, the most outstanding feature of the industry is Township and Village En-
terprises (TVEs). As a unique organizational form, TVE shares a close partnership
between government and business at the local level, which evoke the notion of local
corporatism (Nee, 1996; Oi et al., 1999). The uniqueness of TVEs is distinguished as
quasi-formal public alliance (Bai et al., 2001; Nee, 1996; Oi, 1992; Whiting, 2001). It
means that local government oﬃcials not only play a key entrepreneurship function
in fostering the local proﬁtability by serving as the directors for TVEs (Oi et al.,
1999; Blecher, 1991), but also control the input resources of enterprises, like Land,
access to capital and bank loans, business license, political favor and support (Li,
2005). TVEs in return could help to achieve certain government goals in terms
of increasing community government's revenue, creating non-farm employment and
raising per capita income (Pei., 1998; Jin and Qian, 1998; Sun, 2000).
Despite its success in the initial phase of China's economic reforms, the organi-
zational structure of TVE began to collapse in mid-1990s. As only a transitional
device, more than half of TVEs in rural China were partially or fully privatized
(Li and Rozelle., 2003; McMillan and Woodruﬀ, 2002), the reasons could be found
in declining eﬃciency and lower productivity at micro level, the corruption of po-
litical ineﬃciency at local level (Yao, 2004), and national policy shift in favor of
private ﬁrms and free economy market at the macro level (Cao and Weingast, 1997;
Dong et al., 2004). However, a large number of emerging literatures still suggest
that TVEs' connection and the informal personal ties with local government are
still working (Whyte, 1995; Li and Rozelle., 2003; Li, 2004, 2005). The evolution
of rural enterprises contributes to the special government-enterprise partnership at
local levels. It is worthy to investigate this quasi-formal governmental impact on
the ﬁrm performance and management of rural industry in China.
According to the status quo of China, we examine the eﬀects of institutions
in ﬁrms¡¯ management, and speciﬁcally, we focus on the ﬁrm-government network
as a driving force to the ﬁrm management ability and behavior. By proposing
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an externally embedded network perspective on ﬁrm performance, we demonstrate
how ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by the external institutional structure. Furthermore, we
study the network value of ﬁrms' local and external networks in the eﬀects of ﬁrm-
government relationship using a simple game-theoretical model, to show that the
value of network power increases in the complexity of external network decreases
and if the ability of the communication ﬂow of internal social network increases.
We will give some implications after the theoretical analysis on ﬁrms' management
behavior.
2 A network-based perspective
2.1 Institutional embeddedness
While neoclassical theory neglects the emergence of incomplete contracts, oppor-
tunistic behavior and diﬀering incentive schemes, institutional economics and new
institutional economics allow for market imperfections in economic transactions.
The introduction of formal institutions leads researchers to investigate and incorpo-
rate a focus on informal constraints, principally norms and networks (Nee, 1996).
Norms is a general agreement on conduct, emerging in networks through constant
interaction between actors. If there is a general agreement on cooperation being
the norm between all members, network contributes to this eﬀect through following
ways: a) by communicating, actors can agree on norms or adapt strategies proven
successful in transactions, b) actors can communicate experiences and information
with other actors, building up actors¡¯ reputation in the network, c) actors not keep-
ing to the norms can be sanctioned by other members in the network. These three
mechanisms promote the function of norms and constraints which in turn help to
maintain the cooperation. Compared with the formal contracts, these instruments
are less costly in monitoring and enforcement.
When actors repeatedly interact with each other in social and also economic
domains and thereby they might share common knowledge and information about
each others¡¯ choices can be modeled using game-theoretic approach (Kandori, 1992;
Bendor and Piotr, 2001). Through repeated interactions they generate implicit
rules, community norms, emerging as an equilibrium outcome over time. Hence, the
emergence of norms is also strongly connected to network structure, which will be
discussed in the following section.
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2.2 Structural embeddedness
Firms are embedded in the networks of social relationship that may involve the
state, families, professions, religion and ethnicity (Granovetter, 1985). A number of
researchers have incorporated embeddedness into ﬁrm behavior and outcomes. The
networks have been found positively inﬂuencing ﬁrm performance, product innova-
tion at the ﬁrm level, and enhancing the individual's power and career mobility at
the employee level. Research on personal networks of entrepreneurs revealed that
entrepreneurs perceive and exploit business opportunities in disconnected networks
(Burt, 1992), obtain information, advice and social support from network alters,
furthermore, networks help to control and manage exchange structures and access
ﬁnancial capital.
From the structure perspective, the networks of relationships interact with insti-
tutional inﬂuences to underlie the processing of issues and alternatives for answers
in organizational moves. The structural networks vary from degrees of strengths
and various compositions in society, thus they provide an intriguing opportunity to
explore the eﬀect of institutional inﬂuences on organizational performance.
Organizational variables in the management theory are diﬀerentiating, describing
the degree of unit¡¯s specialization, intensity of inter-ﬁrm interdependence, depend-
ing on asset speciﬁcation, uncertainty, frequency and complexity of interdependent
activities. From this point, for a ﬁrm in business, the networks could be built partly
upon their senior executives¡¯ private and professional working relationships, and
partly through their expanding market exchange relationships and organizational
routines. Firms diﬀer in the nature and strength of their social ties and connections
with others in an institutional framework. The ﬁrms under embedding in diﬀerent
institutional environments could behave extreme diﬀerently, furthermore, diﬀerent
degrees of institutional relationship deﬁne the extent to which ﬁrms are related to,
and the outcome that ﬁrms could yield.
Speciﬁcally, as institution" is a multidimensional concept, we specify the ﬁrm-
government relationship as network norms and structures in our research. According
to the above arguments, we emphasize the institutional embeddedness, in particular,
the ﬁrm-government network in the ﬁrms' performance, and we will demonstrate our
arguments using a simple game-theoretic approaching after the literature review on
Chinese situation in the following section.
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3 Government and ﬁrm performance: Chinese style
3.1 Literature review
The success of TVEs (Township and village enterprises) at the beginning of eco-
nomic reform era yields volumes of theoretical and empirical studies to look at the
government ﬁrm performance relation. Compared to the state-owned enterprises
before the reform, many researches demonstrate the eﬃciency of restructure in in-
stitutional arrangements. Weitzman and Xu (1994) suggest internal institutional
form of TVEs, which are seemed to facilitate cooperation through implicit contracts
among community members leads to higher economic performance; similar inter-
pretations argue the income-sharing contract may be optimal in the absence of an
independent legal system (Nee, 1996). Che (2002) emphasizes the TVE ownership
arrangement can act as a commitment mechanism to limit rent-seeking activities,
the pro-business government has the interest to promote the performance of ﬁrms.
Similarly Che and Qian (1998) also develop a theory to support the argument that
collective ownership of TVEs limits the predatory of central government. The com-
munity government's protection of TVEs becomes more eﬀective than that of private
enterprises because ownership gives the community government better information
about the operation of ﬁrms (Li, 1996), especially, the accumulation of the collec-
tive land provides TVEs with an initial investment and lays the foundation for the
formation of actual control right of local government (Pei., 1998).
Some other literature explains the institutional environment helps to achieve the
outstanding performance of TVEs. As part of the political institutions, the commu-
nity government can provide better political security to their own enterprises (Chang
and Wang., 1994). The success of TVEs due to a set of external conditions made
by the national policy, the early creation of product markets, followed gradually by
markets for assets and factors of production, the decentralization of tax and ﬁscal
system. TVEs have developed in an economy characterized by weak market institu-
tions and poorly speciﬁed property rights with a declining but still functional state
sector. Thanks to the central governments' inﬂuence on capital market, TVEs are
able to access subsidization from political bureaus, and state-owned banks. Given
the limited amount of personal ﬁnancial resources, TVEs are able to access a larger
pool of capital, bank loans with the help of the community government. Besides, the
eﬀect of ﬁscal decentralization that has made community governments independent
ﬁscal entities. Community governments are able to retain and use a large propor-
tion of the revenues they generate, and they are also subject to hard ﬁscal budget
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constraints due to limited ﬁscal revenue transfers from the higher level government.
During the last two decades, especially since mid-1990s, TVEs have been increas-
ingly privatized and most newly established ﬁrms are private enterprises. Largely,
the studies begin to criticize the role or local government may lead to ineﬃcient
economic performance, the debate is mainly focused on agency theory and own-
ership management problem. Zhu (1998) constructs a formal stylized model on
the rent-seeking theory to show the possibility of government oﬃcials choose in-
eﬃcient contractual and ownership arrangement in pursing their own self-interest.
Furthermore, when the local community expands, the local government burden a
considerable amount of debts accumulated by TVEs' non-performing loans or the
potential credit risks (Zhang et al., 2004), such ﬁnancial crisis leads the government
to seek institutional change. It is well known that the institutional coercive power
makes those who run the government to use that force in their own interest rather
than promoting economic development, thus commitment problem is also existed
in the local community level, in which the economic goal can not be achieved and
the local government in favor of local revenue seeks other investment channels but
does not support the development of rural ﬁrms any more. To summarize, the
literature referred above more or less explain the government impact on the ﬁrm
performance and ﬁrm productivity, despite the privatization among the rural ﬁrms,
political inﬂuence plays an important role in the enterprise development.
Recently, some studies with respect to the social structure and social capital
have conceptualized a new sight to investigate the government impact on ﬁrm per-
formance and economic development. Originally, it is found from economic socio-
logical argument, which focuses on mutual cooperation between ﬁrms and local gov-
ernment, especially between TVEs and their aﬃliated political bureau. Among the
arguments, the predominant argument is Local Corporatism (LC) (Walder, 1995),
which refers to a loosely coupled coalition between local government, ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and ﬁrms aiming at promoting market-oriented growth. From the point
of view of this theory, local governments act as a strategic alliance partner and fa-
cilities transactions between the ﬁrm and various other organizations, such as bank,
the police, tax collectors and other government agencies (Boisot and Child, 1996;
Walder, 1995). The theory also depicts social reputation mechanism resulted form
the embeddedness of government in social network relations with ﬁrm management
(Lin, 1995; Li, 2005). To be sure, Local Corporatism demonstrates the importance
of formal and informal institutions in realizing the credible commitment of local
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government, and descriptively speciﬁes the networks of personal relations structure
in local economic exchange (Granovetter, 1985; Lin, 1995). Although many of them
descriptively explain how the social capital inﬂuences the ﬁrm performance, none of
them theoretically analyzes the interaction between government and ﬁrm, and how
the network of government and ﬁrm aﬀect the ﬁrm performance. Details will be
discussed in the next section.
3.2 The value of ﬁrm-government Network
As the above arguments indicate, the ﬁrm-government relationship in China could
be divided into formal relation, which describes the routine business between ﬁrm
and local governments, and informal relation, which casts light on the personal
relationship between the managers of ﬁrm and political oﬃcers. Furthermore, as
the oﬃcers of local government try best to maximize their own payoﬀs, they set up
the relationship with upper level oﬃcers, seeking for the high chance of promotion.
For the ﬁrms, they are not only willing to get support from local jurisdiction, but
also hope to ﬁnd more business opportunities for expansion or other beneﬁciaries.
We consider one speciﬁc trade between the local government (G) and a local
ﬁrm (F). Local administrations have to make eﬀorts or issue contract with ﬁrms to
accommodate demands for more land, tax reduction or other politically controlled
resources by ﬁrms. If the two players are able to reach the agreement, the local
government could get political support and community support from local ﬁrms,
the ﬁrms in other side, intent on exploiting diﬀerent local incentives, tend to have
economical support. The following strategic form (Tab. 1) describes the two-player
inﬁnitely repeated game, where each player can either cooperate (c) or defect (d).
Due to the position of local government and ﬁrm, we assume they cooperate when
they agree to sign the contract on speciﬁc issue, defect of ﬁrm comes from the
situation where ﬁrm would not obey the contract as signed; defect of the local
government means corruption and other related behavior from the political bureaus.
Table 1: Inﬁnitely repeated two-player matching game
Firm
C D
Local Government C (Rm, Rm) (b,a)
D (a,b) (0,0)
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where m ∈ {h, l}, the payoﬀ in the game satisfy a > Rh > Rl > 0 > b and
a + b 6 2Rl. Besides, following Annen (2003) individuals have a discount factor
σ ∈ (0, 1), which is assumed to be the same for both player. As the status of nature,
players have no social connections, individuals are not able to recognize themselves
in diﬀerent stages of the game, and defection in each stage is the dominant strategy.
Prison's dilemma and the equilibrium would be both players choose defection. Under
this situation, no long-term trade and cooperation occurs.
Now we consider the ﬁrm and local government have integrated in a social net-
work, as deﬁned earlier, individuals are able to build themselves reputation within
the network. If a network can provide information about an individual's history,
individual cares for his reputation, which may induce them to behave cooperatively.
Any defection is possibly punished in the network. We argue the incentives for each
of the player to cooperate are inﬂuenced by both the external social network (ESN)
and internal social network (ISN).
Figure 1: Illustration of ISN and ESN
ISN
ESN
Local government
Local firms
Upper level government
Non-local firms
Source: own illustration.
Internal Social Network (ISN). Before the privatization, the government's non-
ﬁnancial interests in ﬁrms and ﬁrm's dependence on government for bailouts and
subsidiaries create a mutual dependence between government and ﬁrm. It refers to
the information sharing among social actors which is facilitated by a high degree
of relational embeddedness in the social network. As Local Corporatism theory
strengthens, the mutuality describes the government's dependence upon ﬁrms for
physical output and the provision of employment and social welfare constraints its
ability to discipline ﬁrm with the threat of closure, thus the member of Chinese
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community is more likely to be obtained information and hope to gain exchange
beneﬁts from acquaintances and families, which is demonstrated by (Granovetter,
1974) as strong ties" and weak ties" respectively. As Krackhardt (1992) argues
that in an organizational domain, information exchange is highly dependent on the
degree of emotional closeness among social actors, the members of local community
still have strong ethnic and emotional connections between each other. Thus, for
individual player in the local community, either local bureau or the local ﬁrm has
the opportunity to form an internal network in favor of his own interest. The com-
munication and speciﬁcally, the quality of information transmission in the network
lead to the quality of performance.
Deﬁnition 1. Communication in the local network is reliable with probabil-
ity of q(nI , θ), where q(nI , θ) depends on the inclusiveness of the internal network
nI and the communication level θ. ∂q(nI , θ)/∂nI < 0, ∂q(nI , θ)/∂nI∂nI > 0,
∂q(nI , θ)/∂θ > 0. It deﬁnes the probability of being discovered in next period,
1− q(nI , θ) is the probability of not being discovered in the next stage.
From the deﬁnition above, probability of not being discovered after defection
decreases as the size of the local network increases, it is compatible with the reality
that, when the business organization become much more in the jurisdiction and
the local government seeks the most possibility of attracting the investment, local
government has less interest on controlling the existed rural enterprises, thus increase
the probability of being detected for ﬁrm's defection behavior. Another important
factor aﬀecting the probability is communication, the higher the communication
level is, the higher the probability of being detected will be. This deﬁnition argues
the relational embeddedness should enhance the information utilization and reduce
the opportunity behavior.
External Social Network (ESN). Tian (2001) develops a theoretical framework to
capture the external management of TVE managers to highlight his public-relation
ability, and write the external ability into ﬁrms' production function. Extending
Tian's notion on external management ability, we argue the external social net-
work (ESN) of individual player. The external network of rural ﬁrm managers is
the capacity to negotiate with non-community political bureaus and other business
suppliers or customers outside the community. As a whole, ESN states the connec-
tions outside the community. On the way of achieving the organizational objectives,
information acquisition is not a discrete event, but rather a part of multi-stage multi-
level process. We assume the eﬀect of ESN is constrained through the complexity
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of the exchange setting. The deﬁnition below captures the fact that in the exchange
relationship of external network either "high-match" or "low-match" are being con-
sidered when the two players agree to cooperate, here the cooperative payoﬀ of
matching are written as and , where.
Deﬁnition 2. Suppose complexity in the external network is reliable with
probability of of p(nE, φ), where p(nE, φ) depends on the size of external social
network of players and the complexity of the exchange setting φ. The proba-
bility of low payoﬀ is twice diﬀerentiable function as well, ∂p(nE, φ)/∂nE < 0,
∂p(nE, φ)/∂nE∂nE > 0, ∂p(nE, φ)/∂n > 0. The probability of high-match is given
with probability 1− p(nE, φ).
It states the probability of a low payoﬀ increases as complexity of the external
exchange setting increases. For instance, Berliant et al. (2001) emphasize that
the size of a city inﬂuence the eﬃciency of knowledge exchange. That is, for the
local government, when it is intervened by the upper level the government, his
incentive to behave well in the local community would be impacted; for the local
ﬁrm, the more ties can be regarded as an opportunity set for ﬁrms as a lubricant to
reduce transaction costs. When there is complicated external network existed, this
means, the possibility for him to invest in this local area will aﬀected, and thus the
probability of low payoﬀ increases. Note the complexity is determined externally
to the network, it is a feature of the whole exchange setting in which the network
operates.
3.3 The strategic performance
Following from the deﬁnition described above, the strategy to cooperate in each
stage t for both players is a sub-game perfect equilibrium if and only if
pii(c
t
i, c
t
−i) > pii(dti, ct−i) , i ∈ {G,F},∀t (1)
Where pii is the discounted payoﬀ of player i of the inﬁnitely repeated game and
cti, d
t
−i denote the actions cooperate and defect in each stage respectively. Consider-
ing both the communication in internal social network and the complexity structure
of external network, the self-enforcing condition (1) holds, if
[1− p(nE, φ)]Rh + p(nE, φ)Rl
1− δ > a+
σ[1− q(nI , θ)][1− p(nE, φ)Rh + p(nE, φ)Rl]
1− δ
(2)
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The inequality above denotes the expected discounted payoﬀ of one individual
when cooperating on the left-hand side and the expected payoﬀ when defecting on
the right-hand side. The transformation of the equality leads to the network positive
enforcing power as follows:
S(nI , nE, θ, φ) =
[1− p(nE, φ)Rh + p(nE, φ)Rl][1− δ + q(nI , θ)]− a(δ − 1)
1− δ > 0
(3)
In order to sustain the cooperative equilibrium given the structure of the game
above, we need ﬁrstly set the discount factor to be high. Besides, it is clear to
see that positive enforcing power of whole network S in an increasing function of
communication embeddedness of internal social network q(nI , θ), and a decreasing
function of complexity of external network p(nE, θ). The value of network power
increases in the complexity of external network decreases and if the ability of the
communication ﬂow of internal social network increases. As expanding theoretical
deﬁnitions of Annen (2003), we put the network game theoretic performance analysis
in the framework of local government and local ﬁrms, emphasizing the network eﬀect
of inter-organizational relationship. The same as the theoretical study, we ﬁnd the
relevant empirical observations discussed below.
4 Implication and conclusion
4.1 Local-oriented business strategy
As the theoretical model implies, a local oriented business strategy would increase
the network management ability of speciﬁc ﬁrm. Although China is approaching to
the market economy, the long history of local corporatism is still dominating the
social norms; the dynamics of network evolvement are path-dependent. Those with
higher initial social position are likely to have more high status and resource rich
players in their network, and these network clusters may function as closed societies.
Embedded local ties are those with which an actor has a high proportion of ex-
changes and close interaction, as opposed to less frequent, less close arm¡¯s-length
ties. Network ties transmit information and are thought to be especially inﬂuential
information conduits because they provide salient and trusted information that is
likely to aﬀect behavior. To this extent, the local networks with close ties help to
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speed up the communication and transparency in the local community, thus help
to overcome the uncertainty of the imperfect institutional market. The industrial
district literature also claims that ﬁrms in close proximity to each other gain knowl-
edge spill-overs (Jaﬀe and Adams, 1996; Saxenian, 1994). Other argument supports
that closed networks, where direct ties are also tied to each other, generate trust
(Coleman, 1988).
From these arguments, we suggest the ﬁrms to attain a close networks with local
organizations and local ﬁrms, to search for a more eﬀective collaboration (Fig. 2).
Figure 2: Local actors in the ﬁeld of tension of local and non-local orientation
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As many ﬁrms and local government emphasize the `go out' business strategy, it is
skeptical to challenge with this slogan regardless of the business overall performance.
According to the theoretical analysis, the complexity of the external network will
decrease the player¡¯s network value, and decrease the success probability. However,
analysis of the failure rates of apparel manufacturers in New York showed that ﬁrms
with a high proportion of embedded ties to ﬁrms with mixtures of embedded and
arm¡¯s-length ties had lower failure rates (Uzzi, 1996). The ﬁrms appeared to beneﬁt
both from the broader information collection that arm¡¯s-length ties provided and
from the trust that embedded ties provided, thus suggesting that a balance of strong
and weak ties is most eﬀective (Uzzi, 1997).
Thus, the external management should be organized to small-world" princi-
ples (Watts, 1999). The best network has local clustering into dense sub-networks,
short paths between all actors, and relatively few ties. We believe those strategic
conceptions helpful implications for the ﬁrm management, that is, ﬁrms are highly
54
F-G NETWORK ON MANAGEMENT INNOVATION
constrained in their ability to form a network that is maximally eﬃcient with respect
to some property, the ﬁrms should be pay more attention on the ¡®go out¡¯ strategy.
As the ﬁgure below indicates, for the local actors, they are confronted with a ﬁeld
of tension of regional and local orientation which has great importance for future
development, the openness reform helps local actors to face with the communication
radius widen on a regional scale. Interpersonal relations tend to be woven more and
more in unlimited loose and open network structures with complexity. If the ﬁrms
are used to the local orientation strategy, based on spatial closeness and mutual
dependency, they confront with the regional competition with more challenges.
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Chapter 4
Firm-Government Relations and Market Transactions in
rural China
Jiangping Han
Abstract
This paper examines the role of ﬁrm-government relation in ﬁrm's market
transactions in rural China. Using a fresh survey of medium and small size
ﬁrms in rural area of Zhejiang province, we observe the ﬁrm-government net-
work plays a positive role through a series of economic transactions mechanism,
such as ﬁnancial access, raw materials resources access and input and output
products prices in the weak institutional environment. We oﬀer a measure-
ment using ego-centric network theory to operationalize the ﬁrm-government
networks, and furthermore, we argue the managers who are active in political
connections would easily overcome business transactions obstacles.
Key words: ﬁrm-government relations, market transactions, social network
analysis, China
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NETWORK RELATIONS AND MARKET TRANSACTIONS
1 Introduction
The patterns and eﬀects of relations between government and ﬁrms have long been
discussed in the framework of institutional economy, political economy and other
economy disciplines (North, 1971; Roland, 2000). As many cases of socialism econ-
omy address, the governments have overwhelming privileges to control production
and distribution through planned price system and market intervention. As a re-
sult, the ﬁrm mainly depends on the quality of his relations with political bureaus
to get access to resources and its bargaining power over quotas and administrative
licenses. Through this way, the ﬁrm-government relations may help ﬁrm on business
opportunities. Even in the world full of market competition, the empirical studies
suggest that ﬁrm-government relations may still have a positive impact on ﬁrm's
business activities (Fisman, 2001; Faccio, 2006). Governments are able to create
appropriate conditions for business environment which fosters capital accumulation,
eﬃcient allocation of resources and furthermore help to sustain the economic growth
(Haggard and Huang, 2008). Besides, the governments could play a role as a pro-
tector and enforcer of private property rights (Barzel, 1997). On the other hand,
ﬁrm-government relation is considered to harm ﬁrm's eﬃciency. There is evidence
indicating that the ﬁrms wholly or partially under the state's control are subject to
employment inference or private utility maximization of political oﬃcers (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1994), which directly induces the ineﬃciency of ﬁrms. Given the sub-
stantial debate of political's inﬂuences on business, it is necessary to analyze how
the ﬁrm-government relations are structured in an optimal way, or even, in which
social or business dimensions might be the relationship consequential.
China, in this case, is a good example deserving the empirical analysis on ﬁrm-
government relation. First, the country itself is well known for its fast development
on economy but no great success on political reform. Due to the weak organizational
and institutional constraints, political authority in China is prone to the inﬂuences
of special interests on business. The communist Party can exert the power on local
governors, who may be promoted if their regions perform economically well, on the
contrary, the one will be disciplined or even be punished if the economic statistics
of his region do not display satisfactorily to the central government's expectation.
Thus, the local politicians would prefer to participate in the business issues as much
as they can. Second, China faces challenges in a process of ﬁscal decentralization and
regional yardstick competition, which has been extensively discussed by Weingast
and Qian (1996) in the theory of Market Federalism, Chinese style. Local gov-
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ernments are delegated more decision-making powers in investment approval, ﬁrm
entry, revenue mobilization, and more autonomy in community development, which
in return enable local governments to pursue their own economic interests by allying
politically connected ﬁrms in local area; Third, as North (2005) suggests the reason
for ﬁrms to connect with governments derived from the particular cultural institu-
tions, to this extent, Weitzman and Xu (1994) attempts to explain that the business
behavior in China is deeply rooted in the traditional Chinese cultural values, which
consist of a sense of order, vertical and horizontal relationships, obligation to the
group, and the preference for harmony and cooperation in interpersonal relation-
ships. The institutional background of China therefore provides an ideal empirical
settings on analyzing the relationship between ﬁrm and local government.
Under this circumstance, the widely accepted miracle of TVEs (Township and
Village Enterprises) have portrayed a distinguished relationship between ﬁrms and
local government. TVEs locate in the rural area of China, speciﬁcally in the township
or in village. The ownership structure of TVEs is regarded as ambiguous form,
implying that the control power and decision making power are not clearly deﬁned
among local cadres, ﬁrm managers and villagers. As an organizational form, TVE
shared a close partnership between government and business at the local level1, which
evoked the notion of Local Corporatism (Nee, 1996; Oi et al., 1999). The uniqueness
of TVEs is distinguished as quasi-formal public alliance (Li, 2005). It means that
local government oﬃcials not only play a key entrepreneurship function in fostering
the local proﬁtability by serving as the directors for TVEs (Oi et al., 1999; Blecher
and Shue, 1996), but also control the input resources of enterprises, like Land, access
to capital and bank loans, business license, political favor and support (Blecher and
Shue, 1996; Li, 2005). TVEs in return could help to achieve certain government
goals in terms of increasing community government's revenue, creating non-farm
employment and raising per capita income. Despite its success in the initial phase
of China's economic reforms, the organizational structure of TVEs began to collapse
in mid-1990s. As only a transitional device, more than half of TVEs in rural China
have been partially or fully privatized (Brandt et al., 2004; McMillan and Woodruﬀ,
2002), the reasons could be found in declining eﬃciency and lower productivity at
1China is a large country with ﬁve levels of government below central government, there are
31 level provincial level units, 331 prefecture level units, 2,109 counties and 44,741 townships
and 730,000 villages (World Bank, 2002). When people talk about decentralization and local
governance, always confuse by the multilevel nature of bureaucracy. We deﬁne the local government
as government under counties in this paper.
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micro level, the corruption of political ineﬃciency at local level (Yao, 2004), and
national policy shifted in favor of private ﬁrms and free economy market at macro
level.
After observing the signiﬁcant role of local government played in rural China,
many studies conducted to analyze the eﬀects of local government controlled TVEs
on their own economic performance and their business behavior in the weak in-
stitutional background. The public TVEs are regarded as second-best ownership
solution to private ownership (Che and Qian, 1998b), therefore they may be in-
duced to enjoy better market access and to choose a more eﬃcient technology than
private enterprizes (Roland, 2000). Che (2002) has emphasized TVEs serves as a
second-best commitment mechanism, through which the government would restrain
itself from the rent-seeking activity; Chen (2000) has illustrated TVEs operation en-
joyed a lower transaction costs; Additionally, Tian (2001) has denoted the external
management ability of TVEs, which helps to increase the economic eﬃciency by the-
oretically incorporating external management ability into the production function.
Furthermore, Zhou (2009) has proposed the ﬁrm manager's political membership
aﬃliation as a kind of political capital help to increase the likelihood of ﬁrm's ac-
cess to the ﬁnancial market, On the other hand, TVEs' essence as public ownership
inducing the rent-seeking and corruption problem of local government are criticized
by many economists (Bai et al., 2001; Aidt, 2003), however, until now there is no
appropriate empirical approach trying to analyze the potential linkage between the
value of ﬁrm-government relationship and diﬀerent market transactions of ﬁrms.
To our understanding, the innovation setting found in the ﬁeld of TVE literature
emphasizes the social capital and social networks embedded in the local governance
formation Naughton et al. (2007). Our survey with managers of rural ﬁrm conducted
in Zhejiang province partially describes the value of political capital and social net-
work. According to the interview with managers there are two diﬀerent opinions,
some believe in the intensively competitive market, and refuse any type of political
networking, they admit the government can not give them any beneﬁciary since the
market is fully liberalized; however, some others argue the importance of invent-
ing in the political connections, through the methods of shareholding with political
bureaus, inviting oﬃcials as extra-supervisors, active involvement in the political
activities. Theoretically, social networks enable actors to achieve their goals eﬀec-
tively because of cooperative behavior, high trusted embedded in relationships and
informal social mechanisms that control opportunistic behaviors (Coleman, 1988).
At ﬁrm level, besides the inter-ﬁrm connections, the managers may seek to channel
63
NETWORK RELATIONS AND MARKET TRANSACTIONS
rents by building formal or informal connections with local oﬃcials. We assume
this political network eﬀect may signiﬁcantly inﬂuences ﬁrm's market access and
economic performance. We attempt to investigate the following research questions:
what is the nature of ﬁrm-government relations? What are the identiﬁable patterns
of ﬁrm-government relations in China? Where do economic actors like rural ﬁrms
actually secure advantage through reliance on political connections?
This paper picks up the threads of the literature and provides new insights and
results which previously were either impossible to obtain owing to lack of data or
which remained unconsidered. The present paper is structured as follows: in the next
section, we discuss the nature of ﬁrm-government relations, and the speciﬁc cases in
China, by incorporating network perspective to conceptualize the ﬁrm-government
relationship; we further investigate how the ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by market structure
and market transactions in rural China, and propose the hypotheses whether the
potential linkage between ﬁrm and political authorities could decrease the likelihood
of obstacles to diﬀerent market structures; in the fourth section, we specify the ﬁeld
study in China and introduce the description of data and variables, the quantita-
tive measurements are discussed afterwards; in section 5, we empirically test the
hypotheses and report the results, and section 6 provides a conclusion and further
research choices.
2 Discussion of Firm-Government Relationship
2.1 The nature of ﬁrm's political connections
In the framework of transition economy, ﬁrms have incentives to set up strong con-
nections with governments because politically network connections are assumed
to be valuable. Although the relationships between political organs and enter-
prizes seem ineﬃcient as an institutional arrangement, the growing beneﬁts of ﬁrm-
government connections may be considered to come from several preferential policies
such as tax reduction, favored resource allocation, relaxed political constraints and
credible assurance like enforcement of business investment or ﬁnancial support. In
the case when products import or export is restricted, those ﬁrms who get more easily
to the market access largely because of their ability to inﬂuence decision markers, re-
gardless of enterprize's productivity and proﬁtability (Wank,2009). Given the weak
institutional background, trade restrictions, the protection of home industries, the
existence of government subsidies, price controls are some means by which the ﬁrms
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may be able to connect relations with Local governments and gain advantages over
other competitors.
Politicians, on the other hand, have incentives to keep the tight connections
with ﬁrms in order to fulﬁll their own objectives diﬀerent goals from ﬁrm's eco-
nomic eﬃciency. Therefore, the intervention of the political governments would
decrease ﬁrms' performance. Roland (2000) brieﬂy uses the criterium of whether
the ﬁrm is privately or publicly owned to distinguish the relationship between ﬁrm
and government. He argues ﬁrstly the relationship entitles the government to in-
tervene in the production, which obviously forces the managers to deviate from
eﬃciency. The managers of public owned ﬁrms will have more adverse incentive
than privately owned ﬁrms' managers, and thus will be less diligent in maximizing
revenues and minimizing costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). A second view refers to
the commitment problem. Lack of commitment may be a source of ineﬃciency inter-
vention even if government pursue eﬃciency objectives. The politicians who oversee
public owned enterprizes operations cannot credibly commit to bankrupting poorly
performing SOEs (State-owned Enterprizes), or even to withholding additional sub-
sidized funding, so state enterprizes inevitably face soft budget constraints.
Generally speaking, we have surveyed a wide range of experience and literature
on political connections, following others, distinguish among three consequences:
ﬁrst, the ties with political oﬃcials positively help ﬁrm performance due to the ben-
eﬁts from reduction of information costs. Studies by Fisman (2001) ﬁnd that stock
prices of ﬁrms closely connected with Indonesia President dropped more than less
well-connected ﬁrms at the time of rumors of his worsening health, which suggests
the politically-connected ﬁrms have more reliable information compared with less
politically connected ones; Johnson and Mitton (2001) analyze politically connected
ﬁrms in Malaysia whose oﬃcers or major shareholders are aﬃliated to top govern-
ment oﬃcials and ﬁnd capital control implemented during Asian Financial Crisis
mainly beneﬁt these connected ﬁrms. Choi and Thum (2007) argue that the ties be-
tween ﬁrms and the politician's survival act as means of credible commitment which
forces entrepreneurs to support the government and to exert eﬀort in its stabiliza-
tion. Their case actually explains the political connections based on rent exchange.
Second, the political connections have nothing to do with ﬁrm performance. Faccio
(2006) studies over 2000 ﬁrms in 47 countries and discovers that political connec-
tion -deﬁned as large shareholders or top directors being a member of parliament, a
minister or the head of state, or closely related to a top oﬃcial- has no signiﬁcant
price eﬀect, even though such connections are widespread. Third, there is no signif-
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icant linkage between political connections and ﬁrm performance. Surveys by Cull
and Xu (2005) and Schankerman and Hellman (2000) ﬁnd CEOs in China and 20
East European transition economies perceive contacts with government oﬃcials to
be detrimental to the ﬁrm.
2.2 Firm-government relationship in rural China
As we have already introduced, Market-Preserving Federalism Chinese style, orig-
inally proposed by (Weingast, 1995), sets the institutional structure of socialism
society into de facto federalism. It highlights a series of institutions that distribute
authority between central and local governments with the aim of promoting high
growth rates by reducing the government intervention in the economy and further
facilitating inter-government competition to attract business and investment. Li
et al. (2000) illustrate when competition is suﬃciently intense in the product mar-
ket, the local government will be induced to shift the residual claims to the manager,
thus the local ﬁrms will jump out of the residual control rights by local government.
Although it seems the ﬁrms would totally get rid of the control by local government,
the ﬁrm-government relations are extensively observed between TVEs (either private
or collective) and local governments (especially township and village governments).
As a consequence of national policies, TVEs were rooted in the township and
villages of rural China, but shared a variety of ownership structure: the ﬁrms were
partially or wholly controlled by local governments, or in some other cases, the ﬁrms
were partially run by local oﬃcials. The existence of TVEs shapes numerous inter-
pretation of an eﬃcient substitute in a weak environment (Che and Qian, 1998a).
Initially illustrated by Oi (1992), Local Corporatism was to explain the process of
explosive rural economic growth that took oﬀ in the 1980s and continued into the
1990s in rural area. Such areas had a legacy of collective-run industries that formed
the basis for TVEs development. Oi et al. (1999)argues, due to the decentraliza-
tion combined with hardened budget constraints, the local governments was granted
greater rights over any surplus. To develop the rural industrial economy was a ma-
jor opportunity for local oﬃcials who were eagerly to generate proﬁts to ﬁll up in
the hole of agricultural revenue loss. One can broadly deﬁne the relation between
local government and ﬁrms as a quasi−formal government−business partnership at
the local level in a special context of weak formal institutions and strong informal
institutions (Li, 2005). In other words, local corporatism is a special institutional
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design to govern both formal and informal relationships between local oﬃcials and
TVEs' managers.
Behaviors of Local Government. When we discuss the behaviors of local gov-
ernment, the focus is mainly on the county, township and village governments and
their aﬃliated departments. At the time when TVEs originated, local government
served multi-disciplinary functions in the local area in China. First, it acted as an
industry corporate board in the ﬁrms, to perform the tasks of strategic planning,
management selection, incentive design and ﬁrm performance evaluation. Because of
the eﬀects of the need for revenue generation, local governments went into business
with various agencies at the county-level to raise revenues and to provide employ-
ment opportunities (Blecher, 1991). Second, local government contributed himself
to develop the local public utilities and facilitated resource access for local ﬁrms.
By developing the physical environment, the access to capital and bank loans, and
the link to the external markets, local government played a role of middleman. For
example, Park and Shen (2003) have argued that the function of local government
was mainly in the form of loan guarantor, so TVEs had priority to get loans than
private rural ﬁrms. Third, local government acted as a regulator or policy maker
through interpreting the government policies and regulations favorably and imple-
menting them selectively at the community, including tax collection, alternative
levies and fees. Forth, local government served as a organizer and took a leading
role in fostering the local social capital and structure development among people.
The behavior of local government and its aﬃliated agencies had great impact on
collective action and social capital through trust, norms and networks among dif-
ferent organizations. It is because the politician's promotion and compensation are
aﬀected by their performance in various political and social objectives. Undertaking
the functions referred above and achieving the objectives in their jurisdiction may
increase the political oﬃcials' income and promotion opportunities, but it may not
help or even jeopardize ﬁrm eﬃciency.
Nowadays, after the massive privatization of public TVEs in the end of 1990s,
local oﬃcials gain from their connections with the ﬁrms in following several ways:
they may receive management fees or unauthorized fees and taxes levied on private
business; private business may rely on them to ﬁnd channels for re-selling at higher
market prices goods bought at low state-set price, or to gain inside channels for
exports. They may beneﬁt formally from the behavior since the generated extra-
budgetary revenues may help them to fulﬁll the economic requirements set by the
upper level governments.
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Behaviors of Firm Manager. The foremost method the managers attempt to
use is to work through oﬃcial channels. They will focus on the careful cultivation
of ties with selected oﬃces and oﬃcials, rather than a regularized and impersonal
adventure into the bureaucracy (Pearson, 1997). There are several ways for rural
ﬁrm managers to connect with local oﬃcials:
1) Formal institutional connections. Oﬃcials in some speciﬁc departments may
be invited to be placed on a board of directors. Sometimes, ﬁrms try to embed
relationships with oﬃcials into their organizational structure by placing a key oﬃcial
(such as someone from the supervisory bureau) on a board of directors or high in the
management structure so the ﬁrm can use that person's connections and inﬂuence to
its own advantage. In most cases, however, relationships are less institutionalized.
Relationships may be sought for one-time beneﬁts, managers cannot be certain,
however, that these one-time eﬀorts at inﬂuence will be eﬀective. More eﬀective use
of ties involves the active cultivation of relationships that last over time.
2)Formal individual connections. Mangers in rural ﬁrms have not shown strong
inclinations toward formation of strong horizontal ties among ﬁrms, but they are
prone to be active in political activities. Among the managers in rural area, one
potential channel for formal, organized but individually inﬂuence is representation
in existing political organs, notably the CCP, NPC, CPPCC 2 and their local coun-
terparts. The membership is considered as political capital (Zhou, 2009), and the
investment in such political capital involves participating regularly in routine ac-
tivities and confederacies, contributing to government-sponsored social programs,
which in return could receive considerable beneﬁts.
3)Informal individual connections. Besides the formal individual connections, the
managers prefer informal connections with politicians. Managers attempt to form
dense client alliances with the political oﬃcials in person, especially at the local
level. Ties may be built on existing family relations or, among the well-educated,
on bonds developed in school, as in the case of one manager who had connections
with schoolmates who were now in the political agencies and in securities regulatory
agencies. Also the informal connections are built through bribery and the giving of
small gifts to lower-level cadres, by employing middle-level oﬃcials in their business
or by cultivating high-level oﬃcials as patrons.
2CCP denotes Chinese Communist Party; NPC is the abbreviation of National People's
Congress; CPPCC denotes Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. They represent
the three most important legislative (or semi-legislative) organs of the Chinese government. The
lowest legislative organ is at the township level.
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The managers try to satisfy their own narrow business interests through building
personal relationships with local oﬃcials, to improve business conditions and more
potential access controlled by the government (Hendrischke, 2003). Managers call
on them to achieve narrow types of inﬂuence, ranging from evading an existing rule,
gaining a favorable interpretation of a rule, assuaging the anger of an oﬃcial about
past deeds, and to moving a procedure along faster. From the ﬁeld study we have
also learned, good relationships can be especially important when the government
provides approvals, or when the government is a customer or supplier. The goal of
using contacts is usually to avoid formal rules set down by the government rather
than to change the existing regulatory regime, and is very important for both the
registration and the operation of business. Local governments retain some types
of authority and discretionary favoritism control in allocating resources and protec-
tion, especially in rural area, where local cadres play a signiﬁcant important role in
the community development, thus the ﬁrms who has strong connection with local
political agencies enjoy preferential status in obtaining bank loans and other key
inputs as before (Che, 2002; Brandt et al., 2005).
2.3 Conceptualization of Firm-Government Relationship
The existing empirical work focusing on the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc connections has
not inquired about the nature of the connections, in general, there are three diﬀerent
proxy measurements to deﬁne the ﬁrm-government relations:
1)Relations between top ﬁrm managers and top government oﬃcials. Political
connections of the ﬁrms, normally describing the relation between high-ranking ﬁrm
managers and political oﬃcials, can be passed on through inheritance such as family,
social status, ethnicity, gender, etc. In particular, whether top ﬁrm managers are
related to top government oﬃcials is widely used as the proxy measurement for
political connections in literature (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2001; Faccio,
2006). They mostly use the number of ex- and/or current government oﬃcials that
belong to the board of directors. Most ﬁrms going public are SOEs and can only be
partially privatized so that the state maintains control. Consequently, an important
characteristic of these ﬁrms is that the board of directors of these ﬁrms is dominated
by former or current government oﬃcials even after going public. Thus, although all
SOEs are, to some extent, politically connected, those that have important current or
ex-government oﬃcials on their boards would be characterized by stronger political
connections.
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2) An alternative way to describe the ﬁrm-government relations is by ﬁrm's activ-
ities in politics. This includes bribery and corruption, electoral campaign contribu-
tion, philanthropic donations and other forms of developing relations through school
classmates ties. Korszner and Stratman (1998), Ang and Boyer (2006) focus their
research on campaign contributions and their economic eﬀects on the contributing
companies.
3) Political Membership. Putnam (2000) assumes that individual engage in
civil society through participation in voluntary organizations or networks, such as
churches, clubs, associations and informal groups. This implies the social actors,
either individuals or organizations, will have more social capital than those have
fewer membership relationships in society. Bian (2002); Li et al. (2008) study the
political membership as a key measurement of political capital.
We attempt to apply the measures of social networks to analyze the ﬁrm-government
relations in China. Granovetter (1985) proposes the deﬁnition of embeddedness
which refers to the process by which social relations shape economic action by cre-
ating unique opportunities and access to those opportunities. The actions of eco-
nomic agents are embedded in concrete systems of social relations, which further
facilitate and constrain agents' proﬁt and other economic actions. The actors in
this bilateral relationship would attempt to establish costly safeguards to make sure
the information and resources are exchanged successfully in the relation. The theory
of embeddedness argues the process of embedding commercial transactions is incor-
porated with future exchanges expectations of trust and reciprocity that promote
unique value creation in the relationship (Uzzi, 1997).
Regarding the enterprize performance, many scholars agree that social capital
embodied in managerial ties and network matters (Granovetter, 1985; Burt, 1997),
other studies incorporate social capital and social networks as independent variables
that aﬀect entrepreneur's actions and its outcomes (Hoang and Antoncic, 2003).
Even in the context of China recently, a growing number of literature jumps out
of the studies on the economics implications of ownership, it investigates the so-
cial capital and social networks of entrepreneurs instead, and tries to explain the
network connections in ﬁrm's economic performance and business behavior (Bian,
2002). Peng and Luo (2000) explain that manager's micro interpersonal ties with
top executives at other ﬁrms and with government oﬃcials help improve organi-
zational performance, furthermore Peng (2004) focuses on the economic payoﬀ of
kinship networks in the context of China¡¯s rural industrialization to argue that kin
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solidarity and kin trust played an important role in protecting the property rights
of private entrepreneurs and reducing transaction costs during the early stages of
market reform, when formal property rights laws were ineﬀective and market in-
stitutions underdeveloped. Keister (1998)proposes that interlocking directorate in
the business groups in China will improve communication and ﬁrm access to scarce
capital when markets are beginning to develop, and thus improve ﬁrm performance.
However, few of the network analysis discussed above manages to describe the
ﬁrm-government network, and to analyze the eﬀects of network on ﬁrm business
behavior. In reality, the main mechanism to form politics-business network can
inﬂuence the reduction of general competitive intensity within a community. It
is no doubt that ﬁrms in China use networking as an eﬀective business strategy
within the current economic and governmental system. Of the various types of
network, developing the social ties embedded in the formal hierarchical political
system is an important strategic focus for many ﬁrms. We count on the argument
from Granovetter (1985), who has also stated that social networks including political
connections are a key determinant of resource allocation and other economic actions,
to look for the appropriate proxy measurement of ﬁrm-government relations.
Network Range. Network range is one of structural property of the individual
actor that is proposed to inﬂuence performance. Network range is deﬁned as the
extent to which an actor's ties link it with diverse others (Burt, 1992). For example,
if an individual's ego-centric network is limited to others that belong only to one
ethnic or social group, that individual has low network range. On the other hand, an
ego network comprising others of a wide variety of ethnic and social groups has high
network range. Network range implies that the actor is connected to partners that
are dissimilar from itself and each other. In our case, political network range through
ownership describes the variety of institutional groups or individuals who share the
control power and decision power of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm with a higher network range
will therefore have access to more diverse resources. In addition, this means that
the ﬁrm has an eﬀective network, in that the resources it has access to are not
duplicated or redundant (Burt, 1982). Rogers and Kincaid (1981) develop Epstein's
(1961) ﬁnding that networks characterized by greater heterophily and diversity are
informatively rich. Burt (1983) ﬁnds that large ﬁrms, with the highest network
range, also tended to have multiplex directorate ties and access to the inﬂuence of
diverse economic sectors on their boards. Building on these empirical ﬁndings, it
may then be argued that the higher the network range, the easier the ﬁrms have
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access to resources and other information.
Network Ranking. Lin (1999) suggests the social resource proposition, which for-
mulates that social resources (e.g., resources accessed in social networks) exert eﬀect
on the outcome of an instrumental action (e.g., attained status). Batjargal (2000)
operationalizes resource embeddedness as contact's resource characteristics that are
contingent upon occupational status, authority position, and core versus peripheral
sector. The second proxy measurement of ﬁrm-government relation as the extent
to which an egocentric network is comprised of actors of high or low socioeconomic
status and the extent to which entrepreneurs have been able to marshal ﬁnancial
and material resources from their personal networks.
Political Constraint. Constraint drawn from (Burt, 1992) work on structural
holes is another essential structural property of ego-centric network. With respect
to the ﬁrm-government network, we assume the ego ﬁrm A has a relationship with
two political oﬃcials, B and C. A stands in a better position to proﬁt from the
relationship if B and C are not connected to each other. When B and C are only
connected through A, a structural hole which can be exploited by A, exists between
them, therefore, the ego ﬁrm A obtain information separately and with minimum
redundancy from both B and C. Besides, A has the opportunity to control B and C
by playing them oﬀ against each other. In another word, the ego ﬁrm A can simply
arbitrage resources between B and C. In other words, if B and C are connected
to each other in some way as well -either directly or through another actor- A's
advantage begins to disappear. The absence of a structural hole between B and
C poses a constraint on A. Network constraint applied in ﬁrm-government network
portrays the ego's entrepreneurial opportunities and chances when the alters, here
are the political oﬃcials, are more or less connected with each other. If the ego
manager succeeds in making a large investment of time and energy to reach one
of the oﬃcials, and if the oﬃcial is surrounded by few structural holes with which
the ego could negotiate to get a favorable return on the investment, this contact
constraints the ego's chances of investment and business opportunities. It has been
empirically demonstrated that constraint in negotiating related to performance in a
variety of context, such as industry returns and managerial career progress (Burt,
1992).
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3 Firm-Government Relations and Market Trans-
actions
Economic transactions is the most obvious place to test the eﬀect of network (Burt,
1992). In this section, we further investigate the market structure development in
China to examine whether the value of connections with local political authority
varies in diﬀerent market ranging from the ﬁnancial market, resource market to
input/output price market, and whether the political networks could aﬀect the ﬁrm's
market transactions. We propose the hypotheses that the value of ﬁrm-government
relation is correlated with the likelihood of ﬁrm's access to diﬀerent markets in which
the ﬁrm use political connections to secure advantages.
Financial Market and Firm-Government Relations. It is well known that Chi-
nese government has undertaken some privatization, and took considerable steps
to support the private ﬁrms, to some extent, by providing a series of property
rights securities, eliminating the ideological stigma associated with private sector
and granting political legitimacy to its activities. However, the government shows
biases in actively supporting the ﬁrms regarding the investment approval process
necessary for ﬁrms to enter new activities and the provision of ﬁnance. Haggard
and Huang (2008) empirically measure the policy of ﬁnancial constraints increased
sharply in the 1990s when compared to the 1980s.
Despite the regulatory constraints, ﬁnancing plays a signiﬁcant role in ﬁrm's de-
velopment. For ﬁrms in rural area, they are normally small or medium size, the
primary ﬁnancing method they could rely on is internal sources, namely retained
earnings and principal owner ﬁnancing. However, external ﬁnancing is very crucial
for the steady success of ﬁrms, managers seek connections with local governments in
order to secure more ﬁnancial opportunities and gain much reputations. There are
two arguments discussing the eﬀect of ﬁrm's political connections on ﬁnancial mar-
ket: on the one hand, poorly private property protection in transitional economies
implies that government can not commit credibly, the government oﬃcer may ex-
propriate the rich ﬁrms when he is revealed all the ﬁnancial statements (Bai et al.,
2004), from this point of view, even the ﬁrms who have good relations with local gov-
ernments may not reluctant to resort to local governments for bank access; On the
other hand, Bai et al. (2006)empirically investigate the positive impacts of political
participation and philanthropic activities, which are deﬁned as informal substitutes
for the lack of formal protection of private properties, on the access to bank loans.
Li et al. (2008) use the same survey data to demonstrate party membership may
73
NETWORK RELATIONS AND MARKET TRANSACTIONS
help private entrepreneurs to obtain loans from banks or other state institutions and
aﬀords them more preferential treatment in the legal system. Zhou (2009) also ar-
gues pursuing membership in the legislative or semi-legislative organs of the Chinese
government is an eﬀective strategy for private entrepreneurs to get access to bank
loans, and may be more useful for small and medium enterprizes. Given the above
discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed:
Hypothesis 1a. Network range reduces a ﬁrm's reported ﬁnancing obstacle.
Hypothesis 1b. The connections with top political oﬃcials (High ranking) reduces
a ﬁrm's reported ﬁnancing obstacle.
Hypothesis 1c. Political constraints gives ﬁrm managers an disadvantage in ac-
cessing to ﬁnancial institute, thus increase a ﬁrm's reported ﬁnancing obstacle.
Firm's access to input resources and ﬁrm-government relations. In rural China,
the ﬁrms can not live without the licenses of electricity and water usage, and espe-
cially, the land property use licenses. The industry-used electricity and water supply
have long been regarded as public utility in the rural domain, besides, local gov-
ernments control power of license distribution. With regard to land, reallocations
are conducted to facilitate tax and quota collection by local government and the
village-wide or township-wide reallocation are a substitute for missing land market.
Local governments have the absolute power on reallocating the land use licenses,
thus the by-product of rent-seeking behavior is widely observed on the issue of land
property. To this extent, local governments in rural area retain some types of au-
thority and discretionary favoritism control in allocating resources and protection,
thus the good connection with local governments may help ﬁrms more easily to get
access to those raw input resources.
We put the focus on land. Through legislation, provincial governments and
their administrative leaders(governors) have been delegated legal responsibility for
maintaining the quality and quantity of land in rural area, including the required
replacement of protected agricultural land that is used for non-agricultural purpose.
Regulations on the protection of basic farmland, local government is emerging as
a major player in translating land and protection policy into local pattern of land
use. In principal, village leaders are granted the rights to use their discretionary
power over land to reallocate land as a way of guaranteeing social welfare under the
jurisdiction. Considering the attributes of the ﬁrm-government networks in which
the ego and alters embedded, we have the hypotheses as follows:
Hypothesis 2a. Network range reduces a ﬁrm's likelihood to report the diﬃculty
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on input resource access.
Hypothesis 2b. The connections with top political oﬃcials (High ranking) reduces
a ﬁrm's likelihood to report the diﬃculty on input resource access.
Hypothesis 2c. Political constraints increase a ﬁrm's likelihood to report the dif-
ﬁculty on input resource access.
Firm's access to products market and ﬁrm-government relations. Product market
is said to be the most liberalized market structure in China (Nee and Opper, 2007).
Competition among various ﬁrms on the product market keeps consistently high,
with only a few state-owned monopolies existing. Although the products input
market is more or less liberalized, the price is not wholly decided by market rule
with respect of supply and demand. Planners in the Ministry of Commerce make
products price guidance administratively, and the dramatic price changes are mostly
observed, traced and supervised under the direction of State Commodity and Price
Bureau. Price reform is aiming at radically limiting the scope of government price
and market interventions, and enlarging the role of market allocation. In the ﬁeld
of agriculture products, which are considered as the input for most agribusiness
ﬁrms, the prices of which are sometimes intervened by local governments to stop
the outﬂow of the important raw materials. The governments are able to adjust
the price system through political policies and legislative intuitions, and a variety of
quality inspections and products licenses would further constrain the ﬁrm's bushiness
behavior. Firms which have political ties with speciﬁc department oﬃcials may be
thus more able to survive by gaining access to products output market conferring
advantages on local government relative to other ﬁrms (Huang, 2008). We assume
Hypothesis 3a: the ﬁrm's network range has nothing to do with input/output price
market.
Hypothesis 3b: the ﬁrm's connections with high ranking oﬃcials could help ﬁrm
to get cheaper input price, but there is no potential linkage between the the value
of connections with high ranking oﬃcials and the output products market. On the
contrary, the ﬁrm's connections with low ranking oﬃcials have nothing to do with
input price, but there is positive linkage between the the value of connections with
low ranking oﬃcials and the output ﬁnished products market.
Hypothesis 3c: Political constraint decrease the ﬁrm's likelihood to get lower input
price and higher output price.
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4 Data and Variables
4.1 The proﬁle of sample ﬁrms
Survey area. The data was collected between 2008 and 2009 mainly in Chinese east-
coastal province Zhejiang. In order to avoid the large heterogenous properties of the
data set, we focus only on agribusiness ﬁrms in rural area. It is believed that the
use of political connections may be more widespread in rural villages and townships,
where more traditional forms of trading may persist (Nee and Opper, 2007).
Collecting information on agribusiness ﬁrms presented several challenges. First,
there was no ready information on the networks among ﬁrms from which we can
design sampling procedures; second, it was diﬃcult to obtain access to ﬁrms, espe-
cially to information regarding business transactions and ﬁrm-government relations.
Personal face-to-face interviews have been done in Chinese with the questionnaire
both in English and Chinese. We had recruited three college students to conduct
the survey. Thus, instead of random sampling procedure, we have employed speciﬁc
sources to identify and interview respondents: (1) we used personal ties (relatives,
acquaintances, schoolmates and colleagues) and oﬃcial partners of Kiel University
to introduce us to those townships and villages; (2) we asked some local government
agencies (trade unions, government statistical bureaus and agriculture bureaus) to
introduce us to managers they know and invite them to cooperate with us in in-
terviews; (3) we attend agribusiness gatherings and conferences and interview those
who are willing to cooperate with us. The sample probably does not represent
the Chinese rural ﬁrms as a whole, as ﬁrms in the sampled, listed as non-stated
owned enterprizes above designated size 3are likely to be more successful than other
smaller ones. However, the listed enterprizes generally represent the average level
of agribusiness ﬁrms in rural area.
Characteristics of agribusiness ﬁrms. We identiﬁed totally 131 rural agribusiness
ﬁrms in 26 townships dispersed in three counties(See Figure 1). However, 21 ﬁrms
in Luqiao county were not reachable until the end of the survey phrase. In all, we
interviewed 131 managers of those ﬁrm as well as 90 sales managers for detailed
information in each rural ﬁrm, each interview lasted from 2 hours to 5 hours. The
surveyed ﬁrms are from ﬁve agribusiness sub-sectors, food and snack sector (39),
meat manufacturing and processing (28), tea, cereal and wine processing (24), fruit
3'Non-state-owned industrial enterprizes above designated size' are those with annual revenue
from principal business over 5 million yuan (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007).
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canned processing sector (14), agro-chemistry (26). We asked each respondent to in-
troduce the ﬁrm information, such as the main products, the employment situation,
the age of the ﬁrm and other related ﬁrm speciﬁc questions, then the respondents
were asked to rate the overall performance of their ﬁrms, the quality of business
environment and input and output price estimation on the ﬁve-likert scale, the ac-
countancy data such as value-added output, the taxed forwarded to the government,
ﬁxed assets and sales were collected as well. Moreover, relevant network data on
ﬁrm-government relations were collected. Envisaged ego-network relations such as
a social-based political network was drawn based on the social network questions.
Table 1: Proﬁle of Sample Firms (n=131)
Characteristics Percentage
County Distribution
Yuhang 54.96%
Nanxun 24.43%
Xihu 20.61%
Sub-sectoral Distribution
Food and snack sector 29.77%
Meat manufacturing and processing 21.37%
Tea, cereal and wine processing sector 18.32%
Fruit canned processing 10.68%
Agro-chemistry 19.65%
Origin of Ownership
Genetically private ﬁrms (n=74) 56.49%
Publicly owned/collectively owned ﬁrms (n=57) 43.51%
Size of Workforce(2007)
No more than 50 49.01%
51-100 23.22%
More than 100 26.77%
Starting Year
Before 1992 30.11%
1992-1997 22.68%
After 1997 47.21%
Attitudes towards market transactions. In our interviews, many managers ad-
mitted that the economic reforms had changed their management strategies. From
planned economy to market economy, almost all the local ﬁrms had to make changes
within the organizations that reﬂect the market orientation. Many of them distin-
guished the attitude and engagement of rural ﬁrm from the old style organizations
of the planned economy. The freedom and competition of the market economy had
forced them to develop much more quickly than other competitors in order to get
lead in the same industry. Referring to the market transactions, the managers found
it easier for them to access to the output market. One of the managers in Nanxun
county said he had counted on his own to ﬁnd the sale channels and potential mar-
77
NETWORK RELATIONS AND MARKET TRANSACTIONS
Figure 1: Sampled area in Zhejiang province.
Zhejiang Province Sampled, but no data collected
Sampled, with data collected
Hangzhou
Taizhou
Wenzhou
Lishui
Quzhou Jinhua
Jiaxing
Huzhou
Shaoxing Ningbo
Source: Own illustration
kets. In order to attract more customers he lowered the prices of the new products.
On the other hand, it is still hard for most of the rural ﬁrms to get access to ﬁnancial
support and to raw materials. Many need social network or guanxi to ﬁnd appropri-
ate resources and supports. The managers' attitudes towards market transactions
can be found in Table 2.
Table 2: Frequency of market relations according to the interview (N=131)
Frequency Very diﬃcult Diﬃcult Medium Easy Very easy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Raw material Access 2.29% 29.43% 36.64% 32.06% 4.58%
Financial Access 13.74% 47.33% 29.01% 8.40% 1.53%
Price Estimation <-10% -10% ∼ 0% Same 0% ∼ 10% > 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Input 17.56% 29.77% 22.14% 22.90% 7.63%
Output 6.87% 25.19% 17.56% 36.64% 13.74%
Note 1: Price estimation is the scale estimation compared with market price.
Attitudes towards ﬁrm-government relationship. Almost all the managers in the
interview strengthened it was important to build close relationship with some district
administrative oﬃces in the jurisdiction. Although the ﬁrms could not be beneﬁted
from bailouts like very early stage in the reforms, the county or district administra-
tive oﬃce nevertheless was able to provide resources that was even valuable in the
market economy: they may provide guidance through the economic reforms, helping
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the local ﬁrms to implement a new investment and undertake expansion oriented
development plans; they may help to set up a board of directors, making the ﬁrms
more like the western organizations, and giving management signiﬁcant autonomy.
Many ﬁrm managers spoke repeatedly about the close alliance between the local
administrative oﬃces and his senior managers. The political oﬃces more or less
controlled the resource that the ﬁrms were hard to access, more importantly, the
political oﬃcials may help ﬁrms to apply for ﬁnancial funds or credits which were
even hard for ﬁrm itself to get. In this case, the close relations between rural ﬁrms
and rural administrative oﬃces are important from our interview.
Data collection problems. From the face-to-face interview, the problem of selec-
tion bias would occur. Because within the pool of potential interviews, high per-
forming ﬁrms and the ﬁrms in the politics-business network are typically selected for
the survey through the cooperation with local cadres, hence, coeﬃcient estimates
of F-G relations eﬀect will be biased upward. In order to avoid this problem, we
screened all the agribusiness ﬁrms in the local community through the data bank
controlled by local statistics bureau, then we contacted the screened ﬁrms indepen-
dently by the way of telephone, email and personal ties. With the supporting letter
issued by the local leaders, we were able to do interview with most of the ﬁrms we
screened, and without the companion of local oﬃcers.
A methodological issue relevant to data collection is the relationship between
inter-organizational networks and personal networks embedded in diﬀerent politi-
cal organizations. Relations among persons from two or more organizations may
mutually shape inter-organizational relations. Personal relations have important ef-
fects in facilitating inter-organizational networks in general (Keister, 1998). In this
result, data on ﬁrm-government network and ﬁrm-ﬁrm business partner network
structure were collected by the standard method of name generators and name in-
terpreters (Burt, 1992; Marsden, 2002). Name interpreters were employed to name
the characteristics of partners (supplier, customer, competitor or other ﬁrms), re-
lational duration tie age between ego and alters measured in years, alter location,
and whether the alters were belong to the same business group as the ego was. The
questions describing strength of relations between listed ﬁrms were also asked. The
relationship were deﬁned in three categories: E as especially close between the Ego
and the alter, D as distant in the sense that they are rarely work together, total
strangers or don't share any information, leave E D blank indicated two ﬁrms were
neither distant nor especially close (Burt, 1992).
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There are some authors suggest the name-generator approach employed in social
network analysis is found to be ineﬀective in the ﬁeld study, as managers' personal
ties are regarded as a personal and business secret, and some respondents are reluc-
tant to disclose such contacts (Yeung and Tung, 1996; Peng and Luo, 2000). Given
these conditions, the existing literature which refers the importance of social capi-
tal or the eﬀect of social network among organizations use qualitative methods1 to
assess the structure and relationship. We challenge the name generator approach
to obtain more reliable data compared to widespread qualitative approach. With
respect to Firm-Government network, we ask both chief manager and a lower level
manager to assess their ties with speciﬁc organizations, the ties are not restricted
to personal ties or Guanxi ties, we deﬁne the ties as the ones found in information
exchange, social activities, and administrative activities, which are assumed as open
information.
4.2 Variables
Dependent Variables. We use three variables to indicate ﬁrm's business behavior,
more speciﬁcally, to deﬁne ﬁrm's obstacles to the business environment. Self-reported
degree of diﬃculty on access to raw materials(ACC-RES) is an ordinal variables
ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 denotes "very diﬃcult", 2 "diﬃcult", 3 "medium", 4
"easy", "very easy". With the same ordinal scale, we also have self-reported degree
of diﬃculty on access to ﬁnancing and credit(ACC-CRE) as well as self-reported
degree of diﬃculty on access to products market. Here, we measure the scale of
ﬁrm's input and output price compared with the average market price as a proxy
of the economic transactions in products market, the ﬁrm's managers were asked
to identify whether the price of their raw materials input (INPRICE) and ﬁnished
products (OUTPRICE) were 10% higher, 5% higher, the same, 5% lower or 10%
lower than market price.
Independent Variables. As discussed in section 2.3, we ﬁrstly introduce rela-
tional embeddenss variables to deﬁne Firm-Government relation resource. We use
the speciﬁc social rank status, high rank ties (HIGH-RANK), normally measured by
the manager's relation with top oﬃcers in local bureaus, and low rank ties (LOW-
RANK), which is the ties between sales manager and lower level oﬃcers in local
bureaus. Secondly, we consider network range (RANGE). We classify the sharehold-
ers network range into seven diﬀerent categories, in which we distinguish whether
the shareholders are state-owned government, local government, foreign ﬁrms, large
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Table 3: Descriptive Variables (N=131)
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
LGVALUE Logged value-added output in 2007 8.217 1.257
LGCAPITAL Logged price of ﬁxed-asset in 2007 9.549 1.161
LGLABOR Logged employment in 2007 4.034 0.916
P-HIGH Number of ties with high rank oﬃcials in local bureaus 2.962 1.931
P-LOW Number of ties with low rank oﬃcials in local bureaus 4.954 2.260
ACC-RES Access to input or resources (1=very diﬃcult, 5=very easy) 3.122 0.912
ACC-FIN Access to credit or ﬁnancial support (1=very diﬃcult, 5=very easy) 2.366 0.879
RANGE The diﬀerent groups of shareholders 2.382 1.085
LGSHARE Whether the oﬃcials of local government have the shares in the ﬁrm 0.351 0.479
CONSTRAINT The political constraint of ﬁrm manager's ego network 0.620 0.313
M-EDU Education of manager (1=high school, 5=Master degree) 2.756 0.962
M-PARTY Party member of manager(0=no, 1=yes) 0.626 0.486
M-EXP Manager's working experience (1=< 5 years, 5=>20 years) 2.687 0.852
YEAR Age of the ﬁrm(1=0-5years, 5=> 21years) 2.802 1.041
OWNORG Original registered ownership form of ﬁrm(1=TVE, 0=others) 0.435 0.498
REWARD Reward issued by local government (1=yes, 0=no) 0.343 0.477
domestic business groups, informal local oﬃcials, collective organizations or indi-
viduals. Third, network constraint (CONSTRAINT) as informal network structure
indicator. These variables are based on the survey, in which the manager and one
another lower level manager (in most of the cases sales manager) of each ﬁrm were
asked to ﬁll in this part simultaneously, to make sure that the politics-business net-
works were being explored in the largest extent. 4 Furthermore, we have included
whether there is shareholders from local bureaus (LGSHARE) or indirect sharehold-
ers from local bureaus (like the close relatives of local oﬃcials), to describe the ﬁrm's
formal/informal institutional ties with local oﬃcials.
Control Variables. The characteristics of the manager is involved as one set
of the control variables. Human capital is often used as control variables in the
entrepreneurship studies (Zhou, 2009), our analysis which dedicates to study ﬁrm-
government relations has been strongly inﬂuenced by the analysis on entrepreneur-
ship. The education level of manager (M-EDU)is predicted through a ﬁve-scale
measurement, the Communist Party membership of manager (M-PART) is mea-
sured by a binary variable, coded 1 if the manager is a party member, 0 otherwise.
The working experience of managers (M-EXP) are also considered as one of the
important human capital variables in our survey.
4Constraint is measured as (pij +
∑
q piqpqj)
2, q 6= i, j, where pij is the proportional strength of
q's relationship with j, as pij is the proportional strength deﬁned above of i's relation with j. The
function deﬁnes the proportion of i's network time and energy that directly or indirectly involves
j (Burt, 1992).
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The characteristics of the ﬁrm is also involved in the control variables. To control
for organizational size and economic performance competencies, we include log num-
ber of employees(LGLABOR) and organization age(YEAR), measured from birth of
the ﬁrm. We include log ﬁrm's ﬁxed-asset capital(LGCAL) to measure the ﬁrm's
overall performance. To control diﬀerences in ownership, we create OWNORG as a
binary variable, coded 1 for ﬁrms which were originally registered as TVEs , code
0 for private or foreign invested as original register status. It is argued in many
literature, the ownership of TVE had a external management connection with local
governments (Tian, 2001),we control the variable here to test whether the ownership
of TVE years before give suﬃcient support for the ﬁrm's recent business behavior.
It is another measurement to consider the dynamics of political embeddedness. We
use binary variable (REWARD) as a proxy measurement to show the reputation of
ﬁrm among the local bureaus and political inﬂuence, coded 1 for ﬁrms are rewarded
by speciﬁc political agencies in terms of product quality, trustworthy, society dona-
tion, etc, coded 0 for ﬁrms are not issued for any rewards referred above. All the
variables as well as mean and standard deviation could be found in Table 3. We also
examine the correlation between the party membership and political embeddedness
indicators referred above, there is no signiﬁcant correlation between two variables.
Thus we are able to put the party membership variable in the control variable, as
an indicator of the proﬁle of the manager.
4.3 Ordinal regression models
General model Ordered logistic regression holds Parallel regression assumption",
which assumes the coeﬃcients that describe the relationship between the lowest
versus all higher categories of the response variable are the same as those that de-
scribe the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories
(Greene, 2002), in another word, the assumption of ordinal logistic regression is
the same proportional percentage among categories. In the ordered logistic model,
the underlying probability score of how a one-unit change in probability of magni-
tude of the dependent variable is estimated as a linear function of the independent
variables and set of cut points (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002). The probability of ob-
serving outcome i corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function,
plus random error is within the range of the cut points estimated for the outcome.
Generally, if we observe the respondent's answer y as
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y = j if γj−1 < y∗ < γj
where j = 1, 2, . . . , J are the responses that are ordered in nature, and γ's are
J − 1 unknown parameters which can be named cut points or threshold parameters.
We further assume  ∼ N(0, 1), the probability for j-th outcome is given by
Prob(y = j) = Φ(γj − β′x)− Φ(γj−1 − β′x)
Where Φ(·) is the cumulative standard normal distribution, which is continu-
ous and twice diﬀerentiable. x is a vector of independent variables that aﬀect the
response. In this case, if we recognize Φ(·) as ordered logistic regression, then
Prob(y = j|x) = 1
1 + exp(−(γj − β′x)) −
1
1 + exp(−(γj−1 − β′x))
The ordinal probit model produces predicted probabilities similar to those ob-
tained from the ordinal logit model, which is also named as proportional odds model.
However, the ordinal probit model exerts a property that makes sampling from its
posterior distribution particular eﬃcient (Johnson and Albert, 2004).
Marginal eﬀect. The marginal eﬀect describes the partial ﬁrst derivative of y
with respect to xi. It illustrates the slope of the line tangent to the logistic curve
evaluated when keeping all variables at some value. The marginal eﬀect of xi in the
general model for the j-th response could be written as:
δi,j =
∂Prob[y = j|x]
∂xi
= [φ(γj−1 − β′x)− φ(γj − β′x)]βi
where φ(·) is the standard normal (logistic) density function, the sum inside the
brackets [ ] can be either positive or negative. Therefore, the marginal eﬀect on
being in category j may be positive for some value of xi and negative for others.
Informative Priors and MCMC estimation. The prior model is often applied
as specifying a proper prior distribution on the vector of category γ, in order to
avoid identiﬁability problem in the normal models. Bayesian approach is proposed
to be suitable when the number of observation is small (Johnson and Albert, 2004).
Regarding the prior information in the bayesian approach, the dimension of the re-
gression parameter and the dimension of the random component of cutoﬀs should
be both considered for the speciﬁcation of a proper prior. By using the conditional
means approach, prior estimates of cumulative success probabilities are often speci-
ﬁed. The induced conditional means prior can be written as
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g(β, γ) ∝
M∏
j=1
F (γj − x′jβ)Kjgj [˙1− F (γj − x′jβ)]Kj(1−gj)f(γj − x′jβ)
subject to γ1 6 γ2 6 · · · 6 γC−1. F (·) denotes the link distribution function,
f()˙ is the density, Kjgj and Kj(1− gj) are the speciﬁc parameters using a Dirichlet
density (Johnson and Albert, 2004). Another advantage of bayesian approach is
to judge the overall goodness of ﬁt of an ordinal regression model, we will do the
judgement in the next section.
5 Quantitative Findings
5.1 Ordered logistic analysis
We assume that the logit of the probability that a ﬁrm manager's attitudes to-
wards market transactions is a linear function of the ﬁrm characteristics and ﬁrm-
government relationships. That is, we assume a proportional odds model of the
form
log(
θic
1− θic ) = β0 + βi × Fi + βj × FGj
where Fi and FGj illustrate the variables of ﬁrm's basic characteristics and ﬁrm-
government network relations respectively.
Correlation table(see Appendix: ﬁgures and tables) summarizes the correlations
coeﬃcient for each variables of the frameworks for ﬁrms' access to important mar-
ket relations, let us say, to raw materials and resources, to ﬁnancial support and
credit, and to products market like input and output price of products. The indi-
vidual correlations between the variables do not suggest obvious problems of pairwise
collinearity, which implies the appropriateness the use of all independent variables
in a regression model. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations between the determinants
and the dependent variables as expected.
Table 4-5 respectively presents the ﬁndings of our ordered logit analysis of ﬁrm's
access to ﬁnancing, raw material resources and to products price market. We deﬁne
ﬁrm's accesses to these four market mechanisms as scenarios, model (1)-(4) repre-
sents column (1)-(4) of each scenario, which we will discuss at follows. Model (1)
in each table shows the dependent variables regressed on the measure of formal in-
stitutional ties, let us say, the local government's share in the ﬁrm and the network
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Table 4: Ordered logit estimates: Diﬃculties of Firms' access to ﬁnancial market and raw
materials.
Financial market Raw Materials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LGLABOR 0.197 0.210 0.0767 0.0484 -0.0516 -0.0546 0.00241 -0.100
(0.82) (0.86) (0.29) (0.18) (-0.22) (-0.23) (0.01) (-0.39)
YEAR 0.169 0.209 0.258 0.381 0.237 0.344 0.355 0.327
(0.76) (0.93) (1.06) (1.51) (1.11) (1.56) (1.49) (1.32)
OWNORG -0.879∗ -1.113∗∗ -1.294∗∗ -1.472∗∗∗ -0.573 -0.996∗∗ -0.884∗ -1.064∗∗
(-1.92) (-2.36) (-2.53) (-2.88) (-1.28) (-2.08) (-1.71) (-2.01)
REWARD 0.161 0.153 0.0141 -0.134 0.461 0.528 0.466 0.523
(0.42) (0.40) (0.03) (-0.31) (1.21) (1.37) (1.16) (1.26)
M-EDU 0.393∗ 0.365∗ 0.392∗ 0.521∗∗ 0.0954 0.0545 0.0466 0.0695
(1.84) (1.70) (1.68) (2.12) (0.45) (0.25) (0.20) (0.29)
M-PARTY 0.472 0.286 -0.133 -0.214 1.112∗∗ 0.843∗ 0.324 0.391
(1.08) (0.63) (-0.27) (-0.42) (2.50) (1.83) (0.64) (0.77)
M-EXP -0.0721 -0.0488 -0.207 -0.188 -0.213 -0.258 -0.347 -0.0792
(-0.30) (-0.20) (-0.75) (-0.63) (-0.89) (-1.06) (-1.31) (-0.27)
LGSHARE 0.348 -0.0292 -0.196 -0.241 1.151∗∗∗ 0.622 0.672 0.605
(0.87) (-0.07) (-0.43) (-0.52) (2.83) (1.43) (1.48) (1.33)
RANGE 0.467∗∗ 0.360∗ 0.406∗∗ 0.387∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.386∗ 0.275 0.261
(2.50) (1.85) (1.98) (1.88) (3.02) (1.92) (1.32) (1.24)
HIGH-RANK 0.229∗∗ 0.227∗ 0.185 0.350∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.301∗∗
(2.08) (1.90) (1.52) (3.10) (2.53) (2.44)
LOW-RANK 0.0820 0.0734 0.215∗ 0.161∗ 0.133 0.169
(0.92) (0.78) (1.83) (1.81) (1.43) (1.46)
CONSTRAINT -1.516 -1.681∗ -2.803∗∗∗ -2.564∗∗
(-1.59) (-1.71) (-2.88) (-2.57)
LOC2 -0.367 -1.247∗∗
(-0.73) (-2.37)
LOC3 1.350∗ -0.0206
(1.80) (-0.03)
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
range among the shareholders with the eﬀects of the control variables; Model(2)
adds two more variables sequentially, and shows the dependent variables regressed
on the measure of informal political resource ties, namely high (or low) ranked ties
with the eﬀects of the control variables. Model(3) adds one more variable, shows the
dependent variables regressed on the measure of informal political individual ties,
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Table 5: Ordered logit estimates: Price scale estimation of Firms' access to Input and
output products market.
Input Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
LGLABOR 0.159 0.128 -0.0543 -0.161 -0.477∗∗ -0.558∗∗ -0.609∗∗ -0.704∗∗∗
(0.73) (0.58) (-0.23) (-0.65) (-2.13) (-2.42) (-2.44) (-2.76)
YEAR -0.0419 -0.0476 -0.0659 -0.336 -0.154 -0.137 -0.0253 -0.218
(-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.30) (-1.47) (-0.75) (-0.66) (-0.11) (-0.91)
OWNORG 0.222 0.179 0.439 0.581 0.642 0.421 0.317 0.457
(0.53) (0.41) (0.94) (1.24) (1.51) (0.92) (0.64) (0.93)
REWARD -0.538 -0.535 -0.666∗ -0.194 -0.284 -0.229 -0.235 0.000246
(-1.46) (-1.46) (-1.70) (-0.47) (-0.77) (-0.61) (-0.60) (0.00)
M-EDU -0.285 -0.319 -0.325 -0.468∗ -0.155 -0.193 -0.272 -0.302
(-1.35) (-1.49) (-1.39) (-1.94) (-0.75) (-0.93) (-1.21) (-1.32)
M-PARTY 0.621 0.527 0.427 0.501 0.690∗ 0.499 0.440 0.587
(1.53) (1.26) (0.91) (1.05) (1.67) (1.18) (0.94) (1.22)
M-EXP -0.816∗∗∗ -0.781∗∗∗ -0.636∗∗ -0.224 -0.627∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗∗ -0.648∗∗∗ -0.270
(-3.58) (-3.41) (-2.50) (-0.82) (-2.85) (-2.63) (-2.58) (-0.97)
LGSHARE -0.292 -0.348 -0.266 -0.423 0.202 -0.0914 -0.0362 -0.149
(-0.79) (-0.88) (-0.66) (-1.01) (0.53) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-0.34)
RANGE 0.0531 0.0492 0.0708 0.0188 0.516∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.370∗ 0.332∗∗
(0.30) (0.25) (0.34) (0.09) (2.79) (2.06) (1.75) (2.58)
HIGH-RANK -0.0407 -0.107 -0.0857 0.0692 0.0467 0.0500
(-0.40) (-0.97) (-0.78) (0.64) (0.40) (0.43)
LOW-RANK 0.0998 0.132 -0.0332 0.183∗∗ 0.173∗ 0.0979
(1.23) (1.54) (-0.31) (2.11) (1.91) (0.91)
CONSTRAINT 0.351 1.204 ∗∗ -1.110 -0.691
(0.41) (2.33) (-1.24) (-0.75)
LOC2 -2.026∗∗∗ -1.647∗∗∗
(-3.96) (-3.02)
LOC3 -2.250∗∗∗ -1.177∗
(-3.12) (-1.74)
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
that is the political constraint of the ﬁrm manager, and model(4) displays all the
independent variables.
In the following we do hypothesis testing on four scenarios referred above. We
deﬁne the constrained models as the one without any relational variables, and the
unstrained models are those with all variables included. As we see in Table 6, the
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LR-chi square diﬀerence between the two models of ﬁrst scenario, ﬁrm's access to
ﬁnance, is 17.54 with 6 degree of freedom (d.f), which is signiﬁcant at the 0.0075
level. The BIC and AIC statistics also both favor the unconstrained model, which
includes the relational network variables. Likelihood-ratio tests indicate that for all
scenarios the included embedded network variables add signiﬁcantly to the ﬁt of the
model. The models show the ﬁrms' accesses to market transactions are signiﬁcantly
improved by ﬁrm-government relations, although the size and scope of eﬀect vary
with dependent variables.
Table 6: Likelihood-ratio test of ordinal regression models
Unconstrained model Fi, FGj 6= 0
(vs. constrained model FGj = 0)
LR-stat Chi2(6) AIC BIC
Access to ﬁnance 17.54 0.0075 317.08(322.6) 357.1(368.3)
Access to raw materials 27.52 0.0001 309.3(324.6) 359.2(361.2)
Input price 17.98 0.0063 413.6(419.9) 457.0(468.3)
Output price 23.96 0.005 391.9(403.9) 441.3(446.0)
Model (1)-(4) in table 4 report ordered logit regression results for testing Hy-
potheses 1a-1c. Generally, the coeﬃcients for political relations in the regressions
have the expected signs and are statistically signiﬁcant. The positive coeﬃcient of
RANGE variable indicates the cumulative probability starting at "1" end of the scale
increases as the number of network ties increases. That means, the large the range of
ﬁrm's shareholders is, the more odds will be that ﬁrm manager would report an eas-
ier access to ﬁnancial market. Besides, the coeﬃcient of local government's share in
the ﬁrm is found negative and insigniﬁcant. This suggests the the local oﬃcials who
directly or indirectly hold the shares in the ﬁrm may not helpful for ﬁrms on ﬁnan-
cial access. Regarding the relational resource ties, we ﬁnd high-rank and low-rank
positively aﬀect the ﬁrm's conﬁdence to access to ﬁnical market, thus hypotheses 1b
can be eﬃciently tested through regression estimation. The constraint of manager's
individual ties with local oﬃcials is proved to strongly aﬀect the ﬁrm's judgement on
ﬁnancing diﬃculties, negative sign means when the ﬁrm manager ﬁnds himself more
politically constrained, he may consider it more diﬃcult to have access to ﬁnancial
market, which supports the hypothesis. However, we do not ﬁnd the signiﬁcance
of Communist Party membership on obtaining the credit, like that Li et al. (2008)
suggest in their paper. One explanation is that Li et al. analyzes the ﬁrm's access
to formal ﬁnancing like banks or other state institutions. In our survey, we allow the
respondents to report the overall diﬃculty to credit or ﬁnancing, including formal
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or informal ways. It apparently suggests that through political embeddedness, ﬁrms
have much more conﬁdence in obtaining the ﬁnancing.5
In the control variables, we have found the high education level of managers
increased the odd of self-reporting degree of diﬃculty in access to ﬁnancing, which
is consistent to much literature that education helps ﬁrms to perform better. The
variable of TVE ownership as initially registered shows negative coeﬃcient with
signiﬁcance. If we take model (4) as an example, for any ﬁxed category j, the esti-
mated odds that the ﬁrms are TVEs as initial status is less easier to have access to
resources, equal 0.23(e−1.472) times less than estimated odds for originally registered
non-TVEs. Through this result, we are able to read, the privatization of TVEs has
given rural ﬁrms more control and freedom, thus they ﬁnd it easier to market trans-
actions in the market economy. The property rights of ﬁrms seem not appropriate
to establish as an indicator of ﬁrm-government relations, as much research work
suggested.
Column (5)-(8) (Model (1)-(4) on the right side) of Table 4 report the eﬀects of
ﬁrm-government relations on ﬁrm's self-reported degree of diﬃculty in access to raw
material resources. In consistent with the Hypothesis 2b, we ﬁnd that political high-
ranking ties have signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm's self-reporting of raw material resource.
This result suggests high rank ties with decision power, give ﬁrms more information
and marketing resources, which increase ﬁrm's conﬁdence in access to rural resources.
Constraint in this term, is also signiﬁcant and negative. The political structural holes
increase ﬁrm's self estimation on raw materials due to the suﬃcient information
exchange and favorable political guidance.
Table 5 illustrates the eﬀects of political relations on ﬁrm's self-reported degree
of diﬃculty in economic transactions, especially whether the ties help to inﬂuence
the products prices. Unfortunately, in terms of the input products market, there
is no signiﬁcant sign from relational variables except the political constraint, which
means, few structural holes of political network increase ﬁrms' estimation on input
price, the hypothesis is partially tested. In terms of political relations on ﬁrms'
output price estimation, RANGE and LOW-RANK ties show signiﬁcant eﬀects on
ﬁrm's output products price, the result is not consistent when we incorporate all
the variables together. Nevertheless, we can still ﬁnd the positive eﬀect of RANGE
5Informal credit or ﬁnancing is not legally allowed by the national policies, however, in Zhejiang
province informal credit is treated as an ﬁnancing experiment which is allowed by central govern-
ment. Local government has lots of resources and power on informal ﬁnancing, which helps ﬁrms to
realize the importance of obtaining informal credit through good relations with local government.
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on manager's output price calculation, which suggests that, the more varied is the
ﬁrm's director of board, the higher competitive prices the ﬁrm would get in the
output market.
With regard to marginal eﬀect, we report the marginal eﬀect results of all sce-
narios in table 7, holding the other constant at their mean. Marginal eﬀects provide
a good approximation to the amount of change in dependent variable that will be
produced by a one unit change in a speciﬁc independent variable. For example,
if we focus on the ﬁrst scenario, if there is one unit increase of HIGH-RANK or
LOW-RANK, the probability of ﬁrm's attitudes towards diﬃculty in ﬁnancial ac-
cess would increase by 0.017991 or 0.02076, which is signiﬁcantly smaller than that
of CONSTRAINT (0.16259). Transforming to odds, we can say that the odds of
feeling more easily to get to ﬁnancial support are increased by e0.16 for each unit
decrease in the level of constraint, holding other variables constant.
Table 7: Average marginal eﬀect of each independent variable.
Financial Access Raw material Access Input price Output price
LGLABOR 0.00468 0.00941 0.0152 .07134
YEAR 0.03684 0.03073 0.0152 0.02141
OWN10 0.13504 0.09670 0.04623 0.04283
REWARD 0.01291 0.0495 0.02382 0.00200
M-EDU 0.05040 0.00653 0.04442 0.02826
M-PARTY 0.02082 0.03599 0.04704 0.05518
M-EXP 0.01817 0.0074 0.02342 0.02676
LGSHARE 0.02319 0.05733 0.0332 0.01674
RANGE 0.03747 0.02454 .00132 .03432
HIGH-RANK 0.01791 0.02830 0.00821 0.00437
LOW-RANK 0.02076 0.01582 0.00101 0.0100
CONSTRAINT 0.16259 0.24082 0.11984 0.06668
LOC2 0.03475 0.24082 0.16703 0.15346
LOC3 0.12998 0.0019 0.18033 0.11126
We can also ﬁnd how the probability of being in each category changes as a func-
tion of one of the continuous variables, holding the other variables constant. Figure
2 display how the signiﬁcant variables aﬀect the probability of being in each category
changes. For example, in scenario a) ﬁrm's access to ﬁnancial market, the low rank
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities of chosen categories
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a) Predicted probabilities of financial access for firms.
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manager with oﬃcer's ties increases, the probability of ﬁrm managers choosing 4 or
5 will positively increase, which denote easier access to ﬁnancial support when ﬁrm
manager has close ties with low rank political oﬃcials. Other plot can be explained
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in the same way.
In summary, we ﬁnd some evidence that ﬁrm-government relations of ﬁrms exert
a larger positive eﬀect on ﬁrms' market transactions. These ﬁndings support the
view that the network connections between ﬁrm and local government provides sig-
niﬁcant economic and business beneﬁts for rural ﬁrms in the context of transitional
economy in China.
5.2 Ordinal probit analysis and Bayesian estimation
After applying Cowles (1996)'s algorithm to the interview data, we initialize the
parameter vectors with the maximum likelihood values. We then perform 20,000
Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) iterations. The bayesian sample estimates of
the posterior means of the parameter values of the ﬁrst scenario are displayed in
Table 8, here γi indicates the value of category cut-oﬀ. The estimations indicate
the posterior means agree well with the probit regression which applies the max-
imum likelihood estimation in Table 8. Other statistics of scenario can be ﬁnd
in Appendix. This fact suggests that the posterior distribution of the parameter
estimates is approximately normal. The traces and density plot of the posterior
distribution of each variable in the ﬁrst scenario are displayed in Appendix, which
support the normal distribution conclusion.
Table 8: Statistics for ordinal probit models and simulation models for ﬁrm's access to
ﬁnance
Parameter Ordinal probit model MCMC simulation model
Estimate S.D Posterior Mean Posterior S.D
LGLABOR 0.085 0.133 0.087 0.133
YEAR 0.172 0.126 0.176 0.127
OWN10 -0.688 0.267 -0.704 0.268
REWARD 0.117 0.218 0.118 0.219
M-EDU 0.207 0.125 0.214 0.125
M-PARTY 0.059 0.258 0.056 0.260
M-EXP -0.001 0.131 0.000 0.132
LGSHARE 0.007 0.244 0.001 0.244
RANGE 0.240 0.114 0.250 0.114
HIGH-RANK 0.127 0.062 0.134 0.062
LOW-RANK 0.044 0.050 0.045 0.051
CONSTRAINT 0.297 0.324 0.299 0.325
γ2 1.710 0.182 1.712 0.184
γ3 2.954 0.235 2.951 0.239
γ4 4.090 0.400 4.092 0.401
Note: 1. Statistics for ordinal probit and simulation models of other scenarios can be found in Appendix
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The MCMC algorithm used to estimate the posterior means of the parameter
estimates is the vector of laten variables Z. As discussed in the section 4.3, these
variables provide a convenient diagnostic for detecting outliers and assessing good-
ness of ﬁt. We can examine the posterior-predictive residual to further investigate
whether there exists over-dispersion in the likelihood-based analysis. If we denote
y∗i as the posterior distribution of the simulated manager's attitudes toward ﬁrm's
access to ﬁnancial support and let yi denote the observed attitudes category, then
the posterior-predictive residual distribution for the ith observation is deﬁned as
the distribution of yi − y∗i . The plots of the estimated interquartile ranges of the
posterior-predictive residuals is provided in Figure 3. Since all the ranges do cover
0 which indicate no over-dispersion. The appearance of four scenario plots indicate
there is no lack of ﬁt.
Figure 3: Inter-quartile ranges of the posterior-predictive residuals of four scenarios
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Source: own illustration.
6 Conclusion and Discussions
In contract to studies that have focused on investigating a ﬁrm's internal capabilities
or the context-speciﬁed ownership arrangement in China, this study tries to consider
how ﬁrms win advantages and collective gains through social ties and networks
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with local government. Moreover, we do not fall into the implications of Guanxi,
which appear in almost every paper describing the speciﬁc inter-personal exchange
relationship in China. Based on the embeddedness theory and the idea of ego-
centric network (Uzzi and Gillespie, 2002), we argue ﬁrm-government relation is a
mechanism by which the ﬁrms gain competencies and resources from one network
tie with local government to create value in exchange with other social ties. In this
sense, we broaden the deﬁnition of political connection or political capital, which
only emphasize the manager's membership status in a legislative organ or in the
Communist Party (Li et al., 2008; Zhou, 2009), the ﬁrm's ﬁrm-government relation
in our analysis could be regarded as a illustration of social network transitivity.
After conducting a in-depth research survey in rural area of Zhejiang province
in 2008, we have empirically studied the eﬀects of ﬁrm-government relationship on
ﬁrm's business behavior through three mechanisms: ﬁrm's access to raw materials,
to ﬁnancing and credit, and to the price market. Consistent with our hypotheses, the
quantitative analysis showed the signiﬁcant inﬂuences of ﬁrm's connection with local
governments on economic transactions. The strong individual relational connections
and institutional embeddedness increase the likelihood that the ﬁrm reports fewer
obstacles on the entry of raw materials, ﬁnancing and products price market. These
ﬁndings support the arguments that the politics still plays a very important role in
the success of business in the transitional economy like China.
Much literature studying the rural China emphasizes the strategic alliance part-
ner the local government plays in facilitating transactions between the ﬁrm and
various other organizations, such as bank, the tax collectors and other government
agencies (Walder, 1995; Nee, 1996), and we operationalize this basic arguments by
incorporating relational embeddedness (like HIGH-RANK or LOW-RANK) and re-
source embeddedness (like RANGE and CONSTRAINT) as the network indicators
of ﬁrm-government relation. However, as most of the results showed signiﬁcant ef-
fects of strong ties with local oﬃcers and ties with high rank oﬃcers on business
channels, we have to admit, the economic powers are still controlled under some
people in local area. Although China's central government emphasizes the success
of market economy, political inﬂuences on business are dramatically strong. Accord-
ing to the empirical results and the qualitative interview, the ﬁrms without good
connections to local bureaus would show less conﬁdence in running a good business.
Much literature suggests inter-ﬁrm alliances have been an increasingly popular
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vehicle for inter-organizational strategic relations in recent years, and the ﬁrm-ﬁrm
network helps to obtain access to needed resources, to learn new skills, to enhance
competitive parity and to broaden the potential market shares (Clegg et al., 2007),
due to our data limitation our result unfortunately can not ﬁnd any information on
inter-ﬁrm network in rural China.
China's market supporting policies are in practice for 30 years, but the institu-
tional environment is far from perfect, and is likely to remain so for some time. In
this result, the ﬁrm's relationship with local government shows strong eﬀect on ﬁrm's
business behavior. Given the multidimensional political agencies even in the rural
area, we further plan to go deeper in investigating the structure and the character-
istics of ﬁrm-government network, and to analyze how the political embeddedness
inﬂuences ﬁrm's decision, like mobility. We also have plans to explore more survey
data in diﬀerent regions to obtain a reliable and more convincing result.
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Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure 4: Trace of the sampled output and density estimates for ﬁrm's access to ﬁ-
nance(Since other densities of scenarios have same shapes as the ﬁrst scenario we present,
the other plots are omitted here.)
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Table 10: Statistics for ordinal probit models and simulation models for ﬁrm's access to raw materials
Parameter Ordinal probit model MCMC simulation model
Estimate S.D Posterior Mean Posterior S.D
LGLABOR -0.057 0.134 -0.058 0.133
YEAR 0.202 0.127 0.206 0.127
OWNORG -0.504 0.267 -0.514 0.270
REWARD 0.242 0.218 0.245 0.218
M-EDU 0.014 0.125 0.013 0.124
M-PARTY 0.476 0.258 0.488 0.260
M-EXP -0.101 0.131 -0.101 0.132
LGSHARE 0.361 0.246 0.371 0.245
RANGE 0.254 0.116 0.262 0.115
HIGH-RANK 0.189 0.063 0.195 0.062
LOW-RANK 0.107 0.051 0.110 0.051
CONSTRAINT 0.099 0.321 0.101 0.324
γ2 1.870 0.298 1.869 0.297
γ3 3.190 0.310 3.192 0.312
γ4 4.953 0.376 4.966 0.375
Table 11: Statistics for ordinal probit models and simulation models for ﬁrm's estimation on input price
Parameter Ordinal probit model MCMC simulation model
Estimate S.D Posterior Mean Posterior S.D
LGLABOR 0.068 0.128 0.067 0.129
YEAR -0.018 0.119 -0.019 0.119
OWNORG 0.139 0.250 0.146 0.250
REWARD -0.277 0.209 -0.279 0.210
M-EDU -0.173 0.118 -0.177 0.119
M-PARTY 0.302 0.245 0.311 0.246
M-EXP -0.446 0.128 -0.454 0.129
LGSHARE -0.253 0.233 -0.266 0.235
RANGE 0.007 0.109 0.008 0.109
HIGH-RANK 0.057 0.058 -0.002 0.058
LOW-RANK 0.044 0.048 0.058 0.048
CONSTRAINT 0.222 0.030 0.224 0.029
γ2 1.433 0.319 1.446 0.320
γ3 2.440 0.334 2.443 0.339
γ4 4.080 0.400 4.081 0.401
Table 12: Statistics for ordinal probit models and simulation models for ﬁrm's estimation on output price
Parameter Ordinal probit model MCMC simulation model
Estimate S.D Posterior Mean Posterior S.D
LGLABOR -0.324 0.131 -0.331 0.131
YEAR -0.080 0.121 -0.082 0.122
OWNORG 0.264 0.255 0.271 0.256
REWARD -0.143 0.211 -0.150 0.211
M-EDU -0.141 0.120 -0.148 0.120
M-PARTY 0.326 0.248 0.336 0.249
M-EXP -0.335 0.128 -0.344 0.129
LGSHARE -0.128 0.236 -0.132 0.236
RANGE 0.203 0.012 0.208 0.012
HIGH-RANK 0.062 0.059 0.063 0.059
LOW-RANK 0.115 0.049 0.118 0.049
CONSTRAINT -0.136 0.302 -0.143 0.302
γ2 1.281 0.204 1.280 0.205
γ3 3.080 0.210 3.081 0.211
γ4 4.409 0.390 4.408 0.391
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Chapter 5
Estimating the Impact of Network Relation to Local
Government on Technical Efficiency in Chinese Agribusiness
Industry
Jiangping Han and Christian Henning
Abstract
Over the last decades, China's GDP has achieved the signiﬁcant aver-
age growth rate in the world. Various scholars highlight special institutional
framework conditions in particular the role of local government as a key fac-
tor explaining China's economic success. However, while some scholars like
Weingast et al.(1995) emphasize the special institutional framework condition
implying competition among local government known as Market Preserving
Federalism Chinese Style (MPFCS), other scholars like Tian(2001) empha-
sizes the importance of government-ﬁrm relations as a driving factor of ﬁrms'
economic performance in China. Thus, there hardly exists a common consis-
tent approach explaining the role of local government in economic performance
and the development of entrepreneurship.
In this regard this paper analyzes the impact of ﬁrm-government relations
on ﬁrm's economic performance at the micro level. Particularly, we estimate a
stochastic frontier production function incorporating social network relations
to local government as determinants of ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency. Major results
imply a signiﬁcant positive impact of ﬁrm's network relations to local govern-
ment on technical eﬃciency. However, after correcting aggregate outputs for
ﬁrm speciﬁc terms of trade, this positive impact of ﬁrm-government relations
vanishes. Interpreting our results we conclude in contrast to Tian(2001) that,
while network relations to local government correspond to valuable resources at
the micro level, these do not necessarily translate into productive resources at
the macro level. Thus, given the institutional background with social planning
in China, economy good connections to local government mainly imply that
ﬁrms have good access to scare inputs or to lucrative output markets. How-
ever, at the macro level favorable market access does not necessarily correlate
with ﬁrm's eﬃciency and hence do not imply higher economic performance.
key words: technical eﬃciency, ﬁrm-government relations, stochastic-frontier
estimation, China
This paper will be submitted to The Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics.
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1 Introduction
The economic reforms launched by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) two decades
ago have helped China to jump into the lines of powerful nations worldwide. Along
with extensive decline in direct control from government over economy according to
a series of national economy and political policies, an increase in the use of mar-
ket forces and international market resources have been widely accepted by most
Chinese ﬁrms. However, China's success would not come true without political par-
ticipation in the economy development and business activities (Guthrie, 2008). A
central theme in the current literature on the economy of growth is still the relation-
ship between politics and business. One of the dynamic strands is the evolvement
and eﬀects of relations between local governments and local business in rural area.
While most researchers agree that the economic development in the local area is
achieved due to the enhancing powers of the local administration, there has been
considerable disagreement about the role of local governments, which insisted that
the intervention of local government had negative impacts on local economy. There
is a substantial debate on how to structure ﬁrm-government relations in rural area,
or even, what dimensions of the relationship might be consequential.
In China it is widely known that the economy is highly embedded in the politics,
the whole country is organized into a tightly nested hierarchy where Communist
Party's plan is carried out through the central government in Beijing, twenty-two
provinces, another ﬁve autonomous regions and three municipalities (Guthrie, 2008).
Approximately 2,200 county governments are set under the lead of district govern-
ment, and simultaneously supervise the lowest level of branches and rural township
or village governments. This administrative structure forms the hierarchy in which
national resources and incentives are allocated from the central command to the
various levels of local governments. Diﬀerent levels of governments have direct con-
trol over State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) and indirect control over other forms of
enterprises in this system. In this regard, by observing more autonomy power con-
trolled by local government Weingast (1995) has proposed the argument of Market-
Preserving Federalism Chinese style, which has set the institutional structure of
socialism society into de facto federalism. It has highlighted a series of institutions
that distribute authority between central and local governments with the aim of
promoting high growth rates by reducing the government intervention in the econ-
omy and further facilitating inter-government competition to attract business and
investment. The theme of the federalism is the reduced intervention of politics in
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business activities, and it has descriptively illustrated the close relations between
government and ﬁrms would negatively aﬀect ﬁrm's performance.
However, in Chinese case, government, especially local governments still have
played an important role in local community and local economy. Local dynamics
and local developments are made from the interactions between multiple functional
agencies, both vertically and horizontally. Those multiple functional political agen-
cies then directly or indirectly intervene ﬁrm's investment plan, business routines
and economic performance. Another approach has emphasized Local governments
were regarded as entrepreneurial, developmental and served as a director of board
in many rural ﬁrms (Oi, 1992). `corporate models'. As an extension to corporatism,
local governments provided a good physical environment, the access to capital, and
linkages to external markets or important agencies (Blecher and Shue, 1996). Under
this circumstance, local oﬃcials' ability on external resources came into the con-
sideration of some researchers. Tian (2001) distinguishes the external management
ability as an indicator of ﬁrm's connection with government when the markets, es-
pecially factor markets are absent or far from perfect. External management ability
thus plays an essential role for successful production. On the contrary, the be-
haviors of local oﬃcials have been criticized by many scholars. Their study shows
that local government oﬃcials put their own objectives above not only the aims
of the central government but also above those of the local community. Sargeson
and Zhang (1999)'s study challenges Oi (1992) and Walder (1995)'s ﬁndings even
for more developed areas on the basis of their work. Supreme and seeks to control
everything appointing the enterprise managers, determining the production quotas
and investment levels.
We ﬁrstly argue, on the contrary to Tian, the productive success at micro level
of ﬁrm performance could not be no more hold at the macro level; secondly, after
applying the existing lobbying theory to derive a micro foundation of concept of
external management ability, we argue ﬁrm-government relation mainly implies the
favorable access to input/ output markets reﬂected in ﬁrm's speciﬁc terms of trade,
which however do not increase ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency. By estimating ﬁrms' pro-
duction function with the help of Stochastic Frontier Analysis, we generally support
our theory.
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2 Theoretical backgrounds
2.1 Theories of ﬁrm-government relations
Township and village Enterprises (TVEs) were considered as a unique economic form
in rural China, which were set up by local governments' initiative as a consequence
of a series of national economic policy in rural area, especially at the administrative
level of township and village. Woo(1999) has investigated the diﬀerent organiza-
tional models of TVEs and summarizes three types of collective TVEs, (1) genuine
collectively-owned enterprises. These ﬁrms are registered and operated by rural
local governments, like village or township governments; (2) partnership between lo-
cal oﬃcials and private entrepreneurs.1; (3) private-ﬁnanced and privately operated
enterprises seeking political shelter and avoiding legal discrimination.2
The role of local governments played in ﬁrm's performance has been widely dis-
cussed in the literature. All the viewpoints in this regard were based on the develop-
ment of public TVEs in 1980s. According to this view, rural governments resembled
an industrial corporation where revenue generation is paramount and the entire lo-
cal government operated as an industrial ﬁrm (Walder, 1995). Holding the same
argument, Oi et al. (1999) suggested `collectively owned industrial enterprises' was
a kind of local government entrepreneurship serving for both the political and eco-
nomic interests of local cadres. Similar themes were clustered under the deﬁnition of
Local Corporatism by many other researchers (Lin, 1995). Varieties of corporatism
deﬁned the role of local oﬃcials as entrepreneurial and developmental, since in this
form, the community were able to generate more revenues and created more em-
ployment opportunities (Blecher, 1991). Che (2002) set up a mathematical model
to emphasize the positive role of local government played in ﬁrm's production. He
used R = f(a, x), where R was the investment return, a was managerial eﬀort and
x was the number of excess workers hired to reach the goal of investment. From an-
other perspective, he employed both entrepreneurial factors and non-entrepreneurial
factors in an eﬀort function of public TVEs. He further assumed utility function
of local oﬃcials as U(x, θ), where x had the same meaning as that above, and θ
represented the political attitudes that political oﬃcials held. Accordingly, he dis-
1These partnership ﬁrms are very common in modern China, many local politicians participate
in the ﬁrms' business in the name of their spouses or relatives, in order to escape the supervision
from upper level governments.
2Category (3) could be merged into category (2) since oﬃcials would ask for share holding if
they are asked to oﬀer political shelter or resource beneﬁciary.
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tinguished θl as pro-politics government agency and θh as pro-business government
agency. When considering both the return of investment and utility, he concluded
if the public TVEs was controlled by pro-business government agency, the beneﬁts
would dominate these of private ownership.
Che (2002)'s result was straightforward under the framework of Local Corpo-
ratism in which local governments were thought to align the interests of local com-
munity and to be productive in public TVEs. However, the resources available to
the local community vary enormously among diﬀerent regions, and this directly af-
fects the behavior of local governments. The nature of local oﬃcials can be more
predatory than entrepreneurial. Yao (2004) also challenged the theories of local cor-
poratism, if local government failed to commit in the community, both private and
public enterprises can not develop well.
Regarding the macro-background of TVEs, the most inﬂuential argument is
Market-preserving Federalism, Chinese style(MPFCS). The characteristic of Fed-
eralism on economy issue is the intergovernmental competition, the higher mobility
of capital and residents across regions should have eroded one of the key foundations
of local corporatism - the dependence of local residents on local collective ownership
for incomes and jobs. If the local government tries to impose excessive taxation or
regulations on the ﬁrm, the ﬁrm is able to transfer to other regions which have fewer
predatory activities by local bureaus. Second, the process of marketization in terms
of market competition and further reforms in the banking and taxation systems has
greatly reduced the dependence of TVE managers and private entrepreneurs on local
oﬃcials for a special access to key resources. Park and Shen (2003) found that in the
more competitive environment, banks prefer private ﬁrms for individual ﬁrm lending
rather than TVEs for joint liability lending. Li, Li, Zhang (2001) illustrated when
competition was suﬃciently intense in the product market, the local government will
be induced to shift the residual claims to the manager, thus, the local ﬁrms will jump
out of the residual control rights by local government. Third, MPFCS enable local
governments to enhance commitment problem. The credit commitment by local
government will induce privatization as a Pareto improvement to both the politi-
cian and the manager (Yao, 2003). Thus the commitment from local governments
would ease the predatory behavior by local government in the argument of Local
Corporatism, and further enhance the ﬁrm performance. In a word, the mechanism
of Market-preserving federalism will directly increase the economic performance in
the industry sector from macro perspective.
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When more and more private TVEs went into the business world, the relations
between local governments and local ﬁrms changed dramatically. On the one hand,
the central government encourages to build new corporate structures in order to fur-
ther block political interventions in the decision making process.3 In other words, the
township and village government was not allowed to become involved in investment
and business activities as an owner of the collective economy. Thus, the relation
between local governments and enterprises is not restricted to one-directional pub-
lic ownership, but developed to multi-directional partnership ownership. With the
promotion of share-holding in the latter part of the 1990s, it has become clear that
local oﬃcials in a number of areas have used their oﬃcial positions to acquire the
major beneﬁts for themselves, families and associates. Lin (1995) in his study of
Daqiuzhuang revealed the networks between the local oﬃcials operating in a more
predatory manner. He showed how the share-holding system has been exploited to
transfer the local enterprise into private hands. However, there are other arguments
supporting the ﬁrm's external ties with diﬀerent political bureaus will help ﬁrm's
performance both in micro and macro level. One of the pioneering work is from
Tian (2001).
2.2 Concept of external management ability
In a widely recognized paper Tian (2001) derived a theory of ownership arrange-
ments and their impact on economic performance under diﬀerent institutional envi-
ronments ranging from a perfect market economy to socialistic planning.
A key point of Tian's model is separation of external and internal management
abilities. While internal management ability corresponds to classical management
skills to organize production, e.g. controlling, technical production, supervision of
labor, etc, external management ability corresponds to manager's ability to promote
good relations with bureaucratic departments. The latter becomes of crucial im-
portance when markets, especially factor markets are absent or far from perfect..."
Tian (2001). The latter is especially the case in socialistic planning economies, where
diﬀerent levels of government agencies control access to scare production inputs. In
particular, these inputs are not distributed via a free market mechanism, where
inputs are distributed across ﬁrms according to their relative economic competi-
tiveness. By contrast, ﬁrms' access to inputs is controlled or at least, regulated by
3Here mainly with regard to shareholder meetings, corporate boards and managers, according
to the Company Law passed in 1994.
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political administrations. Accordingly, Tian further pointed out that in an imperfect
market environment, such as a socialistic planning economy, personal relations with
state bureaucracy crucially aﬀects the access to scare inputs and hence the economic
success of an individual ﬁrm.
...thus, bureaucratic connections become extremely valuable within an imperfect insti-
tutional environment such as a transitional economy. Many transaction and production
relations are personalized, and access to scare inputs is a matter of privilege. External
management ability becomes essential for successful production." Tian (2001).
Formally, Tian tries to capture the relative importance of external and inter-
nal management ability for eﬀective production assuming the following production
function for individual ﬁrms:
Q = F (R,M,L,K; ρ)
Where R stands for external management ability, M is internal management ability,
L and K stand for labor and capital respectively. It is obvious from Tian's argument
and from the production function above, in a transition economy with imperfect
information and in incomplete market (if ρ = 0), external ability, or procurement
ability may be more crucial for a ﬁrm to survive, however, in a perfect market
environment (if ρ = 1), this kind of external management ability is not necessary to
the production process.
In particular, following Tian's own conception, external management ability ba-
sically corresponds to manager's skills to form close personal relations with bureau-
crats who control the access of certain essential factors. Thus, following the logic
of Tian's work, it implies that the closer the personal relation of a ﬁrm manager
with bureaucrats, the higher is the share of the scare input a ﬁrm can acquire. Ac-
cordingly, at the micro level external management ability can be considered as a
productive factor as it increases ﬁrm's production. However, Tian's formalization
of the impact of external management abilities is misleading. Speciﬁcally, if we con-
sider the production of all ﬁrms at the macro level, the productive characteristic of
external management ability holds no more true.
The model constructed below is to support our conjecture on external manage-
ment ability at macro level. To see this more clearly, we assume that a bureaucrat
controls the distribution of a scare input, X, where the amount a ﬁrm i can pro-
cure (Xi) depends on ﬁrm i's external ability with local bureaucrat in the whole
community, which we assume αi, i.e, Xi = αiX. Furthermore, ﬁrm's access ability
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to certain essential input factors depends on the ability of ﬁrm's manager to form
personal relations with the bureaucrats and the eﬀective resources used to form or
maintain these personal relations. We assume a relational function which is non-
linear, increasing and strictly concave, i.e. γi = gi(Ri).
Since the external ability of access to scare essential inputs is a relational concept,
the bureaucrat will distribute the scare inputs across ﬁrms proportionally based on
the relative strength of his personal relations with those ﬁrms. The importance of
ﬁrm i among all the ﬁrms who have personal relations with bureaucrats is assumed
as: αi =
gi(Ri)∑
j
gj(Rj)
.
From the deﬁnition of relational function it is clear to understand that an in-
crease of ﬁrm i's external management ability is productive at individual ﬁrm level.
Meanwhile, since the resource allocation from local government is limited, it also
follows quite plainly that we can always identify a subset of ﬁrms, for which an
increase of their individual external management ability would result in a decrease
of total production at the macro level. Furthermore, in contrast to labor, capital
or even internal management ability, which are directly related with productivity of
ﬁrms or in a community, a common increase of the external management ability of
all ﬁrms would probably in general not result in an increase of total production.
To test our conjecture, we follow Tullock (1967)'s famous rent- seeking theory,
which suggested that from social perspective, external management abilities for
essential input factors is like lobbying activities, which obviously generate a social
waste. As we have already deﬁned above, we consider a set of ﬁrms, among which
each ﬁrm i invest an amount of Ri for external management ability as the relational
input, the local cadres distribute the factor inputs depending on the relations the
ﬁrm have invested, as a result, the ﬁrm receives the amount of Xi input units, as
follows:
αi =
gi(Ri)∑
j
gj(Rj)
Xi = αiX
(1)
As we have deﬁned that function gi is non-decreasing and continuous in Ri, it
follows that there always exists a vector λ = [λi], such that:
αi =
gi(Ri)∑
j
gj(Rj)
= gi(λiRi)∑
j
gj(λjRj)
0 < λi < 1
(2)
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In this case, we see that if there is a common decrease of Ri, at the macro level,
there exist λ to keep the original ratio of factor inputs. We have already known that
the manager of a ﬁrm i has to allocate his time among personal relations and internal
management, the total management time, M+R is limited. If the manager increase
his internal management indicatorM , which is considered to be productive, he would
then obviously devote a common decrease of external management indicator R to
production. From equilibrium (2), a decrease of external management relation can
still keep the original allocation of factor inputs. Under this circumstance, increase
of M and decrease of R directly lead to a higher output for all ﬁrms. As a result,
Pareto dominant in the community is realized when compared to the original non-
cooperative equilibrium. Nevertheless, since each ﬁrm competes for the share of
inputs X, as the resource allocation from local cadres is restricted, a Pareto optimal
allocation based on external management relations can generally not be achieved,
therefore, a social waste is generated.
2.3 Revised model of Tian
As explained in section 2.2, Tian's conception of external management abilities
basically implies the ﬁrm manager's ability with external bureaucrats, to lobby local
government in an imperfect socialism system to distribute a considerable share of
scare inputs for further production use. Based on this point of view, we are able
to apply existing lobbying theories, to name a few, like the interest group theory
of Grossman and Helpman (2001) to derive a micro foundation with the concept of
external management ability.
We ﬁrstly consider a simple lobbying game between local cadre and the manager
of local ﬁrm. We assume the manager and local cadre make their decisions succes-
sively. At the ﬁrst step, the manager decides his production plan, to invest his time
in personal relations with local oﬃcers, generally, we can consider this relational
investment as a support to local government; the local cadre receives support from
diﬀerent ﬁrms in the community and then allocate the inputs among supporting
ﬁrms.
We solve the problem backward. Si(R,N,Xi) is denoted as the support schedule
announced by each ﬁrm. Si implies the support from a ﬁrm which, as the ﬁrm's
plan, can credibly guarantees the development of local community in exchange of
the amount Xi received from the local cadres. to overcome opportunistic behavior
political exchange is embedded in close ﬁrm-government network relations. We
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denote Ni as a network index measuring the closeness of ﬁrm government relations.
The productivity of external management time R with regard to political support
is crucially determined by ﬁrms network relation with the government Ni. The
government cadre then maximizes the supports received from all the ﬁrms in the
community under the restriction that the inputs allocated among ﬁrms. To maximize
his support function we have:
Max
Xi
∑
i
Si(Ri, Ni, Xi)
s.t.∑
i
Xi = X
(3)
After presenting the Lagrange-multiplier λ, we are able to set up the ﬁrst-order
condition:
∂Si
∂Xi
= λ (4)
Generally we assume that the support function of local ﬁrms is mainly based on
external management ability R, which speciﬁcally transform the time used for eﬀec-
tive procurement on bureaucrats into a formalized support function Si. However,
political exchange of inputs and support are plagued by the problem of opportunis-
tic behavior. We think it backwardly, given a received input from local government,
the ﬁrm has no incentive to commit the promises of support. Beside, the ﬁrm has
ex-ante to invest in personal relation with local cadres to build R, we are able to
derive proﬁt maximization as follows:
max
Ri,Xi
Π(Xi)−Riur
s.t.
Si(Ri, Ni, Xi) ≡ 0
(5)
where ur is the parameter of relational indicator Ri, Π is the proﬁt function.
With Lagrange-Multiplier µ we have the ﬁrst-order condition:
∂Πi
∂Xi
− µ ∂Si
∂Xi
= 0
ur + µ
∂Si
∂Ri
= 0
After rearranging the results we have:
∂Si
∂Ri
ur
∂Πi
∂Xi
= − ∂Si
∂Xi
(6)
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On the other hand, after applying the non-cooperative equilibrium of the Gross-
man and Helpman model (Grossman and Helpman, 2001), it follows that given a
sum of distributed input resources, the local government may analogously maximize
the ﬁrms' welfare in the whole community, thus we assume additive social welfare
function as:
max
Xi
∑
i
AiΠi(Xi)
s.t.∑
i
Xi = X
(7)
with:
Ai =
∂Si
∂Ri
ur
(8)
Accordingly, the equilibrium holds for the input amount distributed to a ﬁrm i
by a support maximizing government.
Ai
∂Πi
∂Xi
= −λ (9)
Now we generally assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with labor (L),
capital (K) and the distributed intermediate input X as production factors, Yi =
Lαi K
β
i X
γ
i , where constant returns scale implies that α+β+γ = 1. Since Πi is deﬁned
as the proﬁt function of ﬁrm i, we have Πi(Xi) = pYi−qXi where p and q denote the
oﬃcial output and input prices, respectively. Then we have the ﬁrst-order condition
of proﬁt function as ∂Πi
∂Xi
= pγLαi K
β
i X
γ−1
i − q.
From Equation 9, we have
pγLαi K
β
i X
γ−1
i = q −
λ
Ai
Therefore, ﬁnally we have
Xi∗ = (TOTi)
1
1−γ γ
1
1−γL
α
1−γ
i K
β
1−γ
i
TOTi =
p
q− λ
Ai
(10)
While TOTi denotes ﬁrm i's speciﬁc terms of trade, i.e. assuming a perfect
market ﬁrm i would exactly demand the amount Xi given the output and input price
relation TOTi. Note that ﬁrm speciﬁc terms of trade TOTi depend in particular on
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the relative ability of ﬁrm i to produce credible support of the government when
compared to the ability of all other ﬁrms competing for the input X. Hence, the
terms of trade are particularly determined by favorable network relation of ﬁrm i to
the government (Ni), when compared to competing ﬁrms.
Substituting the input amount X∗i received by ﬁrm i in the rent seeking equilib-
rium into the original production function yields:
Yi = L
α
1−γ
i K
β
1−γ
i [TOTi]
γ
1−γ γ
γ
1−γ (11)
Therefore, we can test our theory regarding the importance of ﬁrm-government
relation for ﬁrm's economic performance via estimating ﬁrms production function
including ﬁrm speciﬁc terms of trade as an additional production factor as speciﬁed
in eq. 11 above.
Not in particular, that following our theory close ﬁrm-government relation mainly
implies favorable access to input markets reﬂected in favorable ﬁrm speciﬁc terms of
trade, while these do not increase ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency. By contrast, following
the theory of local corporatism, close ﬁrm-government relation implies that local
government can credibly commit not to transgress and tax away ﬁrm's returns to
investment. Therefore, under local corporatism close ﬁrm-government relation in-
crease both capital investments and internal management eﬀort of private ﬁrms and
hence the technical eﬃciency of ﬁrms.
Accordingly, we test for competing theories regarding the impact of ﬁrm-government
relation on economic performance via estimating a stochastic frontier function con-
trolling explicitly for ﬁrm speciﬁc TOTs. In particular, we analyze to what extend
various network parameters measuring ﬁrm-government relations signiﬁcantly de-
termine ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency.
2.4 Firm-Government relationships in rural China
As we have introduced, TVEs were rooted in the township and villages of rural
China, but shared a variety of ownership structures: the ﬁrms were partially or
wholly controlled by local governments, or in some other cases, the ﬁrms were par-
tially run by local oﬃcials. The existence of TVEs shapes numerous interpretations
of an eﬃcient substitute in a weak environment (Che and Qian, 1998). In rural area
there is a legacy of collective-run industries that formed the basis for TVEs devel-
opment. Oi et al. (1999)argue, due to the decentralization combined with hardened
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budget constraints, the local governments was granted greater rights over any sur-
plus. To develop the rural industrial economy was a major opportunity for local
oﬃcials who were eagerly to generate proﬁts to ﬁll up the hole of agricultural rev-
enue loss. One can broadly deﬁne the relation between local government and ﬁrms
as a quasi−formal government−business partnership at the local level in a special
context of weak formal institutions and strong informal institutions (Li, 2005). In
other words, there exists both formal and informal relationships between local oﬃ-
cials and TVE managers.
Behaviors of Local Government. When we discuss the behaviors of local govern-
ment, the focus is mainly on the county, township and village governments and their
aﬃliated departments. At the time when TVEs originated, local government served
multi-disciplinary functions in the local area in China. First, it acted as an industry
corporate board in the ﬁrms, to perform the tasks of strategic planning, management
selection, incentive design and ﬁrm performance evaluation. Because of the eﬀects of
the need for revenue generation, local governments went into business with various
agencies at the county-level to raise revenues and to provide employment opportu-
nities (Blecher, 1991). Second, local government contributed himself to develop the
local public utilities and facilitated resource access for local ﬁrms. By developing
the physical environment, the access to capital and bank loans, and the link to the
external markets, local government played a role of middleman. For example, Park
and Shen (2003) argued that the function of local government was mainly in the
form of loan guarantor, so TVEs had priority to get loans than private rural ﬁrms.
Third, local government acted as a regulator or policy maker through interpreting
the government policies and regulations favorably and implementing them selectively
at the community, including tax collection, alternative levies and fees. Forth, local
government served as a organizer and took a leading role in fostering the local social
capital and structure development among people. The behavior of local government
and its aﬃliated agencies have great impact on collective action and social capital
through trust, norms and networks among diﬀerent organizations. It is because the
politician's promotion and compensation are aﬀected by their performance in var-
ious political and social objectives. Undertaking the functions referred above and
achieving the objectives in his jurisdiction may increase the political oﬃcials' income
and promotion opportunities, but it may jeopardize ﬁrm eﬃciency.
Nowadays, after the massive privatization of public TVEs in the end of 1990s,
local oﬃcials gain from their connections with the ﬁrms in following several ways:
they may receive management fees or unauthorized fees and taxes levied on private
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business; private business may rely on them to ﬁnd channels for re-selling at higher
market prices goods bought at low state-set price, or to gain inside channels for
exports. They may beneﬁt formally from the behavior since the generated extra-
budgetary revenues may help them to fulﬁll the economic requirements set by the
upper level governments.
Behaviors of Firm Manager. The foremost method the managers attempt to
use is to work through oﬃcial channels. They will focus on the careful cultivation
of ties with selected oﬃces and oﬃcials, rather than a regularized and impersonal
adventure into the bureaucracy (Pearson, 1997). There are several ways for rural
ﬁrm managers to connect with local oﬃcials:
1) Formal institutional connections. Oﬃcials in some speciﬁc departments may
be invited to be placed on a board of directors. Sometimes, ﬁrms try to embed
relationships with oﬃcials into their organizational structure by placing a key oﬃcial
(such as someone from the supervisory bureau) on a board of directors or high
in the management structure so that the ﬁrm can use that person's connections
and inﬂuences to its own advantage. In most cases, however, relationships are
less institutionalized. Relationships may be sought for one-time beneﬁts, managers
cannot be certain, however, that these one-time eﬀorts on inﬂuence will be eﬀective.
More eﬀective use of ties involves the active cultivation of relationships that last
over time.
2)Formal individual connections. Mangers in rural ﬁrms have not shown strong
inclinations toward formation of strong horizontal ties among ﬁrms, but they are
prone to be active in political activities. Among the managers in rural area, one
potential channel for formal, organized but individual inﬂuence is representation in
existing political organs, notably the CCP, NPC, CPPCC 4 and their local coun-
terparts. The membership is considered as political capital (Zhou, 2009), and the
investment in such political capital involves participating regularly in routine ac-
tivities and confederacies, contributing to government-sponsored social programs,
which in return could receive considerable beneﬁts.
3)Informal individual connections. Besides the formal individual connections, the
managers prefer informal connections with politicians. Managers attempt to form
4CCP denotes Chinese Communist Party; NPC is the abbreviation of National People's
Congress; CPPCC denotes Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. They represent
the three most important legislative (or semi-legislative) organs of the Chinese government. The
lowest legislative organ is at the township level.
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dense client alliances with the political oﬃcials in person, especially at the local
level. Ties may be built on existing family relations or, among the well-educated,
on bonds developed in school, as in the case of one manager who has connections
with schoolmates who are now in the political agencies and in securities regulatory
agencies. Also the informal connections are built through bribery and the giving of
small gifts to lower-level cadres, by employing middle-level oﬃcials in their business
or by cultivating high-level oﬃcials as patrons.
The managers try to satisfy their own narrow business interests through building
personal relationships with local oﬃcials, to improve business conditions and more
potential access controlled by the government (Hendrischke, 2003). Managers call
on them to achieve narrow types of inﬂuence, ranging from evading an existing rule,
to gaining a favorable interpretation of a rule, to assuaging the anger of an oﬃcial
about past deeds, to moving a procedure along faster. From the ﬁeld study we have
also learned, good relationships can be especially important when the government
provides approvals, or when the government is a customer or supplier. The goal of
using contacts is usually to avoid formal rules set down by the government rather
than to change the existing regulatory regime, and is very important for both the
registration and the operation of business. Local governments retain some types of
authority and discretionary favoritism control in allocating resources and protection,
especially in rural area, where local cadres play a signiﬁcant role in the community
development. Thus the ﬁrms who have strong connection with local political agen-
cies enjoy preferential status in obtaining bank loans and other key inputs as before
(Che, 2002; Brandt et al., 2005).
3 Methodology
3.1 Eﬃciency measurement
In order to estimate the inﬂuences of ﬁrm-government relations on ﬁrm's perfor-
mance, we apply stochastic frontier analysis. Stochastic frontier approach is capable
of capturing measurement error and other statistical noise inﬂuencing the shape and
position of the production frontier. We consider it as a superior choice in our Chi-
nese case study, which is largely inﬂuenced by randomly exogenous factors, such as
institutional and organizational impacts. Theoretically, the stochastic approach to
eﬃciency measurement is subject to prior decisions on the distributional form of the
ineﬃciency component of the error term as well as the modeling of the underlying
118
NETWORK RELATIONS AND TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
technology (Sauer et al., 2006). Following the approach pursued in other related
papers (Wiebusch, 2005), we apply a semilogarithmic second-order expansion of the
general form of the production function to obtain the well-known translog speciﬁ-
cation. Firstly, the output orientation of the production frontier can be written as
follows:
yi = f(xi : β) ∗ exp{vi} ∗ TEi (12)
where yi = f(xi : β) ∗ exp{vi} is the stochastic production frontier consisting
of the deterministic part yi = f(xi : β) common to all ﬁrms in the sample and a
ﬁrm-speciﬁc while vi captures the eﬀect of random shocks on each ﬁrm.
Basic Model. We apply a translog production function to estimate the frontier,
and it is described as:
ln yi = β0 +
m∑
k=1
βk lnxki + 1/2
n∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
βkl lnxki lnxli + vi − ui (13)
where i = producer; k, l = input, 1 . . .m.
By a simultaneous one-stage estimation, the non-negative ineﬃciency compo-
nents related to the exogenous factors of ﬁrm production are given by:
ui = δ0 + δr
s∑
r=1
zri
where zi is a vector of exogenous variables that may inﬂuence the structure of pro-
duction process, such as the institutional factors (e.g. ownership, political inﬂuences,
mobility inﬂuences and F-G eﬀects), the organizational factors (e.g. salary, gross
investment as well as ﬁnancial access) and ﬁnally individual characteristics (age,
education as well as working experiences of managers in rural ﬁrms). Therefore,
we have v ∼ iidN(0, σ2v), and ui ∼ N+(δ′zri, σ2u). ui are independently distributed
but not identically distributed, as each ﬁrm will face diﬀerent exogenous variables,
which cause the mean of the normal distribution before truncation will diﬀer. In
order to obtain a consistent estimate of the intercept and the technical eﬃciency of
each practice, we assume ui follow a normal-truncated normal model. Since we later
can include more institutional factors and ﬁrm's speciﬁc relational variables in the
eﬃciency analysis, a more ﬂexible distribution of ui is thus expected.
In this case, the log-likelihood function is given as:
lnL = constant− I lnσ −
∑
i
lnΦ(−δ
′zi
σu
) +
∑
i
lnΦ(−µ
∗
i
σ∗
)− 1
2
∑
i
(i + δ
′zi)2
σ2
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where µ∗i =
σ2vδ
′zi−σ2ui
σ2
, i = vi − ui.
The technical ineﬃciency can be derived as
E(ui|i) = µ∗i + σ∗
φ(µ∗i /σ
∗)
Φ(µ∗i /σ∗)
(14)
We have further the inﬂuences of each exogenous variable on technical ineﬃciency
of the ﬁrm calculated from
∂E(ui|i)
∂zik
=
[
1 +
φ′(µ∗i /σ
∗)
Φ(µ∗i /σ∗)
− (φ(µ
∗
i /σ
∗)
Φ(µ∗i /σ∗)
)2
]
σ2v
σ2v + σ
2
u
γk (15)
Given that the mean of ui is deﬁned as δ′zi, if the coeﬃcient of an exogenous
variable is negative, the exogenous variable is then positively related to TEi, and
vice versa. The values of the exogenous determinants are listed in Table 1 as below.
The maximum likelihood estimates for all parameters of the stochastic frontier and
the ineﬃciency eﬀects model are simultaneously estimated, using R (Henningsen,
2008).
Hypothesis Testing. We use standard log likelihood ratio that approximated by
chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to number of parameter restrictions to test
the scale speciﬁcation of our model. We check for the adequacy of the chosen translog
speciﬁcation by comparing with linear speciﬁcation of Cobb-Douglas production
frontier, which has constant return to scale. Furthermore we check against the
mean response function and test for the joint signiﬁcance of the eﬃciency eﬀects
incorporated.
Monotonicity check. In order to be consistent with microeconomic theory which
requires the production function monotone increases and at least quasi-concave in
inputs. The positive marginal products with respect to all inputs and thus non-
negative elasticities guarantee the monotonicity. The condition given holds for the
translog speciﬁcation as we stated in (2) if the following equation is true for all
inputs:
∂y
∂xk
=
y
xk
∂ ln y
∂ lnxr
=
y
xr
(αk +
n∑
k=1
βkl ln(xk)) > 0
Monotonicity depends on the sign of the term in parenthesis as both y and xr
are positive. By further following the law of diminishing marginal productiveness,
marginal products besides being positive should be decreasing in inputs. This implies
the fulﬁllment of own second derivatives.
∂2y
∂x2k
= [αii + (αi − 1 +
n∑
k=1
βkl lnxl) ∗ (αi +
n∑
k=1
βkl lnxl)] ∗ (y/x2) < 0
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This depends on the nature of the terms in parenthesis and should be checked a
posteriori by using the estimated parameters for each data point. Both restrictions
(i.e.,∂y/∂xi > 0 and ∂y/∂x2i < 0) should hold at least at the point of approximation.
Quasi-concavity check. The necessary and suﬃcient condition for a speciﬁc curva-
ture consists in the semi-deﬁniteness of its bordered Hessian Matrix as the Jacobian
of the derivatives ∂y/∂xi with respect to xi: if ∇2Y (x) is negatively semi-deﬁnite,
Y is quasi-concave, where ∇2 denotes the matrix of second order partial derivation.
Henningsen (2008) designed a three-step estimation approach to impose theoretical
restrictions in stochastic frontier analysis with micEcon¡± package of open-source
software R. In order to avoid the violation of monotonicity and to obtain restricted
coeﬃcients the minimum distance estimation is to be done with the functions in R
(Henningsen and Henning, 2008).
Generalization. We ﬁrstly use value-added output to estimate the production
function. Capital and labor are measured by the ﬁxed asset value and employment
in 2007 separately. In order to test the conjecture as we referred in theoretical
argument above that the ﬁrm-government relation would have no impact on ﬁrm
eﬃciency via terms of trade, we secondly generalize the output via terms of trade
by considering ﬁrm manager's price estimation
Yi = GVi/(1 +OUTPi)− PMEi/(1 + INPi) (16)
where Yi is the ﬁrm's output, GV is gross value of output at current prices, PME is
consumption of raw materials and energy at current prices, OUTP and INP are the
scale of output price and input price estimation respectively, which are self-valued
by the manager in our survey. As it is hard to collect price data at ﬁrm level, we
use categorical price estimation from managers to normalize value-added output.
3.2 Data and variables
In order to examine how the ﬁrm-government relationship inﬂuences the economic
performance in rural area, we collected the data in three diﬀerent counties in Zhe-
jiang province, which is located at the east costal area of China. With the help
of students at economics department at Zhejiang University, we identiﬁed totally
131 rural agribusiness ﬁrms in 26 townships dispersed in three counties, Yuhang
county, Nanxun county and Xihu county. Interviews were then conducted with ﬁrm
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managers to obtain detailed information about ﬁrm-government relations, ﬁrm per-
formance as well as basic ﬁrm characteristics. Each interview lasted from 2 hours to
5 hours. Interviews with the ﬁrm's managers provided the majority of the data. To
maximize accuracy, we also collected the ﬁrm's ﬁnancial statement if possible, spoke
with managers formally and informally, and got information from local industry
bureaus, and validated the data against other published sources.
Since the use of political connections may be more widespread in rural villages
and townships, and especially, among agricultural-related ﬁrms, where more tra-
ditional forms of trading may persist (Nee and Opper, 2007), we focus only in
the agribusiness industry to avoid sector heterogenous problem. The rural ﬁrms
in the sample are from ﬁve agribusiness sub-sectors, food and snack sector(39),
fruit canned processing(14), tea, cereal and wine processing(24), meat manufactur-
ing and processing(28), agro-chemistry(26). Firms are mostly privatized, however,
many managers admitted that some local oﬃcials have personal shares in the ﬁrm.
Table 1: Descriptive Variables (N=131)
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Firm's basic statistics
LGVALUE Logged value-added output in 2007 8.217 1.257
LGCAPITAL Logged price of ﬁxed-asset in 2007 9.549 1.161
LGLABOR Logged employment in 2007 4.034 0.916
Firm-Government relations
P-HIGH Number of ties with high rank oﬃcials in local bureaus 2.962 1.931
P-LOW Number of ties with low rank oﬃcials in local bureaus 4.954 2.260
RANGE The diﬀerent groups of shareholders 2.382 1.085
CONSTRAINT The political constraint of ﬁrm manager's ego network 0.620 0.313
LGSHARE Whether the oﬃcials of local government have the shares in the ﬁrm 0.351 0.479
Manager's human capital
M-EDU Education of manager (1=high school, 5=Master degree) 2.756 0.962
M-PARTY Party member of manager(0=no, 1=yes) 0.626 0.486
M-EXP Manager's working experience (1=< 5 years, 5=>20 years) 2.687 0.852
Firm's characteristics
YEAR Age of the ﬁrm(1=0-5years, 5=> 21years) 2.802 1.041
OWNORG Original ownership status (1=TVE, 0=others) 0.435 0.498
REWARD Reward issued by local government (1=yes, 0=no) 0.343 0.477
Table (1) contains descriptive statistics and deﬁnitions for variables included
in the analysis. In order to estimate a stochastic frontier function, we chose the
dependent variables as the value-added output in real terms (LGVALUE), which is
only available in 2007. Other important inputs include capital stock (LGCAPITAL),
which is inventory value of ﬁxed assets excluding ground and buildings, and total
employment by ﬁrm (LGLABOR). Since we specify in agribusiness sector, which is
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more or less homogenous, we do not have any sub-sector classiﬁcation here.
Furthermore, we are interested in how characteristic and ﬁrm-government re-
lational variables inﬂuence the technical eﬃciency under the stochastic frontier.
First, we use the speciﬁc social rank status to conceptualize one dimension of ﬁrm-
government relations, high rank ties (HIGH-RANK), normally measured by the
manager's relation with top oﬃcials in local bureaus, and low rank ties (LOW-
RANK), which are the ties between sales manager and lower level oﬃcials in local
bureaus. Second, we consider network range (RANGE). Network range is one of
structural property of the individual actor that is proposed to inﬂuence performance.
Network range is deﬁned as the extent to which an actor's ties link with diverse oth-
ers (Burt, 1992). in our case, political network range through directors of board de-
scribes the variety of institutional groups or individuals who share the control power
and decision power of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm with a higher network range will therefore
have access to more diverse resources. We classify the shareholders network range
into seven diﬀerent categories, in which we distinguish whether the shareholders are
state-owned government, local government, foreign ﬁrms, large domestic business
groups, informal local oﬃcials, collective organizations or individuals. Third, we
specify political network constraint (CONSTRAINT) as informal network structure
indicator.5 Political network constraint applied in ﬁrm-government network por-
trays the ego's entrepreneurial opportunities and chances when the political oﬃcials
are more or less connected with each other. Fourth, we have included whether there
exist direct shareholders or indirect holders (relatives) from local governments or
local bureaus (LGSHARE), to describe the ﬁrm's formal institutional ties with local
oﬃcials.
The ﬁrm's manager's human capital factors include the following variables: the
education level of manager (M-EDU), which is illustrated by ﬁrm managers through
a ﬁve-scale measurement; the binary variable which is measure as Communist Party
membership of manager (M-PARTY), coded 1 if the manager is a party member,
0 otherwise; working experience of managers (M-EXP) is considered as one of the
important human capital variables in our survey as well. To describe the ﬁrm's basic
characteristics, we include ﬁrm's business years from birth (YEAR), ﬁrm's original
ownership status when it started to run business (OWNORG) and whether ﬁrm has
5Constraint is measured as (pij +
∑
q piqpqj)
2, q 6= i, j, where pij is the proportional strength of
q's relationship with j, as pij is the proportional strength deﬁned above of i's relation with j. The
function deﬁnes the proportion of i's network time and energy that directly or indirectly involves
j (Burt, 1992).
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received any reward from local bureaus (REWARD).
4 Empirical Findings
The correlations coeﬃcients for each variables are calculated. The individual correla-
tions between the variables do not suggest obvious problems of pairwise collinearity,
which implies the appropriateness the use of all independent variables in a regression
model. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations between the determinants and the dependent
variables as expected.
Moreover, we apply statistical hypothesis tests based on the generalized likelihood-
ratio (LR) test to select the functional form and to determine the presence of inef-
ﬁciencies. The ﬁrst test reported in Table 2 is the selection of the functional form,
where null hypothesis is that the Cobb-Douglas is an adequate representation of the
data. The LR test indicates that the Cobb-Douglas is rejected, certifying that the
more general form of the translog ﬁts this data set better. The second and third
tests are established to test the relevance of ineﬃciency eﬀects in the model and
joint eﬀects of the determinants included in the model. Both null hypotheses are
rejected, which reinforce the appropriateness of chosen translog production model.
Table 2: Generalized likelihood-ratio (LR) tests of null hypotheses
Null Hypothesis (H0) Test Statistics(χ20.95) Prob> χ
2
H0 : βij = 0, ij = 1, . . . , 2 11.01 0.0116
H0 : γ = δk = 0 35.05 0.0001
H0 : δ1, . . . , δk = 0 22.82 0.0009
In order to evaluate the extent and signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm-government relation
variables we start by specifying a translog production function, which is broadly
consistent with the exploratory analysis in the previous section. The models and
parameter estimates are shown in Table 3. In the case of value-added output, Mono-
tonicity and curvature correctness is posteriori checked for all observations: the
translog function is monotonically increasing at 131 out of 131 observations, and
the monotonicity condition was fulﬁlled for both exogenous variables, labor and
capital. Besides, this translog production function is quasi-concave at 131 out of
131 observations. In the case of generalized output, the translog function is mono-
tonically increasing at 113 out of 131 observations, and the monotonicity condition
is fulﬁlled 99% for capital and 80.8% for labor. Translog production function is
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quasi-concave at 131 out of 131 observations. We use the coeﬃcients obtained by
the minimum distance estimation (Henningsen and Henning, 2008) to fulﬁll the
monotonicity condition.
Table 3: Stochastic Frontier Estimation with social network variables
Value-added output Generalized output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LGLABOR 1.588∗∗ 1.732∗∗ 1.670∗∗ 1.705∗∗ 2.232∗∗ 2.352∗∗ 2.321∗∗ 2.562∗∗
(2.04) (2.25) (2.10) (2.05) (2.23) (2.39) (2.35) (2.49)
LGCAPITAL 0.515 0.727 0.796 0.779 -0.550 -0.220 -0.176 -0.271
(0.72) (1.03) (1.07) (1.04) (-0.56) (-0.23) (-0.18) (-0.28)
LGL2 0.112 0.0825 0.106 0.106 0.253∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(1.52) (1.13) (1.33) (1.33) (2.66) (2.05) (2.12) (2.13)
LGC2 0.0591 0.0431 0.0411 0.0428 0.159∗∗ 0.132∗ 0.131∗ 0.141∗∗
(1.13) (0.83) (0.76) (0.78) (2.24) (1.89) (1.86) (1.98)
LGL ∗ C -0.223∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.229∗∗ -0.233∗∗ -0.421∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗
(-2.27) (-2.22) (-2.28) (-2.24) (-3.29) (-3.08) (-3.10) (-3.23)
LGSHARE -0.186 -0.270∗∗ -0.352∗∗ -0.355∗∗ -0.114 -0.215 -0.272 -0.275
(-1.47) (-2.06) (-2.40) (-2.40) (-0.71) (-1.29) (-1.43) (-1.47)
RANGE -0.146∗∗ -0.133∗ -0.133∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.174∗ -0.170∗
(2.01) (1.75) (1.74) (2.01) (1.77) (1.74)
HIGH_RANK 0.0246 0.0253 0.0213 0.0242
(0.65) (0.66) (0.45) (0.52)
LOW_RANK 0.0442 0.0450 0.0220 0.0255
(1.33) (1.34) (0.56) (0.65)
CONSTRAINT 0.332∗∗ 0.215
(2.15) (1.18)
_cons -0.793 -2.058 -2.413 -2.391 2.953 1.102 0.870 0.961
(-0.30) (-0.78) (-0.87) (-0.86) (0.80) (0.30) (0.23) (0.26)
lnsig2v
_cons -2.128∗∗∗ -2.083∗∗∗ -1.933∗∗∗ -1.932∗∗∗ -1.193∗∗∗ -1.109∗∗∗ -1.052∗∗∗ -1.113∗∗∗
(-4.40) (-4.41) (-4.18) (-4.16) (-3.35) (-3.27) (-3.10) (-3.10)
lnsig2u
_cons 0.296 0.236 0.151 0.150 0.329 0.203 0.146 0.192
(1.35) (1.04) (0.59) (0.59) (1.13) (0.63) (0.42) (0.57)
N 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 131
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Column (1)-(4) display the results in which dependent variable is value-added
output, we name them normal model; column (5)-(8) display the results in which
dependent variable is generalized output, we name them generalized model. As we
have stated above, in the case of generalized output here we estimate the output
via speciﬁc terms of trade, and try to investigate whether the ﬁrm-government net-
work eﬀect directly inﬂuences the ﬁrm eﬃciency or the network indicators aﬀect the
eﬃciency via favorable terms of trade (price eﬀect).
From Table 3 we can read, the ineﬃciency tends to be smaller for ﬁrms with direct
or indirect shares from local oﬃcials. The negative sign of the estimated parameter
means that the local government oﬃcials' share in the ﬁrm increase the technical
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eﬃciency (lower the ineﬃciency). In other words, the government oﬃcials have
positive eﬀect on ﬁrm eﬃciency. The ineﬃciency parameter of political constraint
is positive and signiﬁcant, which means the informal ego-network of ﬁrm with local
oﬃcials is negatively related with ﬁrm eﬃciency. Consistent wit the ﬁndings by
Burt(1992), the contact constraints the ego's changes of investment and business
opportunities, the ﬁrm's political constraints with local oﬃcials have signiﬁcantly
aﬀected ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency. Range increase ﬁrm's eﬃciency as well, as we
have expected. The diversity of ﬁrm's shareholders does increase ﬁrm's resourceful
ability to the market, thus can help to increase ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency.
By normalizing the intermediate input price as well as output price in the out-
put, the coeﬃcients and the signiﬁcance changed dramatically on some important
parameters, as column (5)-(8) of generalized model show. The coeﬃcients of local
oﬃcials' share is still negative but insigniﬁcant, which means the direct or indi-
rect shares of local oﬃcials are insginiﬁcant if we consider ﬁrm's favorable terms
of trade, and this formal institutional connection indeed has no eﬀect on ﬁrm ef-
ﬁciency. The good connections to local government mainly imply that ﬁrms have
good access to scare inputs or to lucrative output markets, but can not translate
into technical eﬃciency. We ﬁnd the same eﬀect as the variable of CONSTRAINT.
The variable of RANGE has positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on ﬁrm eﬃciency either
in normal model or in generalized model, which means the diverged characteristics
of shareholders have positively related with ﬁrm performance. Therefore, as we have
expected, the diversity of control power and ambiguous ownership may increase the
ﬁrm's eﬃciency. Among all the ﬁrm-government network relation variables, the net-
work ranking, which is described as networks of high rank and low rank with local
oﬃcials, is insigniﬁcant, that means, the political network ranking has nothing to
do with ﬁrm eﬃciency.
In Table 4 we report the estimation results which include ﬁrm's characteristics,
human capital characteristics and ﬁrm-government relation variables as ineﬃciency
determinants. The variance parameter γ indicates whether the technical ineﬃciency
is stochastic. The value of γ explains the ineﬃciency by measuring the part of the
distance to frontier. In our estimation, the value of γ is all above 0.80, which means
the variance of the ineﬃciency eﬀect is a signiﬁcant component of the error term
variance, and ﬁrm's deviations from the optimal behavior are not only caused by
random factors. We reinforce here that the use of stochastic frontier analysis more
appropriate than the standard OLS estimation. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm manager's human
capital, like education and working experience, signiﬁcantly and positively aﬀect
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Table 4: SFA estimation with both ﬁrm characteristics and social network variables
Variables Normal output Generalized output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CONSTANT 0.56(0.22) 1.30(0.48) 1.32(0.47) 1.48(0.44)
LGLABOR 1.22(1.58) 1.41(1.74)* 1.89(1.92)* 2.00(2.33)**
LGCAPITAL 0.40(0.56) 0.24(0.33) -0.23(-0.25) -0.15(-0.17)
LGL2 0.15(2.27)** 0.16(2.41)** 0.28(3.11)*** 0.22(2.58)**
LGC2 0.06(1.21)** 0.07(1.35) 0.10(1.97)** 0.12(1.96)**
LGLC -0.22(-2.37)** -0.23(-2.43)** -0.41(-3.26)*** -0.37(-3.14)***
OWNORG 1.35(3.36)*** 1.17(2.73)*** -0.33(-0.56) -2.85(-1.93)*
M-EDU -0.54(-2.56)** -0.60(-2.65)*** -0.30(-1.16) -0.91(-1.82)*
M-PARTY -0.99(-2.44)** -1.12(-2.47)** -1.06(-1.90)* -2.27(-2.21)**
M-EXP -0.33(-1.62) -0.37(-1.64) -0.66 (-2.17)** -0.41(-1.03)
YEAR -0.22(-1.29) -0.06(-0.30) 0.40(1.20) 1.09(2.11)**
REWARD 1.16(2.92)*** 1.03(2.66)*** 0.31(0.74) -0.11(-0.55)
RANGE -1.83(-2.10)** -1.92(-2.21)**
LGSHARE -1.45(-1.90)* -1.03(-1.33)
HIGH-RANK 0.08(0.78) 0.42(0.67)
LOW-RANK -0.05(-0.61) 1.22(0.22)
CONSTRAINT 0.13(2.22)** 0.35(1.21)
σ2v 0.60(0.094) 0.39(0.0571) 0.57(0.087) 0.38(0.0604)
γ 0.900 0.843 0.889 0.810
Note 1. t statistics in parameter parentheses.
2. Standard deviation statistics in parentheses of σ2v .
ﬁrm's eﬃciency, ﬁrm manager's political aﬃliation would aﬀect ﬁrm's eﬃciency as
well. The role of party member is signiﬁcantly associated with ﬁrm performance.
We ﬁnd the ﬁrm-government relation variables have the same eﬀects as we have
discovered above.
This result is an empirical extension to Tian's initial idea (2001), which identiﬁed
external management ability as an important determinant in ﬁrm performance, and
the external management ability can help both ﬁrm and industry sector to increase
the performance. However, he didn't give an empirical methodology to testify the
role of ﬁrm-government relation, besides, he switched too quickly from micro level to
macro level without any convincing supports. We have learned from our estimation
results, while network relations to local government correspond to valuable resources
at the micro level, these do not necessarily translate into productive resources at the
macro level. At the macro level favorable market access does not necessarily correlate
with ﬁrm's eﬃciency and hence does not imply higher economic performance.
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5 Conclusion
The study of local government's role in local business is a rapidly developing ﬁeld
and has been extended to a diverse set of interpretations. This paper has challenged
the result of Tian (2001), who suggested that the external relation with local gov-
ernments may help to increase the productivity of ﬁrms at both macro and micro
level . Using the lobby theory and the social network conception, we ﬁnd that on the
contrary to Tian, the productive success at micro level of ﬁrm performance could
no more hold at the macro level. Furthermore, after deriving a micro foundation of
concept of external management ability, we suggest ﬁrm-government relation mainly
implies the favorable access to input/output markets reﬂected in ﬁrm's speciﬁc terms
of trade, which however does not increase ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency. In addition,
in accompany with the survey in Zhejiang province, we have found the signiﬁcant
role of ﬁrm-government relations played in ﬁrm's performance. The empirical result
support our conjecture that ﬁrm-government relation mainly aﬀect ﬁrm's perfor-
mance via speciﬁc terms of trade, however, at the macro level favorable market
access does not necessarily correlate with ﬁrm's eﬃciency and hence do not imply
higher economic performance.
Since we choose agribusiness industry as our sample, it is necessary to focus
on the ﬁrm-government relation model in this industry sector. In China, Dragon
head" or leading" companies are speciﬁcally deﬁned in the ﬁeld of agribusiness,
those ﬁrms are selected established or supported by government authorities in lo-
calities to contract with farmers to procure products with speciﬁc attributes. This
concept emphasizes links between farmers and processing and marketing compa-
nies to strengthen farmers relationships with the market, to raise farm incomes and
to guarantee the factors input to ﬁrms. Under the mutual contract, farmers pro-
vide labor, land and important inputs, while the dragon head company provides
seed, operating lanes, fertilizer and technical expertise. Within this system, farm-
ers have less control over the marketing process, while the agribusiness ﬁrms enjoy
both lucrative markets and close relationships with local bureaus. Almost 30% of
agribusiness ﬁrms in our interview are either county level or even provincial level
dragonhead agribusiness companies, while other 70% are either private or have fewer
network relations with local governments. The ownership structure of those drag-
onhead ﬁrms is ambiguous, take our sample as an example, although most of the
ﬁrms have strengthened their private ownership status, many ﬁrm managers admit
the strong involvement of local government in helping to organize the inputs and
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output market chances, to facilitate the investment plan, and to get easier access
to ﬁnance. The government's role may include ownership, direction, or provision of
land, facilities, credit, or subsidies. From our estimation we can conclude that the
dragonhead agribusiness model, which is heavily associated with local governments,
may not help the industry sector development at macro level.
Our major results clearly highlight that ﬁrm's network relations to local govern-
ment have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on ﬁrm's economic performance. However,
while ﬁrm's relations to local government clearly improve access to scare inputs or
to lucrative output markets and hence increase ﬁrm's economic performance via fa-
vorable individual terms of trades, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of these relations on ﬁrm's
technical eﬃciency has been found. Therefore, in the contrast to existing litera-
ture it has been concluded that ﬁrm-government relations increase ﬁrm¡¯' economic
performance at the micro level, but not necessarily at the macro level. This nega-
tive result follows straightforwardly from our quantitative analyses, indicating that
improved market access of individual ﬁrms does generally not translate into an in-
creased overall eﬃciency of a sector.
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SUMMARY
Summary
Over the last decades, China's GDP has achieved outstandingly high economic
growth rate in the world. Various scholars highlight special institutional frame-
work conditions, particularly the role of local government as a key factor explaining
China's economic success. The patterns and eﬀects of relations between politics and
business have long been discussed. Diﬀerent arguments are introduced from macro
and micro perspectives to investigate the inﬂuences of local governments in local
economy. There are generally two mechanisms: market-preserving federalism by
Weingast, which implies hard budget constraint" and denotes that the decentral-
ization can be understood as commitment device" from the central government to
local governments; Tian emphasizes the role of local government as public manager"
from micro perspective, ﬁrms are able to get access to limited resources and lucrative
output markets via external management ability with local governments. However,
there hardly exists a common consistent analysis, which theoretically and empir-
ically explains the role of the local government in ﬁrm's market transactions and
economic performance. This PhD thesis mainly employs extensive data collected in
Zhejiang province of China in interviews with managers of TVEs (Township and vil-
lage Enterprises), government oﬃcials, and academics, to analyze the structure and
eﬀects of network relationship between rural ﬁrms and rural administrative oﬃces
in China.
The dissertation develops a comprehensive theoretical framework which concerns
the impact of institutional framework on economic performance at the micro and
macro level. After extensively examining the existing literature, the conception of
ﬁrm-government network relations and strategic alliances as external management
resources is operationalized by applying social capital and social network analy-
sis. At the methodological level it integrates quantitative network methodologies
with advanced micro-econometric analyses of ﬁrm production (stochastic frontier
approach) to systematically study the impacts of ﬁrm-government network relations
on ﬁrm's economic performance in China. In particular, by using a unique own
survey of agribusiness ﬁrms a comprehensive and theoretically founded econometric
analysis of the impact of ﬁrm-government relations on economy performance at the
micro and macro level has been conducted.
Major results of the dissertation clearly highlight that ﬁrm's network relations
to the local government have a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect on ﬁrm's economic
performance. However, while ﬁrm's relations to the local government clearly im-
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prove the access to scarce inputs or to lucrative output markets and hence increase
ﬁrm's economic performance via favorable individual terms of trades, no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of these relations on ﬁrm's technical eﬃciency has been found. Therefore, in
contrast to the existing literature it has been concluded that ﬁrm-government rela-
tions increase ﬁrm's economic performance at the micro level, but not necessarily
at the macro level. This negative result follows straightforwardly from the analyses,
since improved market access of individual ﬁrms does generally not translate into
an increased overall eﬃciency of a sector. It can be further concluded that each ﬁrm
competes for the better access to resources is normally similar to the subvention
payment, a Pareto optimal allocation cannot be achieved, and therefore, a social
waste in the sector is generated.
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Zusammenfassung
In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat China ein beeindruckendes Wirtschaftswachstum er-
reicht. Zur Erklärung dieser enormen Wirtschaftsleistung eines sozialistischen Sys-
tems, das China bis heute ist, werden in der Literatur die speziellen institutionellen
Rahmenbedingungen in China, insbesondere die Rolle der lokalen Regierung als Pro-
moter der Wirtschaft, diskutiert. Dabei gibt es verschiedene Makro- bzw. Mikrothe-
orien, die die Rolle der lokalen Regierungen hinsichtlich der Eﬃzienz der lokalen
Wirtschaft zu erklären versuchen. Auf der einen Seite ist hier die Makrotheorie
des Market Preserving Federalism" von Weingast zu nennen, wobei Weingast eine
stärkere Dezentralisierung von der nationalen zu den lokalen Regierungen als ein
commitment device" versteht, das unter anderem ein hard budget constraint" im-
pliziert. Alternativ hebt Tian die Rolle der lokalen Regierung als Public Manager"
auf der Mikroebene hervor, der über externe Management-Qualitäten verfügt, die
im sozialistischen System den Zugang zu knappen Ressourcen sowie lukrativen Ab-
satzmärkten ermöglichen. Allerdings gibt es bisher weder eine umfassende theoretis-
che Analyse, die die Rolle der lokalen Regierung hinsichtlich des Marktzugangs und
der wirtschaftlichen Leistung der Unternehmen erklärt, noch gibt es entsprechende
empirische Analysen, die die Bedeutung der Firm-Government-Relation zwischen
lokaler Regierung und Unternehmen quantitativ analysiert.
In diesem Zusammenhang liefert die Dissertation am Beispiel ländlicher Re-
gionen in der Provinz Zhejiang eine umfassende empirische Analyse der Bedeu-
tung von Firm-Government Relations für die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit von
Agribusinessunternehmen auf der Mikroebene und deren makroökonomische Im-
plikationen. Ausgangspunkt der empirischen Analysen ist eine auf der Grund-
lage der bestehenden Literatur durchgeführte theoretische Analyse der Bedeutung
der Netzwerkbeziehungen zwischen lokaler Regierung und lokalen Unternehmen auf
der Mikro- und Makro Ebene. Methodisch wurde die quantitative Netzwerkanal-
yse mit mikroökonometrischen Schätzverfahren der stochastischen Frontier-Analyse
verbunden, indem Netzwerkindikatoren, die die individuellen Firm-Government-
Beziehungen beschreiben, als Determinante der technischen Eﬃzienz und des Mark-
tzugangs individueller Agribusinessunternehmen verwendet wurden.
Zentrale Ergebnisse der Analysen sind, dass Netzwerkbeziehungen zu der lokalen
Regierung eine bedeutende und positive Auswirkung auf die wirtschaftliche Leis-
tung von Agribusinessunternehmen ausüben. Allerdings führen diese Beziehungen
im Wesentlichen zu einer signiﬁkanten Verbesserung des Zugangs zu Input- und
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Outputmärkten und erhöhen somit die wirtschaftliche Leistung der Unternehmen
aufgrund verbesserter Terms of Trade, während hinsichtlich der technischen Ef-
ﬁzienz individueller Unternehmen keine signiﬁkante Wirkung der Netzwerkbeziehun-
gen nachgewiesen werden konnte. Entsprechend konnte im Gegensatz zu der beste-
henden Literatur insgesamt geschlussfolgert werden, dass Firm-Government-Relations
zwar die ökonomische Performanz individueller Unternehmen auf der Mikroebene er-
höhen, aber dies nicht unmittelbar zu einer Eﬃzienzsteigerung des gesamten Sektors
auf der Makroebene führt. Dieses zunächst überraschende (kontraintuitive) Ergeb-
nis folgt unmittelbar aus den empirischen Schätzergebnissen, da ein verbesserter
Marktzugang einzelner Unternehmen analog zu Subventionszahlungen in der Regel
nicht zu einer Pareto-optimalen Allokation knapper Ressourcen, sondern zu einer
intrasektoralen Wettbewerbsverzerrung führt.
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A List of Sample ﬁrms
County ID Firm Sector
Yuhang E01 Jiamei Touring Nutrition Foods CO.,LTD Snacks
Yuhang E02 Shenwang Food Co., LTD Snacks
Yuhang E03 Wangwang Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E04 Shun Feng Xiang Food Inc. Food and snacks
Yuhang E05 Peng Fei food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E06 Zhong ren food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E07 Chaoshan Fruits ﬁrm Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E08 Yi Jiangnan Tea Co., LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E09 Yinquan Tea Co., LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E10 Jiuyi Food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E11 Yuhang Slaughtering Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E12 Mingbao Food Co., LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E13 Yaotaitai Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E14 Dawang Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E15 Huaweiheng Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E16 Changle Can Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E17 Yimin Food Co. LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E18 Wanlong Meat Products Co., LTD Meat processing
Yuhang E19 Yiwan Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E20 Dalu Tea Company Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E21 Songtian Food Co., LTD Meat processing
Yuhang E22 Lifemate Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E23 Mingzhou Food Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E24 Meiyuan Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E25 Xingting Tea Co., LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E26 Guoda Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E27 Cangqian Jiahe Cereals & oils processing Factory Cereals processing
Yuhang E28 Yajia Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E29 Meihua Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E30 Henghua Food Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E31 Kehuang Feedstuﬀ Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E32 Lingxin Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E33 Jingu Wine Co., LTD Cereal processing
Yuhang E34 Dayunhe Aquatic Feedstuﬀs Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E35 Maidier Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E36 Mingzhu Animal Health Care Products Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E37 Baxian poultry husbandry Enterprise Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E38 Huaying Sheep Farming Enterprise Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E39 Shenwang Food Co., LTD Snacks
Yuhang E40 Wangwang Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E41 Shun Feng Xiang Food Inc. Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E42 Peng Fei food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E43 Zhong ren food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E44 Chaoshan Fruits ﬁrm Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E45 Yi Jiangnan Tea Co., LTD Tee processing
Yuhang E46 Yinquan Tea Co., LTD Tee manufacture and processing
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Yuhang E47 Jiuyi Food company Food and snacks
Yuhang E48 Yuhang Slaughtering Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E49 Mingbao Food Co., LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Yuhang E50 Yaotaitai Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E51 Dawang Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Yuhang E52 Huaweiheng Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E53 Changle Can Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E54 Yimin Food Co. LTD Fruit canned processing
Yuhang E55 Wanlong Meat Products Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Yuhang E56 Yiwan Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Yuhang E57 Dalu Tea Company Tea manufacture and processing
Nanxun H01 Lin fu fei Chemical material Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H02 De taishun Meat Processing Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H03 Yaji Agribusiness Processing Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H04 Mayao Yongfeng Meat Processing Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H05 Fangyuan Meat Processing Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H06 Greatwall Meat Processing Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H07 Zhongwei Chemical material Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H08 Kang falai dried vegetables Fruit and vegetables canned processing
Nanxun H09 Jinniu Nongzhuang Co., LTD Meat manufacture
Nanxun H10 Feixiang Cereal processing enterprise Cereal processing
Nanxun H11 Zhongcheng Co., LTD Cereal processing
Nanxun H12 Lianshi Wine enterprise Wine manufacture
Nanxun H13 Sanling Feestuﬀ Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H14 Tianhu Aquatic feedstuﬀ Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H15 Make Shipai Meat Manufacturing Enterprise Meat manufacture
Nanxun H16 Chengxiang Group Meat processing
Nanxun H17 Shenhao Agri processing Co.,LTD Meat processing
Nanxun H18 Dongfang Food Co.,LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H19 Xintianzi Conditioner Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H20 Maoye Food Co.,LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H21 Tianhu Aquatic feedstuﬀ Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H22 Tianwang Group Food and snacks
Nanxun H23 Huajin Kang Co., LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Nanxun H24 Zhenlu bio-chemistry Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H25 Jinsheng Feedstuﬀ Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H26 Huanghu Tee manufacture Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Nanxun H27 Xinliang Cereals & oils processing Factory Cereals processing
Nanxun H28 Tainian Agro-chemistry Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H29 Changxing Feedstuﬀ Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H30 Yuansheng Agribusiness and trade Co., LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H31 Wushun Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H32 Qinya Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H33 Caishi Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H34 Yixin Food Co.,LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H35 Zhongtian Agro-chemistry Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Nanxun H36 Yuhua Food Co., LTD Meat manufacture
Nanxun H37 Runchang Food Co., LTD Meat processing
Nanxun H38 Huayu Meat processing factor Meat processing
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Nanxun H39 Huacheng Agribusiness and trade Co., LTD Food and snacks
Nanxun H40 Guoda Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H41 Nanfeng Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H42 Linghu Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H43 Yangshi Food Co.,LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H44 Huajing Fruit processing Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H45 Dongxing Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H46 Changsheng Food Co., LTD Fruit canned processing
Nanxun H47 Rongshun Meat processing factor Meat processing
Xihu X01 Shuntian Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X02 Baizhuang Tea Company Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X03 Baoli Bio-chemistry Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X04 Hongda Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Xihu X05 Gushi Tea Company Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X06 Yufeng Tea Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X07 Aifa Garten Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X08 Shengsheng Tea Company Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X09 Falai Bio-chemistry Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X10 Fucheng Meat processing Co.,LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Xihu X11 Tianyi Meat processing Co.,LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Xihu X12 Huijia fengmu Bio-chemistry Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X13 Jiangxue Aquatic Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X14 Jinwu Tea Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X15 Yaou Group Meat manufacture
Xihu X16 Shengyi Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X17 Jinjiang Tea Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X18 Changming Bio-chemistry Co.,LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X19 Huanke processing Co.,LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Xihu X20 Linshan Fruit processing Co.,LTD Fruit canned processing
Xihu X21 Dibang Aquatic Feedstuﬀ Technology Co., LTD Agro-chemistry
Xihu X22 Anxi Tea Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
Xihu X23 Weili Meat slaughtering and processing Co.,LTD Meat manufacture and processing
Xihu X24 Ruyuan Food Co., LTD Food and snacks
Xihu X25 Zhengzhu Food Co.,LTD Food and snacks
Xihu X26 Wensheng Food Co.,LTD Food and snacks
Xihu X27 Longwu Tea Co.,LTD Tea manufacture and processing
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B Questionnaire
Note 1. The following questionnaire was designed in 2008, and was conducted by
the collaboration work between Zhejiang University and Kiel University.
2. Since most of the ﬁrms did not report any information on ﬁrm-ﬁrm relations
(C10-C12), we had very few information on this proposed question. We did not get
any empirical facts regarding the ﬁrm-ﬁrm relationship.
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Basic characteristics of Rural firms in China (Questionnaire) 
Firm:
Name of interviewer Partner:
Village/ Township/ Province:
Address:
Tel/ Fax
=================================================================================
All information will be kept confidential and anonymous, and the result is only used for academic research. 
=================================================================================
Part A: General Questions
A1. What the property rights does the business currently have/ and when it was registered?
Registered Now Ownership
  Private (individual)
  State-owned
  Township and Village Enterprise (TVE)
 
Foreign-invested
* If foreign: What proportion of your 
organisation’s capital do they own?
  Limited partnership
  Limited Joint-stock Company
  Limited liability Company
A2. Please specify your enterprise’s leading products or services
Leading products or services Other products
A3. Please indicate the how long (years) your firm has originally operated.
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >21
    
A4. Please indicate the workforce situation of your business in 2007.
Number % local residents % seasonal workers Average monthly wage
Employee
- managers
- white collar
- blue collar
Manager’s Profile
NO.
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A5. Please indicate which age group you are in:
18-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-60
    
A6. Please indicate the stage at which you completed your formal education.
Junior school or 
below 
Senior school/ 
technical school
College 
Degree
Bachelor 
Degree
Master 
Degree
PhD or 
higher
     
A7. What is your position in the firm? (Check all apply)
Owner CEO Vice-manager Sales manager Others
    
Yes No
A8. Are you a party member?  
      Are you a member of People’s Congress? *specify the level  
      Are you the member of the industry association?  
A9. Please indicate years of work experience in your current profession.
0-5 6-12 13-20 21-30 >31
    
Part B: Economic and Accountancy Data Description
B1. Input and Output price Estimation. 
10-20% 
lower
10 – 5% 
lower
< 5% 
lower Average
>5% 
higher
5-10% 
higher
10-20% 
higher
The price level of main product 
your firm achieves compared to 
the average market price level is       
The price level of input product 
your firm achieves compared to 
the average market price level is       
B2. Could you estimate the scale of input/ output price fluctuation last year?
Input price fluctuation Very little Little Moderate Large Very large
    
Output price fluctuation Very little Little Moderate Large Very large
    
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B3. Could you compare your firms' current performance with those of close competitors in your region on a 
five-point scale?
Lowest 20% Lowest 10% Average Highest 10% Highest 20%
Total asset growth     
After-tax return on total sales     
Labor productivity     
Market share     
B4. Describe how easy it is for you to access to the following factor resources?
Very difficult Difficult Medium Easy Very Easy
Inputs     
Outputs(Sales)     
Financial access (Credit)     
B5. Could you estimate the total production costs that are generated from the main business (Yuan)? 
Category 2007
Total costs
Among which: Law material costs
Energy and transportation costs
Costs for social activities
B6. Could you estimate the following value generated from the main business (Yuan)? 
Category 2007
Net value of fixed assets
Value-added Output
Value of Bank loans
B7. Could you describe the sales in 2007?
Product Sales Revenue(Yuan)
Demographic percentage of sales
Local Provincial National International
Part C. Network Questions
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Firm-Government Relationship
C1. Could you estimate your firm's strategy for dealing with the local government.
No contact A few administrative contacts
Some resource 
dependency contacts
Some investment 
contacts Business partner
    
C2. Check the arguments below.
Strongly 
disagree Disagree
Partly 
agree Agree
Strongly 
agree
a. Relation with both officials and business partners 
is the most essential factor for success in business.     
b. Failing to cultivate those relations with officials 
has a significant effect on enterprise performance.     
c. Local government still controls the resource of 
business activities.     
d. Governments still have control power over input 
or output price.     
e. I have complete faith in the integrity of the 
government department.     
f. The local government would try to gain 
advantages over my business.     
g. Compared to the beginning of the reform era, it is 
now more difficult to gain favorable treatment 
through personal relation with officials.     
h. I would support the development of the local 
economy in any case.     
i. I have thought to move to other regions to expand 
the business.     
j. It is easier to get credit or loans from financial 
institute through personal relationship with 
government.     
C3. Can you tell the supporting/regulation program you have received from local government?
Tax 
reduction
Rent 
reduction
Employment 
support
Administrative 
support
Product 
Reward
Supporting program     
License labor Environment Trade Tax
Regulation program     
C4. In the following, please tell the over the last six months, administration-related contacts from whom you 
regularly keep in touch with for business (maximum 10)?
For the managers, please fill in the right column of “Manager's Assessment”, for others, please fill in the left 
column of “other assessment”. STR is defined as close friends or family members with whom you have close 
relation and frequent social contact, WEK is defined as acquaintances or administrative partners with whom 
you have some social activities, like applying for the licenses, tax issues or other presences at conference held 
by specific organizations. 
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List of political bureaus in local area
Manager's Assessment Other Assessment
List of government bureaus STR WEK STR WEK
C1 County government    
C2 County Economic and development Bureau    
C3 County development and reform Bureau    
C4 County Land and resources Bureau    
C5 County Environment protection Bureau    
C6 County Technology Bureau    
C7 County Industry and Commerce Bureau    
C8 County Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision    
C9 County Construction Bureau    
C10 County Economic development Area Association    
C11 County Agriculture promoted Bureau    
C12 County Food and Drug Administration Bureau    
C13 County Tax Bureau    
C14 County Economic and Trade Bureau    
C15 County personal and labor Bureau    
T1 Township Government    
T2 Township Bureaus    
B1 Commercial banks, local branch    
B2 Private financial institutes    
B3 Rural credit cooperatives    
C5. Please recall the last informal dinner, at which the local officers or assistance from local bureaus took part 
in as well. Could you estimate when did it take place?
In 3 days In a week In 2-3 weeks In a month More than a month
    
C6. Could you write down the initial names of the officers at table? Please indicate in which level of 
government the officers or assistance work for.
List of officers Level of Government Strong/weak
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
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10
C7 Could you estimate the links between the officers or assistances based on your own experiences? Just 
indicate 1 if they are very familiar with each other, indicate 0 if they do not have ties or you do not know the 
relationship among them.
1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10
Yes No
C8-1. Do local government officials have direct shares in your firm?  
C8-2. Do the relatives of local government officials have shares in your firm?  
C9. Describe shortly about the diversity of shareholders (For example, their industry). 
Firm-Firm Relationship
C10 Trustworthy on suppliers and customers.
Very trustworthy Not at all
Do you trust your suppliers?       
Do you trust your customers?       
Yes No
C11. Are you belong to a business group or do you control some other firms as a business group?  
C12. Over the last six months, are there any business-related contacts with whom you regularly did business 
and kept negotiation relations? Write down the name of each firm. Start with the one you have to keep highest 
frequency relation. Write down the attributes of the named firms. In the cell of “Characteristics”, please answer 
whether the firm is supplier, customer, competitor or others; in the cell of “location”, please write down the 
general region/county the partner is in; in the cell of “year of partnership”, please indicate the total years you 
and your partners keep in touch with each other.  
List of firm partners Characteristics Location Year of Partnership
1
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Please describe the relations between the firms you have named above, and the code are stand for: 
D: Distant relation. Firms or persons are total strangers or never trade.
C: Close relationship.
E: Especially close relationship.
1
2 D C E 2
3 D C E D C E 3
4 D C E D C E D C E 4
5 D C E D C E D C E D C E 5
6 D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E 6
7 D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E 7
8 D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E 8
9 D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E 9
10 D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E D C E
===================================================================================
Thanks again for you cooperation!
===================================================================================
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